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There are two well-worn arguments against a severe punishment like
long-term incarceration: it is disproportionate /o /"e o##ender’s Frongdoing
and an inefficient use of state resources. This Article considers a third
response, one which penal reformers and theorists have radically neglected,
even though it is recognized in the law: the punishment is degrading. In
considering penal degradation, this Article examines what judges and
scholars have deemed the exemplar of degrading treatment—torture. What
is torture, and why is it wrong to torture people? If we can answer this
question, this Article maintains, then we can understand when and why
certain punishments—like perhaps long-term incarceration—are
impermissibly degrading, regardless of their proportionality or social utility
otherwise.
This Article develops an original theory of torture. It argues that torture
is the intentional infliction of a suffusive panic and that its central wrongness
is the extreme disrespect i/ de5ons/ra/es /oFard a -i$/i5’s $a3a$i/E /o realiCe
value. Humans realize value diachronically, stitching moments together
through time to construct a good life as a whole. Torture takes such a being,
one with a past and a future, and via the infliction of amake it stop right now
3ani$, $on-er/s "er in/o a >s"rillE s2.ealing 3igle/ a/ sla.g"/er,, in Jean
154rE’s Fords, restricting her awareness to a maximally terrible present.
The Article then considers what this theory of torture means for our
understanding of degradation more generally. It argues that punishment is
impermissibly degrading, regardless of our other penal considerations, when
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and incisive comments on multiple drafts, I am indebted to Nicola Lacey and Peter Ramsay. I
am also extremely grateful to Lindsay Farmer, John Goldberg, Martha Minow, Carmel
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i/ reIe$/s an o##ender’s s/a/.s as a ".5an: Punishment reaches this threshold
7E de5ons/ra/ing /"a/ /"e o##ender’s li#e-building capacity—the very basis of
his humanity—is completely absent or fundamentally worthless. To so
thoroughly deny so5eone’s -al.e, e-en so5eone F"o "as $o55i//ed a
heinous crime, violates the liberal commitment to human inviolability. The
Article closes by suggesting that long-term incarceration rejects an
o##ender’s s/a/.s as a ".5an, and is /"ere#ore on a 3ar Fi/" 3enal /or/.re,
given that removing someone from free society for decades makes it
exceedingly difficult for him to construct a good life as a whole.
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INTRODUCTION
There are two well-worn arguments against a severe punishment like
long-term incarceration: it is disproportionate )/ )NT /QQT0UT+6* o+/0OU/M0O
and an inefficient use of state resources. This Article considers a third
response, one which penal reformers and theorists have radically neglected,
even though it is recognized in the law: the punishment is degrading.1
"Tl/0U PUTO+rUM0Oh: /)NT+ +TJT'r0) rULTW)M'T* M0WJ(UTh r) JTr*)h PW+(TJh:
PM0N(1r0h: PM0N(1r0Th:2 Pqr+qr+MWh: r0U Pq+()rJf: There is considerable
overlap between these terms, however, and we ought to conceive of the
reasons that oppose such punishments as a unified or general category.3 PYou
$anno/ do /"a/ /o a ".5an 7eing, captures the ideal in broad brush. Let us
+TQT+ )/ )NM* Wr)TO/+l /Q *T0)T0WM0O W/0*MUT+r)M/0* r* PUTO+rUr)M/0
JM1M)r)M/0*f:
1 See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHRt j-+/NMqM)M0O )/+)(+T r0U PW+(TJh M0N(1r0h /+ UTO+rUM0O: )+Tr)1T0) /+
punishment); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR] (same); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR] (same); American Convention on Human Rights art. 5(2), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 143 (same); S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 12(1)(d)-(e) (same); Bundesverfassung
[BV][Constitution] Apr. 18, 1999 SR 101, art. 10, para. 3 (Switz.) (same); U.S. CONST. amend.
4^^^ j-+/NMqM)M0O PW+(TJ r0U (0(*(rJ: -(0M*N1T0)i% N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 5 (same); Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 12, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B
to the Canada Act 1982, c 11 (U.K.) (same); TEX. CONST. art. 1, § IF j-+/NMqM)M0O PW+(TJ or
(0(*(rJ: -(0M*N1T0)i jT1-Nr*M* rUUTUi% CONSTITUI! eZO FEDERAL [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 5
(III) (Braz.) (prohibiting torture and PM0N(1r0 /+ UTO+rUM0O: treatment); New Zealand Bill of
<MON)* #W) I@@ch * @ jXfvfi j-+/NMqM)M0O )/+)(+T r0U PW+(TJh UTO+rUM0Oh /+ UM*-+/-/+)M/0r)TJl
*T'T+T: )+Tr)1T0t or punishment.); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 16, § 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S.
AD uNT+TM0rQ)T+ !#9t jPbrWN ;)r)T =r+)l *NrJJ (0UT+)rKT )/ -+T'T0) M0 r0l )T++M)/+l (0UT+ its
jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not
amount to torture as defined . . . :if
2 See Jeremy Waldron, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment: The Words Themselves, 23
CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 269, 278–79 (2010) (r+O(M0O )Nr) PM0N(1r0T: )+Tr)1T0) M* UM*)M0W) Q+/1
r0U 1MJUT+ )Nr0 PM0N(1r0: )+Tr)1T0)if
3 For attempts to parse the meanings of the various terms, see Waldron, id. and John
Vorhaus, On Degradation. Part One: Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
31 COMMON L.WORLDREV. 374 (2002). But see Ribitsch v. Austria, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
GC jI@@Di j1rKM0O r QM0UM0O /Q PM0N(1r0 r0U UTO+rUM0O: )+Tr)1T0) oM)N/() UM*)M0O(M*NM0O
between the two terms); Tomasi v. France, 241 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 7 (1992) (same).
426 BRONSTHER [Vol. 109
This Article examines penal degradation from the inside out. It looks
to the exemplar of degrading treatment and punishmentStortureSand
considers what it might teach us about degradation more generally. What is
torture, and why is it wrong to torture people? If we can answer this question,
this Article maintains, then we can understand when and why certain
punishmentsSlike perhaps long-term incarcerationSare impermissibly
degrading, regardless of their proportionality or social utility otherwise.
Justice Brennan endorses this method in Furman v. Georgia.4 He writes
that the P-+M1r+l -+M0WM-JT: ql oNMWN )NT ;(-+T1T !/(+) r**T**T* oNT)NT+ a
-(0M*N1T0) M* PW+(TJ r0U (0(*(rJ: M* oNT)NT+ M) M* PUTO+rUM0O )/ N(1r0
UMO0M)l:%5 r0U NT UTT1* P)/+)(+/(* -(0M*N1T0): )/ qT )NT Pparadigm
'M/Jr)M/0 /Q )NM* -+M0WM-JTf:6 Further, prohibitions on degrading punishment
are often grouped together with prohibitions on torture in resolutions,
treaties, and constitutions.7 For instance, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
both provide: PX/ /0T *NrJJ qT *(qLTW)TU )/ )/+)(+T /+ )/ W+(TJh M0Numan, or
UTO+rUM0O )+Tr)1T0) /+ -(0M*N1T0)f:8 Drafters and signatories seem to have
understood that both prohibitionsS(a) no torture and (b) no cruel, inhuman
or degrading punishmentSimplicate the same set of considerations. With
such jurisprudence in mind, Jeremy Waldron writes:
[T]he prohibition on torture is a point of reference to which we return over and over
again in articulating legally what is wrong with cruel punishment or distinguishing a
punishment that is cruel from one that is not: We do not equate cruelty with torture, but
we use torture to illuminate our rejection of cruelty.9
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the relationship
qT)oTT0 PM0)T+0rJ: -(0M*N1T0) JM1M)r)M/0* r0U UTO+rUr)M/0 JM1M)r)M/0*f
4 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 281–82 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
5 Id. at 281.
6 Id.
7 See supra note 1 (providing examples of legal texts that join prohibitions on degrading
punishment and torture).
8 UDHR, supra note 1, at art. 5; ICCPR, supra note 1, at art. 7.
9 Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1738 (2005). Waldron argues that the prohibition on torture represents
r PJTOrJ r+WNT)l-T:? Pr -r+)MW(Jr+ -+/vision in a system of norms which has a significance
going beyond its immediate normative content, a significance stemming from the fact that it
*(1* (- /+ 1rKT* 'M'MU )/ (* )NT -/M0)h -(+-/*Th -+M0WM-JTh /+ -/JMWl /Q r oN/JT r+Tr /Q Jrof:
Id. at 1723. DavMU [(qr0 Tm)T0U* 3rJU+/06* MUTrh r+O(M0O )Nr) )NT -+/NMqM)M/0 /0 )/+)(+T M* r
moral r* oTJJ r* r JTOrJ r+WNT)l-Th *M0WT P)NT -+/NMqM)M/0 WJ/*TJl W/00TW)* oM)N /)NT+ 'rJ(T*
that the world has come to regard as fundamentalSfundamental concepts of human dignity,
N(1r0 T,(rJM)lh r0U )NT +TLTW)M/0 /Q )/)rJ U/1M0r)M/0 /Q */1T -T/-JT ql /)NT+*f: DAVID
LUBAN, TORTURE, POWER, AND LAW 125 (2014). Luban concludes that torture represents an
Pr+WNT)l-T /Q T'MJf: Id. at 112.
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Internal limitations demand that we pursue our positive penal aims, like
+T)+Mq()M/0 /+ UT)T++T0WTh oM)N P-+/-/+)M/0rJM)l: /+ P-r+*M1/0lf: Part I
demonstrates that internal and degradation limitations are relatively distinct.
A punishment may be a proportional and parsimonious means of securing
retribution or deterrence, while nonetheless being impermissibly degrading.
Part II examines both the legal and the most prominent philosophical
conceptions of torture. It argues that the legal conception of tortureSthe
intentional inflictM/0 /Q P*T'T+T -rM0 /+ *(QQT+M0O:Sis far too broad.10
Physical assault often constitutes the intentional infliction of severe pain or
suffering, for instance, but only rarely does it amount to torture. Part II then
considers the work of philosophers Henry Shue and David Sussman, arguing
that they, too, fail to capture what is normatively special about torture. Shue
W/0WTM'T* /Q )/+)(+T r* Pr0 r**r(J) (-/0 )NT UTQT0*TJT**f:11 As such, he
cannot explain the qualitative difference between shouting at or slapping
someone in custody and running electricity through his body or
waterboarding him. All are assaults on the defenseless, but only the latter
are torture. Sussman, meanwhile, argues that torture is unique in that the
'MW)M16* /o0 q/Ulh rQQTW)*h r0U T1/)M/0* r+T (*TU rOrM0*) NM1h *(WN )Nr) NT
M* PrW)M'TJl W/1-JMWM) M0 NM* /o0 'M/Jr)M/0f:12 By forcing the victim to face
his own pain, the torturer forces the victim to face himself, Sussman argues.
However, if someone is complicit in this way when he responds to tortuous
pain, he is also complicit when he responds to (a) non-tortuous pain, like that
associated with very moderate arm-twisting and (b) certain non-painful
instances of coercion, as in a blackmail case where the victim faces his own
desire to keep his homosexuality private. Given that very moderate arm-
twisting and blackmail are not torture, Sussman has not identified what is
distinctive about torture.
With the ground thus cleared, Parts III and IV present an original theory
of torture and degradation. I argue that disrespect is the metric of
degradation, and that the central wrongness of torture is the egregious
disrespect it demonstrates toward a victim. Joseph Raz explains that
P+T*-TW): W/0*)M)()T* )NT r--+/-+Mr)T +T*-/0*T )/ )NT -+T*T0WT /Q 'rJ(Tf13 To
respect something involves aiding or at least not interfering with the
possibility of its exhibition of value, as well as potentially expressing or
10 See, e.g., CAT, supra note 1, at art. 1, ¶ I jPu9t/+)(+T 1Tr0* r0l rW) ql oNMWN *T'T+T
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as . . . :if
11 Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124, 130 (1978).
12 David Sussman, %"a/’s %rong Fi/h Torture? 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 1, 4 (2005).
13 JOSEPHRAZ, VALUE, RESPECT, ANDATTACHMENT 160–76 (2001).
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honoring its value in a symbolic manner.14 a/JJ/oM0O <rk6* J/OMWh oT Wr0
appreciate how pouring water on a beautiful sandcastle disrespects the
*r0UWr*)JT6* 'rJ(Th oNMJT -/(+M0O or)T+ /0 r -Jr0)h OT0T+rJJlh +T*-TW)* )NT
-Jr0)6* 'rJ(TSwith the understanding that such things have value insofar as
people might engage with them meaningfully. The demands of respect thus
depend on what the object of respect actually does to exhibit value, on the
P1TWNr0M*1: /Q M)* 'rJ(T TmNMqM)M/0h r0U )NT orl* M0 oNMWN /(+ rW)M/0* NTJ-
or hinder the working of that mechanism. To apply this logic to human
beings directlySand thus to understand what respecting or disrespecting a
person meansSwe need an understanding of what humans do, exactly, to
exhibit value.
I argue that human beings exhibit value through their meta-capacity for
practical reasonSthe combination of their capacities for autonomy, value-
recognition, memory, and imaginationSwhich enables them to stitch
moments together through time to construct a good life as a whole. Humans
are diachronic creatures with pasts and futures of their own construction to a
significant degree. They live through (dia) time (chronos). They are capable
0/) /0Jl /Q T0L/lM0O P1/1T0)r+l O//U*h: JMKT MWT W+Tr1 W/0T*h q() rJ*/ /Q
rWNMT'M0O P)T1-/+rJ O//U*h: oNMWN +T,(M+T W(J)M'r)M/0 )N+/(ON )M1T )/ qT
realized, things like maintaining families, careers, and friendships. While
suffering, in the bare sense of an aversive or unpleasant experience, may play
a role in the production of temporal goods, as with the suffering involved
with certain forms of professional training, I argue that humans retain the
capacity to generate disvalue, which constitutes merely wanton suffering.
With this conception of human value in mind, I conclude that torture is
the archetype of disrespect for a person and her special capacities for
generating value and disvalue. After examining a number of first-hand
accounts of torture victims, I define torture as the intentional infliction of a
suffusive panic. I then argue that torture, by inflicting a make it stop right
now -r0MWh jri W/1-JT)TJl NrJ)* )NT 'MW)M16* 'rJ(T-generating capacities, as
she loses the thread of her diachronic identity and (b) maximizes her capacity
for disvalue, with her consciousness saturated with suffering. Torture is thus
perverse from the perspective of respecting human value. It takes a being
capable of living broadly and purposefully through time and, via the
M0QJMW)M/0 /Q r *(QQ(*M'T -r0MWh W/0'T+)* NT+ M0)/ r P*N+MJJl *,(TrJM0O -MOJT) r)
*Jr(ON)T+h: M0 ]Tr0 #1p+l6* o/+U*h restricting her awareness to a maximally
terrible present.15
14 Id.
15 JEANAMÉRY, AT THEMIND6S LIMITS: CONTEMPLATIONS BY A SURVIVOR ONAUSCHWITZ
AND ITSREALITIES 35 (Sidney Rosenfeld & Stella P. Rosenfeld trans., Indiana University Press
1980).
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Certain forms of torture, however, are yet more disrespectful than
others, depending on the degree to which they risk long-term psychological
or physical damage. In this way, disrespect is on a spectrum, with torture for
an eternitySsuffusive panic foreverSat the very top. Treatment can be less
disrespectful than this, however, and still be impermissibly degrading. But
where exactly on the spectrum of disrespect shall the dispositive line be
drawn, beyond which we would say that such treatment is impermissible as
a form of state punishment in the United States, regardless of the severity of
the offense or of how useful it might be treat the offender in such a manner?
`M'T0 )Nr) +T*-TW) M0'/J'T* )NT -+/WT** /Q +T*-/0UM0O )/ */1T)NM0O6*
value, disrespect for a person always embodies a rejection of her value. But
there are many types of value that people purport to exhibit and there are
different modes of disrespect. >0T 1MON) L(*) UM*+T*-TW) r0/)NT+6* 'rJ(T r* r
playwright; consider the symbolic disrespect /Q *rlM0O Pl/(+ -Jrl M* 0/) 'T+l
O//Uf: When delivered in a certain manner and degree, however, disrespect
Wr0 T1q/Ul r +TLTW)M/0 /Q */1T/0T6* 'rJ(T r* r human, which is grounded
on her capacity to build a good life through time. Such treatment expresses
the conviction that this creature does not matter, at least not like a person
does, such that we can do whatever we want with it, as if it were a mere thing
or animal. We can say, more particularly, that punishment above the
dispositive line rejects an /QQT0UT+6* *)r0UM0O r* r N(1r0% r0U -(0M*N1T0)
+TrWNT* )NM* )N+T*N/JU ql UT1/0*)+r)M0O )Nr) )NT /QQT0UT+6* JMQT-building
capacitySthe very basis of his humanitySis completely absent or
fundamentally worthless.
Severe degradation like this will usually take the form of a non-
*l1q/JMWh -Nl*MWrJ M0)T+QT+T0WT oM)N */1T/0T6* 'rJ(T-generating capacities.
3Nr) qT))T+ orl Q/+ r -(0M*N1T0) )/ rQQM+1r)M'TJl UT0l r0 /QQT0UT+6*
humanity than for it to literally ruin his capacity to realize diachronic, human
value as a matter of physics? But certain symbolic forms of disrespect can
be so extreme as to qualify. !/0*MUT+ PxT+ql6* x/*Th: ql oNMWN r *Jr'T
overseer forced runaways to eat human excrement as a form of punishment.16
9/ */ )N/+/(ONJl +TLTW) */1T/0T6* o/+)Nh T'T0 */1T/0T oN/ Nr* W/11M))TU
a heinous offense, violates the liberal commitment to human inviolability.
This is an Article about torture and what it means to treat someone with
inhumanity. But it has relevance beyond theMiddle Ages and the immorality
of punishments likes drawing and quartering. Indeed, it immediately opens
up new lines of sentencing inquiry relevant for the present day. While we do
not employ torture as a form of punishment anymore, I argue that we still
degrade offenders. In closing, I raise the possibility that long-term
16 SeeMALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS: THE STORY OF SUCCESS 282 (2008).
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incarceration is impermissibly degradingSthat it is not qualitatively
UMQQT+T0) )Nr0 -T0rJ )/+)(+T oNT0 M) W/1T* )/ +T*-TW)M0O r -T+*/06* T**T0)MrJJl
human capacitiesSgiven that separating someone from free society for
decades represents a severe risk of ruining his life as a whole. In sum, that
the disrespect of torture is so shocking and undeniable does not mean that it
stands alone on the pantheon of injuries, as something qualitatively different
from any other form of aversive treatment. It can serve as a guide to
degradation, and it can provide us with the conceptual tools to move beyond
retributive proportionality and utilitarian efficiency when assessing the
morality of punishments.
I. DEGRADATION LIMITATIONS
Degradation limitations represent the conviction that offenders do not
forfeit their standing as human beings as a result of their crimes. In this role
they constrain the pursuit of our positive penal objectives, like retribution or
UT)T++T0WTh M0 -r+rJJTJ )/ </qT+) X/kMWK6* W/0WT-)M/0 /Q +MON)* r* P*MUT
W/0*)+rM0)*: (-/0 )NT -(+*(M) /Q W/0*T,(T0)MrJM*) -/JMWMT* OT0T+rJJlf17 Thus,
as indicated above, a punishment may be a proportional or parsimonious
means of realizing our penal aims, while nonetheless being impermissibly
degrading. PxTO+rUr)M/0-JM1M)M0O: +Tr*/0*h M0 )NM* orlh r+T +TJr)M'TJl
independent from our other penal considerations.
9/ 1rKT *T0*T /Q )NM* -/M0)h JT) (* W/0*MUT+ #0)/0l x(QQ6* )+Tr)1Tnt of
)NT P+r-T )NT +r-M*): *T0)T0WM0O -+/-/*rJf18 Duff conceives of punishment as
a form of rational discourse between a community and an offender.19 The
/QQT0UT+ W/11M)* r P-(qJMW: o+/0Oh /0 x(QQ6* 'MToh r0U )N(* UT*T+'T* )NT
W/11(0M)l6* WT0*(+Tf20 The community should not simply lash out at him,
Duff continues, but rather ought to express its disapproval rationally,
providing him with reasons to regret his actions and to desist from wrong in
the future.21 While Duff maintains that hard treatment is the means by which
the community censures offenders, he argues that such treatment must
remain within the bounds of rational communication.22 As such, he
concludes that his theory forecloses penal rape, because such a punishment
PU/T* 0/) rUU+T** u)NT +r-M*)t rs a rational moral agentSit simply seeks to
)+r(1r)MkT r0U N(1MJMr)T NM1f:23
17 ROBERTNOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28–33 (1974).
18 R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 143–45 (2001).
19 Id. at 27–30, 79–82.
20 Id. at 60–64.
21 Id. at 88–98.
22 Id. at 143–45.
23 Id. at 144.
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We should recognize which reasons are doing the heavy lifting for Duff.
Duff opposes penal rape here not because it is impermissibly degradingSnot
because it traumatizes and humiliatesSbut because, by traumatizing and
humiliating, it would fail as a form of rational communication.24 The only
legitimate reason for the state to inflict penal harm, Duff believes, is to
censure a moral agent for committing a public wrong; and given that penal
rape would not qualify as censure or the appropriate form of censure, the state
cannot inflict that form of penal harm legitimately.25 The offender deserves
a particular form of communication, and penal rape does not qualify. The
fact that penal rape is extremely degradingSbecause it treats the offender as
a non-human object with no right to bodily autonomy, among other
reasonsSwould thus stand as an independent reason against its infliction.
Perhaps one could foreclose all impermissibly degrading punishments
as a matter internal to the pursuit of her penal aims. Duff seems to believe
that he can achieve this via the constraint that hard treatment remain a form
of rational communication. If that were the case, however, it would not mean
that degradation-limiting reasons were somehow irrelevant or non-existent.
It would mean that the impermissibility of such punishments was
overdetermined, as they are ruled out by the demand to pursue our positive
penal aims with proportionality or parsimony, in addition to the separate fact
that they are impermissibly degrading.26
In general, criminal law theorists are overeager to tie every intuitive
sentencing consideration to the base of their positive theory of punishment,
r+O(M0O )Nr) M) M* r 1r))T+ /Q PM0)T+0rJ: -+M0WM-JTh QJ/oM0O UM+TW)Jl Q+/1 )NT
set of reasons that justifies the positive infliction of penal harm.27 However,
24 Id. at 143–45.
25 Id.
26 SeeWaldron, supra note 2, at 277-78:
The provisions we are considering prohibit treatment or punishment which is cruel, inhuman, or
degrading, whatever else it is. So, for example, if someone thinks that water-boarding is necessary
in certain circumstances to prevent terrorist attacks, that does not affect the question of whether it
is inhuman, nor does it affect the consequences of its being judged inhuman. If it is inhuman, then
it is prohibited by the provisions we are considering whether it is necessary for defense against
terrorism or not.
Id. at 277.
It is quite consistent to say of a punishment that it is cruel and that God ordains it: God may be
cruel. The question of whether something is cruel or inhuman is one aspect of its overall
evaluation; the question of whether God ordains it is another.
Id. at 278.
27 See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION chs. XIV–XV (W. Harrison ed., Basil Blackwell 1948) (1789) (presenting
thirteen rules for determining a proportional utilitarian sentence, including a prohibition on
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we can appeal to sentencing reasons, such as degradation-limiting reasons,
that do not have a very tight relationship with our justificatory penal
reasonsSeven if, as I discuss in Part IV, they share a deeper foundation of
principle in the commitment to human inviolability. For instance, if Duff is
wrong that his justificatory penal reasonSthe imperative to censure a
wrongdoer via the infliction of genuinely communicative hard treatmentS
rules out penal rape, then he is not thereby committed to the legitimacy of
such punishment. He could appeal to the relatively independent degradation-
limiting reasons to foreclose its infliction.
And, indeed, it seems that Duff is wrong that his theory definitely rules
out penal rape. Duff writes of the communicative nature of hard treatment:
^) M* r orl /Q )+lM0O )/ Q/W(* u)NT /QQT0UT+6*t r))T0)M/0 /0 NM* W+M1Tf ^) -+/'MUT* r
structure within which, we hope, he will be able to think about the nature and
implication of his crime, face up to it more adequately than he might otherwise (being
human) do, and so arrive at a more authentic repentance.28
"() oNr) qT))T+ orl )/ Q/W(* r0 /QQT0UT+6* r))T0)M/0 /0 his crime than
to make him suffer the same offense? Why not rape the rapist? The act of
penal rape in and of itself might not constitute the form of communication
)Nr) x(QQ Nr* M0 1M0Uh q() -T0rJ +r-T Q/JJ/oTU ql )NT /QQT0UT+6* M0T'M)rqJT
reflection on what the state has done to him (and therefore what he has done
to his victim) might indeed qualify. ;/ J/0O r* )NT /QQT0UT+6* Wr-rWM)l Q/+
rational reflection remained intact, it seems that Duff would have to appeal
to degradation-limiting reasons to foreclose extremely degrading
punishments.
To be sure, other prominent theories lack the internal resources to
prevent such punishments. Benthamite deterrence theories would license any
UTO+TT /Q Nr+1h 0/ 1r))T+ N/o 'MWM/(*h */ J/0O r* M) or* r PQ+(OrJ: 1Tr0* of
reducing pain and increasing pleasure overall in societyStaking into account
)NT /QQT0UT+6* /o0 Tm-T+MT0WT /Q -rM0 r* r +T*(J) /Q NM* -(0M*N1T0)f29
Meanwhile, strict retributivists like Michael Moore endorse the unadorned
conviction that wrongdoers deserve to suffer.30 If an offender has done
something absolutely heinous to multiple people, would he not deserve,
following strict retributivist proportionality, to have something absolutely
heinous done to him? ]TQQ+MT Y(+-Nlh W/11M))TU )/ )NT PQrM+ -Jrl: 'r+Mr0)
P(0Q+(OrJ: -(0M*N1T0)*h oNMWN )rKM0O M0)/ rWW/(0) )NT /QQT0UT+6* -rM0 r* r +T*(J) /Q )NT
punishment, would fail to maximize utility overall).
28 DUFF, supra note 18, at 108.
29 See BENTHAM, supra note 27.
30 See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 91 (1997)
jP<T)+Mq()M'M*1 M* r 'T+l *)+rMON)Q/+or+U )NT/+l /Q -(0M*N1T0)? 3T r+T L(*)Mfied in punishing
qTWr(*T r0U /0Jl qTWr(*T /QQT0UT+* UT*T+'T M)f:if
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of retributivism,31 accepts this point, as well as the role played by degradation
JM1M)r)M/0* M0 -+T'T0)M0O *(WN -(0M*N1T0)*? Pb'T0 oNT0 -+/-/+)M/0rJM)l M*
satisfied, however, we shall not use a certain punishment if it is intrinsically
degrading to the humanity of the criminalSe.g. we shall not torture the
)/+)(+T+f:32
II. LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICALCONCEPTIONS OF TORTURE
While degradation limitations are both intuitively appealing and widely
recognized in the law, we lack a precise understanding of their normative
foundations and details. When, exactly, is state punishment impermissibly
degrading, and why? As discussed in the Introduction, tortureSthe exemplar
of degradationSis our guide to this issue. What, then, is torture? And what
are its wrong-making features? This Part examines how the law and the
philosophical literature have answered these two questions. To be sure, the
two questionsSthe definitional and the normativeSare interrelated.
However one defines torture will inevitably impact her understanding and
interpretation of its wrongness, and vice versa, and so it is artificial to
consider them entirely separately. Even if intertwined, the two issues
nonetheless involve distinct methodologies; one is linguistic, sociological,
and empirical, and the otherSour true targetSis normative: a moral
interpretation of whatever slice of reality the definition selects.
31 ParM+ -Jrl: +T)+Mq()M'M*)* (0UT+*)r0U )NT MUTr )Nr) r0 /QQT0UT+ UT*T+'T* -(0M*N1T0) )/
derive from a commitment to fairness. If we assume that an offender has benefitted from
everyone eJ*T6* +T*)+rM0) M0 Q/JJ/oM0O )NT JroSnot always a safe assumption, Murphy
arguesSthen he has gained an unfair advantage by breaking the law and failing to restrain
himself in turn; and the harm or suffering of punishment is thus deserved as a means of
stri--M0O rorl )NT /QQT0UT+6* (0QrM+ OrM0f See generally Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and
Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217, 231–43 (1973); Herbert Morris, Persons and
Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968); Richard Dagger, Playing Fair with Punishment, 103
ETHICS 473 (1993); GEORGE SHER, DESERT 69–90 (1987).
32 Jeffrie G. Murphy, Cruel and Unusual Punishments, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND
THERAPY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 223, 236 (1979). See also Alec Walen,
Retributive Justice, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2014),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/justice-retributive/
[https://perma.cc/4J33-L2E4] jPu=t+/-/+)M/0rJM)l *N/(JU +(JT /() WT+)rM0 -(0M*N1T0)* /0 )NT
ground that they are disproportionately large. But there is no reason for retributivists not to
look to other criteria, such as respect for human dignity, to prohibit those forms of punishment
)Nr) *TT1 W+(TJ /+ UTO+rUM0Of:i% Youngjae Lee, Desert and the Eighth Amendment, 11 J.
CONST. L. 101, 102 (2008) (dis)M0O(M*NM0O qT)oTT0 )NT PUT*T+) 1/UTJ: /Q bMON)N #1T0U1T0)
jurisprudence, which is concerned to prevent retributively disproportionate sentences, and the
PUMO0M)l 1/UTJh: oNMWN M* W/0WT+0TU )/ O(r+r0)TT )/ /QQT0UT+* Pr 1M0M1(1 *)r0Ur+U /Q
decency and humanM)l:if
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A. THE LEGAL CONCEPTION
3Nr) M* )NT Jro6* W/0WT-)M/0 /Q )/+)(+T r0U M)* o+/0O-making features?
Perhaps the law can illuminate or inform our moral inquiry.33 I believe that
the law does provide such illumination, but only through its failure. As I
demonstrate below, the most prominent legal sources all define torture as the
intentional infliction of severe suffering. This definition is over-inclusive,
failing to pass a broad-brush test of conceptual analysis. This definitional
failure unsurprisingly muddies the related moral analysis, given the
connection between the two. Apart from warpinO )NT Jro6* +TJr)M/0*NM- )/
1/+rJM)lh )NT UTQM0M)M/0rJ QrMJ(+T oTrKT0* )NT Jro6* rqMJM)l )/ +TrJMkT M)* )+(T
goal of constraining and preventing state torture, as I discuss below.34 ^)6*
0/) /0Jl qrU1/+rJ -NMJ/*/-Nlh )NT0% M)6* qrU JTOrJ U+rQ)M0O r0U M0)Trpretation.
As to the broad-brush test of conceptual analysis, we can agree about
)NT WT0)+rJ Wr*T* /Q )/+)(+T? +(00M0O TJTW)+MWM)l )N+/(ON */1T/0T6* q/Ul Q/+
)NT -(+-/*T /Q M0)T++/Or)M/0h -(JJM0O */1T/0T6* q/Ul r-r+) oM)N P)NT +rWK:
for the purpose of punishment, and so forth. Just the same, we can agree on
what is definitely not torture. This includes most of the practices in the
world. Someone singing a song because she wants to is not torture. It also
includes many harmful practices. Moderately mocking or shoving somebody
is not torture. In this way, torture represents a significantly distinct set of
practices. It deserves a word of its own. And even if there are practices that
fall into a vague middle between torture and not torture, any definition that
encompasses practices that are definitely not torture fails as a matter of
conceptual analysis.
1. Explication
The 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment (CAT) is an international
treaty with 161 parties including the United States and all of the EU states.35
In defining torture, the CAT closely followed the 1975 UN Declaration
against Torture (the Declaration), which was the first instrument to provide
such a definition.36 Here is the relevant language from the CAT:
33 In his work on human dignity Jeremy Waldron employs the method of looking to the
law for moral insight. See JEREMYWALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS 47–78 (Meir Dan-
Cohen ed. 2012).
34 See infra Part III.A.3.
35 CAT, supra note 1.
36 Id. at art. 1, ¶ 1. SeeG.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (Dec. 9, 1975).
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For the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing
him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed,
or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.37
There are five central components: (1) severe physical or mental pain or
suffering, (2) intentionally inflicted, (3) for such purposes as interrogation,
punishment, intimidation, coercion, and discrimination, (4) by a state,
meaning at least with the acquiescence of a person working in an official
capacity, but (5) not including pain or suffering caused by lawful sanctions.
I will consider the final two components first since they are less
M1-/+)r0) Q/+ )NT -(+-/*T /Q UM*WT+0M0O )/+)(+T6* o+/0O-making features.
The meaning of the fifth component (a vestige from the Declaration) is
unclear. It would seem to erase the clause prohibiting penal torture, as Louis
;TMU1r0 Tm-JrM0*h */ J/0O r* *(WN )/+)(+T or* r PJroQ(J *r0W)M/0: UT+M'TU
from a public schedule of punishments.38 The fourth componentSstate
action or acquiescenceSis complex, and not relevant at this ground floor of
the inquiry. Private parties acting without the knowledge of state officials
can surely inflict torture. State torture, though, may feature unique wrong-
making features; it may, for instance, violate substantive Rule of Law values,
as JeremyWaldron argues, in addition to violating basic moral principles that
apply to private actors.39 X/0T)NTJT**h oT 0TTU r )NT/+l /Q )/+)(+T6*
wrongness as a straightforward moral matter before considering what
additional wrong-making features state torture may exhibit.
The first three components of the C#96* UTQM0M)M/0 Nr'T 1/+T )/ /QQT+
as a normative guide to torture simpliciter: (1) severe physical or mental pain
or suffering, (2) intentionally inflicted, (3) for such purposes as interrogation,
punishment, intimidation, coercion, and discrimination. TNT -N+r*T P*(WN
-(+-/*T* r*: M0 )NT )NM+U W/1-/0T0) M1-JMT* )Nr) )NT T0(1T+r)TU JM*) /Q
purposes is not exhaustive. David Luban argues that the drafters should have
qTT0 WJTr+T+ oM)N )NM* ql T0UM0O )NT +TJT'r0) *T0)T0WT oM)N )NT -N+r*T P/+ r0l
other purpo*T oNr)*/T'T+: *M0WT Pu)tNr) o/(JU U+M'T N/1T )NT W/++TW)
W/0WJ(*M/0? )/+)(+T M* )/+)(+Th +TOr+UJT** /Q M)* -(+-/*Tf:40 Nonetheless, given
37 CAT, supra note 1, at art. 1, ¶ 1.
38 Louis Seidman, Tor/.re’s &r./", 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 881, 895 (2005).
39 SeeWaldron, supra note 9, at 1739–43.
40 LUBAN, supra note 9, at 119; see also MATTHEW KRAMER, TORTURE AND MORAL
INTEGRITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 31 (2014).
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the open-T0UTU 0r)(+T /Q P*(WN -(+-/*T* r*h: )NT QM+*) )o/ W/1-/0T0)*
describe the gravamen of the wrong of torture according to the CAT (and
also the Declaration): the intentional infliction of severe physical or mental
pain or suffering. 9NM* M* )NT W/+T /Q )NT UTQM0M)M/0f `M'T0 )Nr) P*(QQT+M0O:
encompasses both physical and 1T0)rJ -rM0h oT Wr0 +TQM0T )NT !#96*
definition of torture further: the intentional infliction of severe suffering.
The United States statute codifying the CAT alters the definition in two
places.41 aM+*)h )NT *)r)()T -+/'MUT* )Nr) )/+)(+T 1(*) qT P*-TWMQMWrJJl:
intended, such that the oblique intent to torture would not qualify.42 Second,
W/0*M*)T0) oM)N )NT 7f;f6* +T*T+'r)M/0* (-/0 *MO0M0O )NT )+Tr)lh43 the statute
-+/'MUT* )Nr) /0T Wr0 /0Jl )/+)(+T r0/)NT+ PoM)NM0 NM* W(*)/Ul /+ -Nl*MWrJ
W/0)+/Jf:44 Nonetheless, the statute does not stray far from the CAT. In
+TJT'r0) -r+)h M) UTQM0T* )/+)(+T r* r0 rW) Pintended to inflict severe physical
or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful
*r0W)M/0*if:45
While not bound by the CAT, the International Criminal Court (ICC)
has followed its definition closely. As defined by the Elements of Crime of
)NT ^!!h )NT QM+*) +T,(M+T1T0) /Q q/)N P)NT W+M1T rOrM0*) N(1r0M)l /Q )/+)(+T:
r0U )NT UM*)M0W) Por+ W+M1T /Q )/+)(+T: M* r* Q/JJ/o*? P9NT -T+-T)+r)/+
inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or more
-T+*/0*f:46 9NT P`T0T+rJ ^0)+/U(W)M/0: -+/'MUT* )Nr) *(WN r 1r)T+MrJ TJT1T0)
1(*) qT W/11M))TU oM)N PM0)T0) r0U K0/oJTUOTf:47 So, again, we have the
intentional infliction of severe physical or mental pain or suffering. The
differences between the two offenses concern against whom the severe pain
or suffering is intentionally inflicted, and why. The crime against humanity
41 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2012). At the time of ratification, the U.S. determined that existing
state and federal law was sufficient to implement the CAT as it related to torture on U.S. soil,
but insufficient to cover torture abroad. 18 U.S.C § 2340 is meant to fill this gap. See U.S.
DEP6T OF STATE, INITIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED
NATIONSCOMMITTEEAGAINST TORTURE ¶ 11 (1999).
42 18 U.S.C. § GFEcjIif #* )/ 1Tr0M0O /Q P*-TWMQMW M0)T0)h: *TT 70M)TU ;)r)T* 'f "JrM+h DE
afFU CF@h CEG jIc)N !M+f I@@Di jWM)r)M/0* /1M))TUi jP# *-TWMQMW M0)T0) W+M1T M* /0T M0 oNMWN r0
act was committed voluntarily and purposely with the specific intent to do something the law
Q/+qMU*:if 3Nr) 1MON) ,(rJMQl r* )/+)(+T )Nr) or* 0/) *-TWMQMWrJJl M0)T0UTU (0UT+ & 2340?
Perhaps a situation where a bomb will cause severe suffering to innocent bystanders as the
unintended byproduct of blowing up a munitions factory. See further discussion infra Part
II.A.2.
43 See generally 136 CONG. REC. S17, 486–S1748601 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990).
44 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1).
45 Id.
46 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALCOURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES arts. 7(1)(f) and 8(2)(a)(ii)–1,
at 7 and 14 (2011).
47 Id. General Introduction ¶ 2, at 1.
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of torture can be committed for any purpose, so long as the conduct was part
/Q r PoMUT*-+TrU /+ *l*)T1r)MW r))rWK UM+TW)TU rOrM0*) r WM'MJMr0
-/-(Jr)M/0f:48 The war crime, meanwhile, requires that the conduct take
place in the context of an international armed conflict against persons
-+/)TW)TU (0UT+ )NT `T0T'r !/0'T0)M/0* /Q I@E@h r0U PQ/+ *(WN -(+-/*T* r*:
those listed in the CAT.49
Finally, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights
-+/'MUT*? PX/ /0T *NrJJ qT *(qLTW)TU )/ )/+)(+T /+ )/ M0N(1r0 /+ UTO+rUM0O
treatment or -(0M*N1T0)f:50 While none of the terms are defined by the
Convention itself, in Ireland v. United Kingdom the European Court of
Human Rights considered whether the British government violated Article 3
oNT0 M) T1-J/lTU PM0)T++/Or)M/0 M0 UT-)N: rOrM0*) *(*pected members and
collaborators of the Irish Republican Army (IRA).51 P^0)T++/Or)M/0 M0 UT-)N:
involved the five techniques of sleep deprivation, stress positions,
deprivation of food and drink, subjection to noise, and hooding.52 After
holding that the treatment constituted inhuman and degrading treatment in
violation of Article 3, the court then considered whether it also amounted to
torture.53
In formulating a conception of torture, the Court envisioned a spectrum
of violence, from (a) violence that is neither inhuman nor degrading to (b)
inhuman or degrading violence to (c) torture.54 It concludes that only
PUTJMqT+r)T M0N(1r0 )+Tr)1T0) Wr(*M0O 'T+l *T+M/(* r0U W+(TJ *(QQT+M0O:
UT*T+'T* )NT P*-TWMrJ *)MO1r: r))rWNTU )/ )NT o/+U P)/+)(+Tf:55
9NT o/+U PM0N(1r0: -T+Q/+1* JT** o/+K )Nr0 1MON) qT Tm-TW)TUh OM'T0
the understanding of the term offered in Ireland. The court found that
M0)T++/Or)M/0 M0 UT-)N or* PM0N(1r0: oM)NM0 )NT 1Tr0M0O /Q #+)MWJT F
qTWr(*T M) Wr(*TU PM0)T0*T -Nl*MWrJ r0U 1T0)rJ *(QQT+M0O: r0U PrW()T
-*lWNMr)+MW UM*)(+qr0WT*f:56 While this may not have been intended as a
48 Id. at art. 7(1)(f)(4)–(5), at 7; Id. n.14. The article also requires that the victim was in
)NT -T+-T)+r)/+6* W(*)/Ul /+ W/0)+/Jh r0U )Nr) )NT -rM0 /+ *(QQT+M0O UMU 0/) r+M*T Q+/1 JroQ(J
sanctions. Id. art. 7(1)(f)(2)–(3), at 7.
49 Id. at art. 8(2)(a)(ii)-1, at 14.
50 ECHR, supra note 1, art. 3.
51 See Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71 (1978); ECHR, supra note 1, at ¶
156–58.
52 Id. at ¶ 96.
53 Id. at ¶ 167.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. (emphasis added); see also 9NT P`+TTK !r*Th: #--f X/*f FFGI–3/67, 3344/67) 12
wf"f b(+f !/0'f /0 _f<f IAC jI@C@i jP9NT 0/)M/0 /Q M0N(1r0 )+Tr)1T0) W/'T+* r) JTr*) *(WN
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W/1-JT)T JTOrJ UTQM0M)M/0 /Q PM0N(1r0h: oT Wr0 *TT )Nr) )NT !/(+)
understands the term broadly.57 And if we incorporate this definition into the
key phraseSPdeliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel
*(QQT+M0O:58S)NT0 )/+)(+T qTW/1T* P)NT UTJMqT+r)T M0QJMW)M/0 /Q intense
physical and mental suffering or acute psychiatric disturbances causing very
*T+M/(* r0U W+(TJ *(QQT+M0Of: We are left just where the Declaration, the CAT,
the U.S. Code, and the ICC let us off, with a conception of torture as a
practice on the far end of a continuum of the intentional infliction of
suffering.59
In applying this understanding of torture, the Court concluded that even
though the fi'T )TWN0M,(T*h r* r--JMTU M0 W/1qM0r)M/0h P(0U/(q)TUJl
amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment . . . they did not occasion
suffering of the particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture
r* */ (0UT+*)//Uf:60 Their infliction did not warra0) )NT P*-TWMrJ *)MO1r:
associated with torture.61 9NT P*-TWMrJ *)MO1r: -N+r*T M* 0/) Q(+)NT+ UTQM0TU
or grounded in the case law and does not seem to provide traction beyond
emphasizing the extraordinary nature of torture. The Court in Aydin v.
Turkey, by comparison, applied this sliding-scale analysis to conclude that
the physical and mental injuries inflicted by Turkish forces upon a 17-year-
old detainee, most importantly the fact that she was raped, deserved that
P*-TWMrJ *)MO1r: r0U ,(rJMQMTU r* )/+)(re.62
2. Critique
At first glance, the legal definition of torture seems unimpeachable.
Whatever torture is, surely it must involve the intentional infliction of severe
physical or mental suffering. And indeed it must, but there are a number of
worries with this definition. The most important involves the test of
conceptual analysis mentioned above.63 `M'T0 )NT 'rO(T0T** /Q P*T'T+T
*(QQT+M0Oh: )NT JTOrJ UTQM0M)M/0 T0W/1-r**T* -+rW)MWT* )Nr) r+T UTQM0M)TJl 0/)
torture.
treatment as deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical, which in the particular
situation is unjustMQMrqJTf:if
57 a/+ -NMJ/*/-NMWrJ UM*W(**M/0 /Q )NT 1Tr0M0O /Q PM0N(1r0h: *TT 3rJU+/0h supra note 2,
at 278–81.
58 Ireland, App. No. 5310/71 at ¶ 167.
59 Indeed, the Court in Ireland notes the connection between its definition and that in
Article 1(2) of the Declaration. Id.Meanwhile, the Court in Aydin v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 75
¶ 195 notes the connection between the definitions of torture in Ireland and the CAT.
60 Ireland, App. No. 5310/71 at ¶ 167.
61 Id.
62 Aydin v. Turkey, 1997 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 86.
63 See supra Part II.A.
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Consider a state dropping bombs on enemy soldiers, or requiring
candidates for elite military units to undergo extreme forms of testing,
looking not to train them but to weed out the weak links. Or consider a
landlord evicting a tenant out of spite, knowing and indeed desiring that the
tenant would have to sleep on the streets for months before she could find
other housing. Or consider someone beating up another person in a bar fight.
All seem to represent the intentional infliction of severe suffering, and yet
none seems to qualify as torture as normally understood. Perhaps in the case
of killing enemy soldiers, severe suffering is neither the intended aim nor
means, assuming the state just wants to kill, and assuming that death in and
of itself does not involve suffering. The question would then depend on
whether the oblique intent to cause severe suffering qualified as tortureS
something the US statute forecloses64Sgiven that dropping the bomb would
almost certainly cause severe physical and mental suffering in some
survivors and those who ultimately die.
An over-inclusive definition is a problem or weakness only if a more
precise definition is available. ^) M* 0/) r* MQ )NT Jro UTQM0T* )/+)(+T r* Pr
Nr+1Q(J -+rW)MWTh: *(WN )Nr) M) T0W/1-r**T* r N(OT r++rl /Q rW)M/0*f The
PM0)T0)M/0rJ M0QJMW)M/0 /Q *T'T+T *(QQT+M0O: 0r++/o* /(+ OrkT 1Tr0M0OQ(JJlf
There may not be a more precise way to define the term; language has
descriptive limits. However, below I will pursue the hypothesis that we can
do much better and secure a definition that covers all practices that are
definitely torture, and none that are definitely not torture.65
64 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1).
65 3rJU+/0h 'T+l ror+T /Q )NT *JM--T+M0T** /Q P*T'T+T *(QQT+M0Oh: 0/0T)NTJT** )rKT*
umbrage at the desire to find a more precise definition of torture. He argues that any such
TQQ/+)h JMKT )NT o/+K /Q `T/+OT 3f "(*N6* JrolT+* M0 )NT >QQMWT /Q [TOrJ !/(0*TJ jOLC),
could only be motivated by the aim to legalize conduct that would otherwise be swept up in
)NT q+/rU -+/NMqM)M/0f >[! JrolT+* +TQM0TU )NT JTOrJ 1Tr0M0O /Q P*T'T+T *(QQT+M0O: */ )Nr)
waterboarding did not qualify as such. See THE TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE
UNTHINKABLE (David Cole ed., 2009). Waldron argues, in response, that we should not be
anywhere on the spectrum of the infliction of pain or suffering. Waldron, supra note 9, at
1698–1703.
3NMJT 3rJU+/06* r+O(1T0) M* -/oT+Q(Jh r0U +T-+T*T0)* )+T0WNr0) W+M)MWM*1 /Q )NT >[!6*
torture memos, for at least three reasons we ought to reject his philosophical conservatism
with regard to a more precise torture definition. First, it is unclear how we can square his
position with any intentionally inflicted suffering on the part of the state. Does his position
rule out non-mild deterrent or retributive punishments? Does it entail pacifism? Second, only
with a more precise definition of torture can we articulate the conviction, which Waldron must
share, that torture is indeed qualitatively worse than lesser forms of aversive treatment.
Relatedly, without a more precise definition, torture is not worth verl 1(WN r* r0 Pr+WNT)l-T:
r0U */(+WT /Q W/1-r+M*/0h oM)N )NT W/0WT-)* /Q M0)T0)M/0rJJl M0QJMW)TU P-rM0: r0U P*(QQT+M0O:
doing all of the work. See Waldron, supra note 9h r) IBFA jr+O(M0O )Nr) )/+)(+T M* r PJTOrJ
r+WNT)l-T:if >(+ 1/+rJ (0UT+*)r0UM0O /Q M0L(+MT*h r) JTr*)h o/(JU )NT0 qT M1-/'T+M*NTUf 9NM+Uh
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It would make this project easier if the hypothesis failed. If the wrong
of torture was indeed the intentional infliction of severe suffering, then our
definition of impermissible penal degradation would be straightforward.
Any punishment that constituted the intentional infliction of severe suffering,
such as long-term incarceration for the purpose of retribution or deterrence,
would be impermissibly degrading. However, as a more refined conception
of torture emerges below, it will become evident that such a definition is
unavailable. Torture and long-term incarceration are distinct in important
ways, while nonetheless sharing some fundamental wrong-making features.
B. PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTIONS
^0 -(+*(M0O r 1/+T -+TWM*T (0UT+*)r0UM0O /Q )/+)(+T6* o+/0O0T**h ^ oMJJ
consider the work of Henry Shue and David Sussman, who have advanced
the two most prominent philosophical theories of torture.
1. Shue: Torture as an Assault on the Defenseless
In his seminal 1978 article, Shue unravels the following argument: since
(a) killing is more harmful than torture and (b) killing is sometimes
permissible, as in a just war, then (c) torture must sometimes be
permissible.66 Shue explains that the argument fails because killing is
permissible when the victim is an active threat, while a torture victim is
necessarily in custody. Given that the fight is over for the torture victim,
;N(T Tm-JrM0*h )/+)(+T PM* M0UTTU 0/) r0rJ/O/(* )/ )NT KMJJM0O M0 qr))JT /Q r
healthy and well-r+1TU Q/T% M) M* r W+(TJ r**r(J) (-/0 )NT UTQT0*TJT**f:67 Does
this capture the central wrong-making feature of torture? Is torture wrong
because it is r0 Pr**r(J) (-/0 )NT UTQT0*TJT**:$68
Shue considers the reply that the victim is not in fact defenseless, since
he retains the ability to end the torture by providing the information desired
by the torturer. Shue offers two responses. First, such an act of compliance
M* (0r'rMJrqJT Q/+ 'MW)M1* /Q P)T++/+M*)MW )/+)(+Th: oN/*T )/+)(+T M* 1Tr0) )/
intimidate a wider group.69 Nothing is asked of them other than to suffer;
they cannot do or say anything to end the ordeal. Second, as to a victim of
r* ^ r+O(T qTJ/oh )NT 'rO(T0T** /Q P*T'T+T *(QQT+M0O: +T-+T*T0)* r +TO(Jr)/+l UTQMWMT0Wlf #
more precise definition would prove more capable at preventing torture, by providing a much
higher interpretative hurdle for the torture-defending lawyers of the future. See discussion
infra Part III.A.3.
66 Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124 (1978).
67 Id. at 130; see alsoMICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THELESSEREVIL: POLITICALETHICS IN ANAGE
OF TERROR 137 (2004).
68 Shue, supra note 66, at 130.
69 Id. at 132–33.
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PM0)T++/Or)M/0rJ )/+)(+Th: )/ *rl )Nr) NT Wr0 T*Wr-T ql M0Q/+1M0O M* r+)MQMWMrJh
Shue argues, because it would demand of him a profound betrayal and
violation of his integritySat least for committed members of the
opposition.70 ;N(T o+M)T*? P#0 rJ)T+0r)M'T oNMWN M* JTOM)M1r)TJl )/ W/(0) r*
an escape must not only be preferable but also itself satisfy some minimum
*)r0Ur+U /Q 1/+rJ rWWT-)rqMJM)lf # UT0MrJ /Q /0T6* *TJQ U/T* 0/) W/(0)f:71
9NT+T r+T *T'T+rJ W+M)M,(T* /Q ;N(T6* r+Oument. First, as a number of
theorists have explained, Shue conflates being defenseless against torture
with being completely non-threatening.72 ;N(T o+M)T*? P9NT )/+)(+T+ M0QJMW)*
pain and damage upon another person who, by virtue of now being within his
or her power, is no longer a threat r0U M* T0)M+TJl r) )NT )/+)(+T+6* 1T+Wlf:73
;/1T/0T T0)M+TJl r) r0/)NT+6* 1T+Wlh N/oT'T+h W/(JU *)MJJ qT )N+Tatening, for
example, if she had the power to mitigate or prevent an attack that she had
earlier engineered. If Shue wants his theory to explain the wrongness of
torture in that caseSas he doesShe needs to say more. Torturing that type
of individual would indeed be an attack on someone who was defenseless
against torture. But unlike assaulting the traditional prisoner of war that Shue
has in mind, it would not be an attack on someone who is completely non-
threatening and powerless. It would not be an attack on someone entirely off
of the battlefield. #* M) *)r0U*h )NT0h ;N(T6* W/0WT-)M/0 /Q )/+)(+T6*
wrongness seems to be overly narrow, covering only those who are
defenseless against torture and non-threatening.
Second, victims of torture need not be defenseless, and thus attacking a
UTQT0*TJT** -T+*/0 Wr00/) qT )/+)(+T6* T**T0)MrJ o+/0O-making feature. Uwe
Steinhoff, in a somewhat involved hypothetical, shows how someone could
inflict tortuous agonywith a laser from some distance, even though the victim
was not defenseless, given that she had a gun and could shoot at the
perpetrator wildly.74 We would maintain that such an individual was
tortured, even though she was not defenseless.
Third, as Kamm and Steinhoff argue, attacking the defenseless is not
always impermissible. Kamm imagines that a group has fired missiles against
us that are very slow to arrive.75 She explains that even if the group was
70 Id. at 136–37.
71 Id. at 136.
72 See F.M.KAMM, ETHICS FORENEMIES: TERROR, TORTUREANDWAR 7 (2011); Sussman,
supra note 12, at 16; KRAMER, supra note 40, at 37–39.
73 Shue, supra note 66, at 130 (emphasis added).
74 UWE STEINHOFF, ON THEETHICS OFTORTURE 40–41 (2013); see also KAMM, supra note
72, at 5–9; William Twining and Barrie Paskins, Torture and Philosophy, 52 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC6Y 143, 160 (1978).
75 KAMM, supra note 72, at 6; see also STEINHOFF, supra note 74, at 94–95.
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defenseless against our counterattack, they are still combatants and we can
permissibly attack them to prevent their future threat; we need not wait for
their missiles arrive.76 P#))rWKM0O )NT UTQT0*TJT**: )N(* *TT1* )/ qT r -//+
candidate for a wrong-making feature that is purportedly beyond the pale,
and the essence of degradation.
a/(+)Nh r* )/ ;N(T6* -/M0t that victims of interrogational torture do not
Nr'T r PJTOM)M1r)T rJ)T+0r)M'T: )/ )/+)(+Th M) U/T* 0/) *TT1h r* xr'MU ;(**1r0
argues, that we should care, or care very much, about the personal integrity
of people who are forced to betray their commitments to extremely illiberal
causes.77
Let us assume, though, that Shue could adequately respond to all these
critiques. There would still be something deeply unsatisfying about his
theory. He would be unable to distinguish qualitatively between different
types of assaults on the defenseless. There would be nothing extraordinary
about the infliction of torture. It would represent a severe type of assault on
a defenseless person, among the many possible types. Shue could not
account for any qualitative moral difference between shouting at, slapping,
or even moderately beating a prisoner, on the one hand, and positively
torturing him with electricity or a waterboard, on the other. The gravamen
of the slap and of running electricity through his body would be the same: an
assault on a defenseless person.78 ^ *Nr+T ;(**1r06* W/0'MW)M/0 )Nr) P)NT+T M*
something morally special about torture that distinguishes it from most other
KM0U* /Q 'M/JT0WTh W+(TJ)lh /+ UTO+rUM0O )+Tr)1T0)f:79 While Shue seems to
agree with tNM*h NM* W/0WT-)M/0 /Q )/+)(+T6* o+/0O0T** r* r0 r**r(J) /0 )NT
defenseless cannot provide the underlying explanation.
2. Sussman: Torture as Self-Betrayal
In pursuit of such an explanation, Sussman distinguishes torture from
coercion. P!/T+WM/0h: NT r+O(T*h P+T,(M+T* /0Jl )Nr) M)* 'MW)M1 Nr'T )NT
capacities needed for practical reasoning and intentional action, and that he
be able to recognize the expression of these powers in those who are trying
)/ -+T**(+T NM1f:80 It would be possible to coerce an agent with no emotional
life, like a corporation, so long as it were capable of pursuing its interests
76 KAMM, supra note 72, at 6.
77 Sussman, supra note 12, at 18.
78 Waldron seems unable to make such a distinction either, given his emphasis on the
impermissibility of being anywhere on the spectrum of intentional pain or suffering. See
discussion supra note 65.
79 Sussman, supra note 12, at 3.
80 Id. at 9.
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rationally and of anticipating the actions of other agents.81 Torture is
UMQQT+T0)h ;(**1r0 r+O(T*? Pu9tNT )/+)(+T+ M* not merely constructing a harsh
set of options for the victim to navigate rationally as best he can. The felt
Tm-T+MT0WT /Q -rM0h QTr+h r0U (0WT+)rM0)l r+T T**T0)MrJ TJT1T0)* /Q )/+)(+Tf:82
It is not the mere fact, though, that torture hurts or is frightening. What is
*-TWMrJ rq/() )/+)(+T Q/+ ;(**1r0 M* )Nr) )NT 'MW)M16* /o0 q/Ulh rQQTW)*h r0U
emotions are used to generate pressure upon him, *(WN )Nr) NT M* PrW)M'TJl
W/1-JMWM) M0 NM* /o0 'M/Jr)M/0f:83 9NM* M* oNr) 1rKT* )/+)(+T r P1/+rJ
-T+'T+*M/0: r0U (niquely wrong on his view:84
3Nr) )NT )/+)(+T+ U/T* M* )/ )rKT NM* 'MW)M16* -rM0h r0U )N+/(ON M) NM* 'MW)M16* q/Ulh r0U
1rKT M) qTOM0 )/ Tm-+T** )NT )/+)(+T+6* oMJJf . . . My suffering is experienced as not just
something the torturer inflicts on me, but as something I do to myself, as a kind of self-
betrayal worked through my body and its feelings.85
Waterboarding victims, for example, are forced to struggle against their
own desire to breathe, Sussman explains.86
Orthodox Kantians, Sussman continues, fail to appreciate the role of
painS*-TWMQMWrJJlh /Q /0T6* MUT0)MQMWr)M/0 oM)N NT+ -rM0 r0U oM)N NT+
affective responses to her painSin explaining the wrongness of torture.87
9NTl (0UT+*)r0U )NT 'MW)M16* JrWK /Q +Tr*/0rqJT W/0*T0) )/ qT )NT O+r'r1T0
/Q )/+)(+T6* wrongness.88 That it is bodily pain that the torture victim could
not reasonably consent to, rather than */1T /)NT+ PM0)T0*TJl (0or0)TU
M1-/*M)M/0h: *(WN r* r qJrWK1rMJT+6* -(qJMWr)M/0 /Q W/1-+/1M*M0O
photographs, is for the Kantians of no moment.89 PuYtl blackmailer is not
U/M0O r0l)NM0O /Q r -MTWT oM)N )/+)(+M0O 1Th: ;(**1r0 +T-JMT* )/ )NT
\r0)Mr0*h PT'T0 )N/(ON *NT M* )Nor+)M0O 1l oMJJ )N+/(ON r 1Tr0* )/ oNMWN
*NT Nr* 0/ +MON)f:90 9NT qJrWK1rMJT+6* r()/0/1l 'M/Jr)M/0 M* -(+-/+)TUJl 0/)
perverse like the )/+)(+T+6* r()/0/1l 'M/Jr)M/0h /0 ;(**1r06* 'MToh qTWr(*T
the blackmail victim is not complicit in his own violation, as discussed
further below.
;(**1r0 W/0*MUT+* )NT \r0)Mr0*6 +T*-/0*T )Nr) )NTl Wr0 r--+TWMr)T )NT
M1-/+)r0WT /Q -rM0h M0*/Qr+ r* M) PM* rJmost impossible to reflect, deliberate,
81 Id.
82 Id. at 10.
83 Id. at 4.
84 Id. at 4–5.
85 Id. at 21.
86 Id. at 23.
87 Id. at 13–16.
88 Id. at 14.
89 Id.
90 Id.
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/+ T'T0 )NM0K *)+rMON) oNT0 /0T M* M0 rO/0lh: *(WN )Nr) -rM0 PW/1-+/1M*T*
or undermines the very capacities constitutive of autonomous agency
M)*TJQf:91 Sussman contends that this response, also discussed further below,
fails for two reasons. aM+*)h M) Wr00/) UM*)M0O(M*N qT)oTT0 (0UT+1M0M0O /0T6*
agency through pain or through pleasure.92 Second, it cannot distinguish
qT)oTT0 (0UT+1M0M0O /0T6* rOT0Wl )N+/(ON )/+)(+T /+ )N+/(ON KMJJM0Oh r0U
thus cannot capture his conviction that torture has a burden of justification
even greater than that of killing.93 Sussman thus concludes that the standard
+T*/(+WT* /Q )NT \r0)Mr0 )+rUM)M/0 Wr00/) rWW/(0) Q/+ )/+)(+T6* o+/0O0T**h
and he rests his conception of its wrongness on his theory of forced self-
betrayal.94
There is a controversial conception of personal identity at the heart of
;(**1r06* )NT/+lf For his argument to get off the ground, we must to some
degree identify with the capacities that torture exploits, such that when one
faces her pain she is (or feels that she is) facing herself. It is not clear, though,
that every person has such a reaction to her pain. It would seem possible for
someone who was, say, repeatedly shocked with electricity, to feel in no way
complicit in her own violation, to feel no shame at all by the fact that she
responded instinctively to her agony, and to put all of the blame on her
perpetrator. Would Sussman conclude that such a person was not tortured,
or experienced something qualitatively less wrongful? Or would he insist
that she was mistaken and that, perhaps as a metaphysical matter, she was
indeed facing and betraying herself when she responded to her pain?
Furthermore, even if we all do identify with our pain receptors, fight-
or-flight responses, and other such capacities in the relevant manner, there is
the additional point that these capacities are not obviously failing or
betraying torture victims. They are perceiving reality correctly. The
message they communicate to a victim is accurate: your body and possibly
your life is in danger. Put differently, the torture victim does not want her
traitorous pain receptors to switch off, so that her tormentor can destroy her
body painlessly, but rather for her body not to be destroyed. It is not clear,
then, how the fact that she responds to her pain makes her complicit in her
own violation. Perhaps her more basic need for a functioning body makes
her complicit. But, here as well, it seems that a torture victim might notS
and indeed should notSfeel like she has betrayed herself when the torturer
exploits her need for a functioning body, as if it represented some failing on
91 Id.
92 Id. at 15.
93 Id. at 15–16.
94 Id.
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her behalf. And we would not think that someone who had the appropriate
reaction, placing all of the blame on her perpetrator and feeling no shame at
all, would have experienced something qualitatively less wrongful than
someone who did feel a sense of complicity.
More fundamentally, even if Sussman is right that (a) torture is a forced
self-betrayal and (b) that this is the central wrong-making feature of torture,
it is doubtful that he has achieved his primary mission of explaining what is
*-TWMrJ /+ (0M,(T rq/() )/+)(+T6* o+/0O0T**f In parallel to the legal
W/0WT-)M/0* /Q )/+)(+T r0U )/ ;N(T6* )NT/+lh ;(**1r06* )NT/+l M* /'T+-
inclusive. Coercion involves introducing an unreasonable obstacle into
*/1T/0T6* UTWM*M/0-making process.95 Sussman distinguishes coercion from
torture, but given that torture must be an instance of coercion, we can
understand his distinction to be between (a) coercion that introduces
obstacles unrelated to bodily pain, like in his example of blackmail, and (b)
coercion that introduces the obstacle of bodily pain, like in torture.
The first problem for Sussman is that he cannot distinguish between
M0*)r0WT* /Q )NT Jr))T+h *M1MJr+ )/ ;N(T6* M0rqMJM)l )/ UM*)M0O(M*N qT)oTT0
assaults on the defenseless. Any instance of painful coercion, no matter how
minor or middling the pain, would qualify as torture on his view, as a
P-T+'T+*T: r()/0/1l 'M/Jr)M/0 oNT+Tql /0T6* /o0 -rM0 +TWT-)M'M)l M* (*TU
against herself. If someone twists my arm very moderately until I agree to
tell her a secret I have not thereby been tortured, even if we accept that the
reason I speak is to stop the pain and that my coercer has thereby forced me
to betray myself. "() ;(**1r06* )NT/+l +T,(M+T* W/0WJ(UM0O /)NT+oM*Tf ^0
short, while Sussman surely has severe, all-consuming pain in mind, the
wrong-making features he identifies would apply to qualitatively lower
degrees of pain.
The second problem for Sussman is that if the gravamen of painful
coercion is forced self-betrayal, many instances of non-painful coercion
share this feature. Sussman is somewhat aware of this possibility. He argues
)Nr)h M0 rUUM)M/0 )/ *Tm(rJ UT*M+Th Purt0l *(M)rqJl M0)T0*T r0U +TJT0)JT**
craving, whether for food, drugs, sleep, or just quiet, could be the medium
u/Q )/+)(+Ttf:96 The idea is that the victim, by identifying with the desire or
craving used against her, would feel partly complicit in her own violation.
While this extends the logic of self-betrayal beyond the infliction of bodily
pain, Sussman nonetheless limits the extension to the realm of unthinking
impulses and instinctsSbasic, first order desires and cravings that one has
95 See Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL 440 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969); NOMOS XIV:
COERCION (Roland J. Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1972).
96 Sussman, supra note 12, at 27.
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JM1M)TU -/oT+ )/ r1T0U 'Mr +r)M/0rJ UTJMqT+r)M/0h r0U )Nr) M0 ;(**1r06*
imagining would be overwhelming.97
But we can extend the logic further yet to non-first order and non-
overwhelming desires.98 In the blackmail case, for instance, where someone
threatens to release a compromising photograph of the victimSfor example,
one that reveals him to be a homosexualS)NT 'MW)M16* UT*M+T Q/+ )Nr)
information to remain private is what generates the pressure. If we can say
that someone identifies with his desire to breathe, which the waterboarder
exploits, then we can also saySindeed, much more confidently saySthat
someone identifies with the desire for his homosexuality to remain private.
While the victim is ultimately worried about what others will think of him,
this worry is uniquely his own, such that he could feel complicit in his own
violation, perhaps wishing desperately that he was not so worried about such
things, or that he had more courage. The blackmailer, then, seems to commit
)NT )/+)(+T+6* *-TWMrJ o+/0O /0 ;(**1r06* 'MToh r* NT (*T* )NT 'MW)M16* /o0
affects, emotions, and desires as tools for exploiting the victim.99 But
blackmail is not torture.
With this, we can conclude our analysis of the over-inclusiveness of
;(**1r06* W/0WT-)M/0 /Q )/+)(+Tf The wrong-making features he identifies
cover acts that are clearly not tortureSM0 -r+)MW(Jr+ jri P1M0/+h: 0/0-
overwhelming instances of painful coercion, like very moderate arm-twisting
and (b) non-overwhelming, non-painful instances of coercion, like
blackmail. Sussman, in sum, has not identified what, if anything, is unique
rq/() )/+)(+T6* o+/0O0T**f
97 See Harry Frankfurt, Identification and Wholeheartedness, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS INMORAL PSYCHOLOGY 27 (Ferdinand Schoeman
ed., 1987) (distinguishing first and second order desires).
98 Kramer seems aware of this point, noting, for instance, that a salesman could exploit
the feelings of a potential customer; but he nonetheless agrees with Sussman that, when
W/T+WM'Th Tm-J/M)M0O */1T/0T6* QTTJM0O* M0 )NM* orl +T-+T*T0)* r WT0)+rJ o+/0O-making feature
of torture. KRAMER, supra note 40, at 175.
99 In R v. Valderrama-Vega [1985] Crim. L.R. 220 (Eng.), the defendant, charged with
importing drugs, pleaded duress. He claimed that the offense was the result of three pressures:
(1) he was threatened with the disclosure to his wife of his homosexual tendencies, (2) there
were threats of serious violence against him and his family, and (3) he was under severe
financial strain. The Court of Appeal upheld the principle that only threats of death or serious
injury could form the basis of a duress defense (though they need not be the only reason for
)NT UTQT0Ur0)6* rW)M/0if 9NT )N+Tr) )/ +T'TrJ NM* N/1/*Tm(rJ )T0UT0WMT* or*h r* *(WNh M++TJT'r0)
to the defense. For our purposes, however, we can understand that Valderrama-Vega, when
bringing the drugs across the border, could have felt shamefully complicit in the way Sussman
describes not only due to his fear of physical violence, but also due to his fear about the
+T'TJr)M/0* )/ NM* oMQTf #0l Nr+U UM*)M0W)M/0 qT)oTT0 )NT )o/h L(*) M0 )T+1* /Q )NT 'MW)M16* /o0
feelings of complicity, seems unwarranted.
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III. PANIC AND RESPECT
Given the limitations of both the legal and philosophical conceptions of
torture, Parts III and IV advance a novel account of the practice. Part III
considers the definitional question: what is torture? It argues that torture is
)NT M0)T0)M/0rJ *r)(+r)M/0 /Q r 'MW)M16* W/0*WM/(*0T** oM)N -r0MWf Part IV
then considers the normative question: why might it be wrong to do this to
someone? It argues that tortureSand degrading treatment more broadlyS
constitutes an extreme form of disrespect.
A. SUFFUSIVE PANIC
1. Blinding Pain
Nazi interrogators tortured Jean Améry though the method referred to
as strappado or corda. His hands were shackled behind his back. A chain
was hooked to the shackles. The chain lead to the top of a vaulted ceiling,
where it ran into a roll. 9NT WNrM0 or* -(JJTU (-or+U* (0)MJ #1p+l6* r+1*
and then body were raised off the ground, with his shoulders bearing all of
his weight. P[T]here was a crackling and splintering in my shoulders that my
q/Ul Nr* 0/) Q/+O/))T0 (0)MJ )NM* N/(+h: #1p+l o+M)T* /'T+ )o/ UTWrUT* rQ)T+
the ordeal.100 P9NT qrJJ* *-+r0O Q+/1 )heir sockets. My own body weight
caused luxation; I fell into a void and now hung bymy dislocated arms, which
NrU qTT0 )/+0 NMON Q+/1 qTNM0U r0U oT+T 0/o )oM*)TU /'T+ 1l NTrUf:101
Améry describes the consuming nature of the pain:
Whoever is overcome by pain through torture experiences his body as never before. In
self-negation, his flesh becomes a total reality. . . . [O]nly in torture does the
transformation of the person into flesh become complete. Frail in the face of violence,
yelling out in pain, awaiting no help, capable of no resistance, the tortured person is
only a body, and nothing else beside that.102
During his thirty months of confinement in the late 1970s, agents of the
Argentinian military junta repeatedly tortured Jacobo Timerman, who had
edited a newspaper critical of the regime.103 In describing the experience of
being electrically shocked, Timerman echoes #1p+l6* -/M0) )Nr) Q/+ )NT
)/+)(+T 'MW)M1 PNM* QJT*N qTW/1T* r )/)rJ +TrJM)lf:
^)6* M1-/**MqJT )/ *N/()Syou howl . . . . What does a man feel? The only thing that
W/1T* )/ 1M0U M*? 9NTl6+T +M--M0O r-r+) 1l QJT*Nf . . . When electric shocks are applied,
100 AMÉRY, supra note 15, at 32.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 33.
103 JACOBO TIMERMAN, PRISONER WITHOUT A NAME, CELL WITHOUT A NUMBER 22-31
(Tolby Talbot trans., 1981).
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rJJ )Nr) r 1r0 QTTJ* M* )Nr) )NTl6+T +M--M0O r-r+) NM* QJT*Nf #0U NT N/oJ*f #Q)T+oards, he
U/T*06) QTTJ )NT qJ/o*f X/+ U/T* NT QTTJ )NT1 )NT 0Tm) Urlh oNT0 )NT+T6* 0/ TJTW)+MWM)l
but only blows.104
9M1T+1r06* UM*)M0W)M/0 qT)oTT0 P*N/()M0O: r0U PN/oJM0O: *TT1* )/
refer to the aural responses characteristic of people versus animals. The
tortured person does not shout out like a person, with words, but rather howls
like an animal.105 #1p+l +TrWNT* r *M1MJr+ W/0WJ(*M/0h +T-JrWM0O PN/oJ: oM)N
P*,(TrJ:?
A slight pressure by the tool-wielding hand is enough to turn the otherSalong with his
head, in which are perhaps stored Kant and Hegel, and all nine symphonies, and the
World as Will and RepresentationSinto a shrilly squealing piglet at slaughter.106
#1p+l6* rO/0l 'M)Mr)TU NM* -T+*/0rJ -+M0WM-JT*h 1r00T+*h 1T1/+MT*h
aesthetic and social theories, political identities, and so forth, all represented
ironically in the excerpt by his knowledge of Kant, Hegel, Beethoven, and
Schopenhauer.
Améry presents his book as a meditation on what it meant to be an
intellectual under torture and in a concentration camp. The excerpts here
encapsulate his conclusions on torture, which do not differ much from those
of his time in a concentration camp. If an intellectual human being differs
dramatically in his capacities and intrinsic value from a piglet, an intellectual
M0 rO/0l r0U r -MOJT) M0 rO/0l r+T )NT *r1T P*N+MJJl *,(TrJM0O: W+Tr)(+Th
Améry argues.107 #1p+l or* r q/Ul M0 -rM0h Pr0U 0/)NM0O TJ*T qT*MUT
)Nr)f:108 Agony erased his refinement and cultivation, and his personal
commitments, too, as the Nazis restricted his ken to his excruciation, with
the resultSthe intended resultSthat he was ready to betray himself and the
Belgian resistance in order to realize his singular desire for the pain to stop.
_/oT'T+h bJrM0T ;Wr++l Tm-JrM0* )Nr) )NT W/0WT-) /Q PqT)+rlrJ:
mischaracterizes the process of confessing or informing under the duress of
torture.109
104 Id. at 33.
105 SeeMurphy, supra note 32, at 233 (arguing that a puni*N1T0) M* PM0 M)*TJQ: UTO+rUM0O
oNT0 M) P)+Tr)* )NT -+M*/0T+ r* r0 r0M1rJ M0*)TrU /Q r N(1r0 qTM0O: /+ P-T+Nr-* T'T0 M* r0
attempt to reduce NM1 )/ r0 r0M1rJ /+ r 1T+T )NM0O:if >0 )NT W/00TW)M/0 qT)oTT0 UTO+rUr)M/0
and animalization, see infra Part IV.B.
106 AMÉRY, supra note 15, at 35.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 33.
109 ^0 */ U/M0Oh *NT -+T*T0)* Q(+)NT+ +Tr*/0* )/ U/(q) ;(**1r06* W/0WJ(*M/0 )Nr) )/+)(+T6*
essential wrong-1rKM0O QTr)(+T M* )Nr) M) q+M0O* rq/() Pr KM0U /Q *TJQ-qT)+rlrJf: See discussion
supra Part II.B.2.
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One cannot betray or be false to something that has ceased to exist and, in the most
literal way possible, the created world of thought and feeling, all the psychological and
1T0)rJ W/0)T0) )Nr) W/0*)M)()T* q/)N /0T6* *TJQ r0U /0T6* o/+JU . . . ceases to exist.110
Scarry demonstrates here that betrayal is not a strict liability offense.
The torture victim lacks awareness ofSand thus cannot in fact betraySthe
values or people that his impulsive utterances may impact. Of course, he has
some awareness of them, or else he would not be able to say anything related
to them, but he lacks awareness of their meaning and importance.
In parallel to Améry and Timerman, Scarry emphasizes the attention-
fixing capacity of severe pain. P#* M0 UlM0O r0U UTr)Nh: *NT o+M)T*h P*/ M0
*T+M/(* -rM0 )NT WJrM1* /Q )NT q/Ul ())T+Jl 0(JJMQl )NT WJrM1* /Q )NT o/+JUf:111
;NT UT*W+MqT* )NT P*-r)MrJ: Tm-T+MT0WT /Q Tm)+T1T -rM0? )NT (0M'T+*T TM)NT+
shrinks down to the body or the body augments to fill the entire universe.112
;Wr++l W/0)M0(T* )Nr) M0)T0*T -rM0 M* rJ*/ PJr0O(rOT-UT*)+/lM0O:? Pr* )NT
W/0)T0) /Q /0T6* o/+JU UM*M0)TO+r)T*h */ )NT W/0)T0) /Q /0T6* Jr0O(rOT
disintegrates; as the self disintegrates, so that which would express and
-+/LTW) )NT *TJQ M* +/qqTU /Q M)* */(+WT r0U M)* *(qLTW)f:113 Verbal expression
depends upon an awareness of, and desire to engage with, the concepts and
)NM0O* )/ oNMWN o/+U* +TQT+h q() )/+)(+T +T*)+MW)* /0T6* ror+T0T** r0U desire
to her pain. And pain, Scarry explains, is itself largely inexpressible, given
its lack of external referents.114 Scarry makes the further, somewhat obscure
point here that language depends upon the presence of subjectivitySof an
P^: oN/ Tm-+T**T* NerselfSand torture robs a victim of this, as the self in
110 ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THEMAKING AND UNMAKING OF THEWORLD 30
(1983).
111 Id. at 33f a/+ Q(+)NT+ UM*W(**M/0 /Q )/+)(+T6* /'T+oNTJ1M0O 0r)(+Th *TT ;T)N \+TM1T+h
Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War on
Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278, 296–99 (2003); KRAMER, supra note 40, at 161–173.
112 SCARRY, supra note 110, at 35.
113 Id. at 35. David Luban articulates a similar view:
[T]orture is a microcosm, raised to the highest level of intensity, of the tyrannical
political relationships that liberalism hates the most. I have said that torture isolates
and privatizes. Pain forcibly severs our concentration on anything outside of us; it
collapses our horizon to our own body and the damage we feel in it. . . . The world
of the man or woman in great pain is a world without relationships or engagements,
a world without an exterior. It is a world reduced to a point, a world that makes no
sense and in which the human soul finds no home and no repose.
David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1430–31
(2005).
114 SCARRY, supra note 110, at 3–IIf ;Wr++l W/0QJr)T* jri qTM0O (0rqJT )/ Tm-+T** /0T6*
pain with precision and detail with (b) being unable to express the very presence of /0T6* -rM0f
While I accept (a), I disagree with (b), at least when it comes to extreme pain. When it comes
to extreme pain, its very presence is in fact easy to communicate, as one wails involuntarily
and everyone within earshot understands what is happening.
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Tm)+T1T -rM0 PUM*M0)TO+r)T*f:115 Accepting that point, though, would require
the conclusion that when a torture victim feels pain, she does not conceive of
it as her pain. That seems very unlikely to be the case. We can say that a
)/+)(+T 'MW)M16* *T0*T /Q *TJQ M* P*T'T+TJl +T*)+MW)TU: /+ T'T0 P+(M0TU: oM)N/()
concluding that it is positively obliterated.
9M1T+1r0 -+/'MUT* *(--/+) Q/+ ;Wr++l6* PJr0O(rOT-UT*)+/lM0O:
argument. He writes that words were somehow inapposite tools for
W/11(0MWr)M0O NM* Tm-T+MT0WTh Q/+ )/+)(+T PM* r -rM0 oM)N/() -/M0)* /Q
+TQT+T0WTh +T'TJr)/+l *l1q/J*h /+ WJ(T* )/ *T+'T r* M0UMWr)/+*f:116 If words
are inherently external and social, and pain is inherently internal and
personal, then the all-consuming pain of torture would indeed be an
Tm-T+MT0WT Jr+OTJl +T*M*)r0) )/ o/+U*h oM)N /0Jl )NT qTr*)Jl PN/oJ: /+
P*,(TrJ: r'rMJrqJT r* 1Tr0* /Q Tm-+T**M/0f
2. *an’s ("o./
Cesare Beccaria, writing in 1764, attempts to clarify the psychological
-+/WT**T* ql oNMWN )NT *T'T+T -rM0 r))T0Ur0) )/ )/+)(+T W/0*(1T* /0T6*
attention:
Every act of our will is always proportional to the force of the sensory impression which
gives rise to it; and the sensibility of every man is limited. Therefore, the impression
made by pain may grow to such an extent that, having filled the whole of the sensory
field, it leaves the torture victim no freedom to do anything but choose the quickest
route to relieving himself of the immediate pain.117
"TWWr+Mr r+O(T* NT+T )Nr) )/+)(+T W/0*(1T* /0T6* r))T0)M/0 r0U Q/+WT* r
reaction because (a) humans are creatures that respond to sense impressions
r0U jqi )/+)(+T W/1-JT)TJl *r)(+r)T* /0T6* *T0*T* oM)N -rM0f I doubt, though,
)Nr) "TWWr+Mr6* P-+T*T0)M*): T1-M+MWM*1Sif we can call it thatScan explain
)NT )/+)(+T 'MW)M16* Tm-T+MT0WTf For to make any sense of the view that our
sense impressions determine our actions would require accepting what
Beccaria seems to overlook: that many such acts are impelled by our prior
sensory impressions, as Locke argues.118 Otherwise, there would be no way
to understand my desire for, say, orange juice, if I was not at that moment
looking at orange juice. As such, without saying more, it is not clear why
QMJJM0O /0T6* present sensory field would consume her attention and
115 Id. at 35.
116 TIMERMAN, supra note 103, at 32.
117 Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, in ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND
OTHER WRITINGS 41 (Richard Bellamy ed., Richard Davies, Virginia Cox, and Richard
Bellamy trans., 1995) (emphasis added) (quoted in KRAMER, supra note 40, at 165).
118 See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING Book II: Chapter
2 jP>Q <T)T0)M/0:ih IEB–52 (ed. Roger Woolhouse ed., Penguin 1997) (1689).
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determine her will. Perhaps a prior sense impression could win that moment
nonetheless.
I take no position on empiricist psychology or any such issues. The
general point is that we normally retain some discretion over whether the data
currently streaming in through our five senses determines our actions or not.
This applies, indeed, to many instances of pain. For example, a dull pain in
my shoulder will not prevent me from going about my day. Another way to
state the point is that in every waking moment our sensory field is saturated
by whatever we see, hear, taste, touch, and smell. But these experiences do
not always consume our attention and determine our will. We need to tell
another story, then, about why extreme pain forces us into the moment, as it
were, in the ways articulated by Améry, Timerman, and Scarry. To say that
M) QMJJ* /0T6* *T0*/+l QMTJU M* 0/) T0/(ONh OM'T0 )Nr) )NT+T (*(rJJl M* r J/) /Q
)NM0KM0O O/M0O /0 PqTNM0U )NT *WT0T*: /Q /(+ *T0*/+l Tm-T+MT0WTh r0U )Nr)
this thinking often determines our decisions. To understand what extreme
pain does to us, how it floods that behind the scenes action, shrinking us
down in the ways described above, requires an additional concept: panic.
The word comes to English from the French panique, which in turn
derives from the Greek panikosh 1Tr0M0O P/Q =r0h: )NT r0WMT0) `+TTK O/US
half-man, half-goatSof fertility, pastures, flocks, and shepherds, among
other things.119 Normally conceived of as a peaceful, playful god, he was
believed to retain a dark side affiliated with a shout that would cause flocks
to stampede, fleeing in terror.120 =r06* *N/() or* qTJMT'TU )/ M1-rW) -T/-JTh
too, supposedly causing the Persians to flee in the battle of Marathon.121 The
English word is associated with this aspect of the god. From the Oxford
English Dictionary: P# *(UUT0 QTTJM0O /Q rJr+1 /+ QTr+ /Q *(QQMWMT0) M0)T0*M)l
or uncontrollableness as to lead to extravagant or wildly unthinking
behaviour, such as that which may spread through a crowd of people; the
*)r)T /Q Tm-T+MT0WM0O *(WN r QTTJM0Of:122 I lack the expertise to engage with
the neurology of panic.123 However, my central point requires only a basic
awareness of the self-preservation instincts associated with the fight-or-flight
response. When pain or suffering reaches a certain point, it can trigger these
119 Panic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/panic
[https://perma.cc/D6N3-QPAV] (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
120 See ROBERTGRAVES, THEGREEKMYTHS 101 (1992).
121 See3f 3r)KM0* [J/lUh P9NT "r))JT /Q Yr+r)N/0? E@c "f!fh: G J. HELLENIC STUD. 380,
391–92 (1881).
122 Panic, OED ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/136852?rskey=EVMqyn&
result=2 [https://perma.cc/B8F6-HPT4] (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
123 See generally John A. Wemmie, Neurobiology of Panic and pH Chemosensation in the
Brain, 13 DIALOGUESCLINICALNEUROSCIENCE 475 (2011).
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M0*)M0W)*h Wr(*M0O )NT PoMJUJl (0)NM0KM0O qTNr'M/(+: W/0*)M)()M'T /Q -r0MW.
The concept of the stampede elucidates. 9NT 'MW)M16* -rM0 /+ *(QQT+M0Oh oNT0
coupled with her self-preservation instincts, will stampede over the other
aspects of her consciousness and identity, dominating not only her sensory
experience, but also the behind the scenes deliberation in an immersive rush
of make it stop right now panic.
In 1958 Henri Alleg, a newspaper editor like Timerman, was tortured in
a variety of ways by the French Algerian authorities.124 They wanted the
names and locations of the people who were protecting him while he was in
hiding.125 Alleg, describing the first time that he was waterboarded,
Tm-+T**T* )/+)(+T6* -/oT+* /Q UT)T+1M0r)M/0?
3NT0 T'T+l)NM0O or* +TrUlh NT *rMU )/ 1T? 83NT0 l/( or0) )/ )rJKh rJJ l/( Nr'T )/ U/
M* 1/'T l/(+ QM0OT+*f6 #0U NT )(+0TU /0 )NT )r-f 9NT +rO or* */rKTU +r-MUJlf 3r)T+
flowed everywhere: in my mouth, in my nose, all over my face. But for a while I could
still breath in some small gulps of air. I tried, by contracting my throat, to take in as
little water as possible and to resist suffocation by keeping air in my lungs for as long
r* ^ W/(JUf "() ^ W/(JU06) N/JU /0 Q/+ 1/+T )Nr0 r QTo 1/1T0)*f ^ NrU )NT M1-+T**M/0
of drowning, and a terribly agony, that of death itself, took possession of me. In spite
of myself, all the muscles of my body struggled uselessly to save myself from
suffocation. In spite of myself, the fingers of my two hands shook uncontrollably.
89Nr)6* M)5 _T6* O/M0O )/ )rJKh6 *rMU r '/MWTf126
Extreme pain or suffering, in this way, does not just hurt more than
moderate pain or suffering; it also contains within it the possibility of a
stampeding panic.
Christopher Hitchens, interested in the question of whether
waterboarding constituted torture, volunteered to be waterboarded by US
Special Forces. His recounting echoes that of Alleg:
In this pregnant darkness, head downward, I waited for a while until I abruptly felt a
slow cascade of water going up my nose. Determined to resist if only for the honor of
my navy ancestors who had so often been in peril on the sea, I held my breath for a
while and then had to exhale andSas you might expectSinhale in turn. The inhalation
brought the damp cloths tight against my nostrils, as if a huge, wet paw had been
suddenly and annihilatingly clamped over my face. Unable to determine whether I was
breathing in or out, and flooded more with sheer panic than with mere water, I triggered
the pre-arranged signal and felt the unbelievable relief of being pulled upright and
having the soaking and stifling layers pulled off mef ^ QM0U ^ U/06) or0) )/ )TJJ l/( N/o
little time I lasted.127
124 HENRIALLEG, THEQUESTION (John Calder trans., 1958).
125 Id. at 47.
126 Id. at 60-61.
127 Christopher Hitchens, 0elie-e ?e, B/’s &or/.re, VANITY FAIR (Aug. 2008),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2008/08/hitchens200808 [https://perma.cc/3P2Z-8TYR].
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As to whether waterboarding constituted torture, Hitchens concluded:
P^ r--Jl )NT #q+rNr1 [M0W/J0 )T*) Q/+ 1/+rJ Wr*(M*)+l? 8^Q *Jr'T+l M* 0/)
o+/0Oh 0/)NM0O M* o+/0Of6 Well, then, if waterboarding does not constitute
)/+)(+Th )NT0 )NT+T M* 0/ *(WN )NM0O r* )/+)(+Tf:128
Malcolm Nance was the Master Instructor and Chief of Training at the
7; Xr'l6* ;(+'M'rJh b'r*M/0h <T*M*)r0WT r0U b*Wr-T ;WN//J j;b<bih oNMWNh
among other activities, trains elite soldiers in surviving and ideally resisting
torture.129 In addition to leading, witnessing, and supervising the
waterboarding of hundreds of people, he underwent the procedure himself
Pr) M)* Q(JJT*)f:130 _T o+M)T* /Q )NT or)T+q/r+U? P70JT** l/( Nr'T qTT0
strapped down to the board, have endured the agonizing feeling of the water
overpowering your gag reflex, and then feel your throat open and allow pint
after pint of water to involuntarily fill your lungs, you will not know the
1Tr0M0O /Q )NT o/+Uf:131 He continues:
It does not simulate drowning, as the lungs are actually filling with water. There is no
way to simulate that. The victim is drowning.132
Waterboarding is slow motion suffocation with enough time to contemplate the
inevitability of black out and expirationSusually the person goes into hysterics on the
board.133
They all talk! Anyone strapped down will say anything, absolutely anything to get the
torture to stop.134
In these excerpts, both Hitchens and Lance confirm that torture induces
a make it stop right now panic and the centrality of this feeling in explaining
the aversiveness of torture. Hitchens expresses this point succinctly when he
o+M)T* )Nr) NT or* PQJ//UTU 1/+T oM)N *NTT+ -r0MW )Nr0 oM)N 1T+T
water . . . :135
128 Id.








135 Probably the most famous fictional account of this process is the climax to George
>+oTJJ6* 1984h oNT0 3M0*)/0 M* M0)T++/Or)TU ql >6"+MT0h )NT rOT0) /Q )NT )/)rJM)r+Mr0 +TOM1Tf
WinstonSwho has a phobia of ratsSis strapped to a chair and threatened with a cage
containing starving rats. The cage was configured so that it could be placed on his head like a
mask. It had a wire door toward the face that could be lifted once the mask was secured, after
which the rats would eat his face. For W/0)Tm)h )NT WNr+rW)T+ /Q ](JMr M* 3M0*)/06* J/'T+ r0U
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To my knowledge, there have been no serious scientific studies of the
psychological, psychiatric, or neurological experience of torture in the
moment of agony. But ex post studies of survivors provide further evidence
for the connection between torture and panic, given the prevalence of post-
traumatic stress disorders and panic attacks after the fact.136 Consider Trung,
co-conspirator. This extract is a good demonstration, as well, of how mental torture, by
resulting in a suffusive panic, belongs in the same category of injury as physical torture.
The cage was nearer; it was closing in. Winston heard a succession of shrill cries which
appeared to be occurring in the air above his head. But he fought furiously against his
panic. To think, to think, even with a split second leftSto think was the only hope.
Suddenly the foul musty odour of the brutes struck his nostrils. There was a violent
convulsion of nausea inside him, and he almost lost consciousness. Everything had
gone black. For an instant he was insane, a screaming animal. Yet he came out of the
blackness clutching an idea. There was one and only one way to save himself. He must
interpose another human being, the body of another human being, between himself and
the rats.
The circle of the mask was large enough now to shut out the vision of anything else.
The wire door was a couple of hand-spans from his face. The rats knew what was
coming now. One of them was leaping up and down, the other, an old scaly grandfather
of the sewers, stood up, with his pink hands against the bars, and fiercely sniffed the
air. Winston could see the whiskers and the yellow teeth. Again the black panic took
hold of him. He was blind, helpless, mindless.
8^) or* r W/11/0 -(0M*N1T0) M0 ^1-T+MrJ !NM0rh6 *rMU >6"+MT0 r* UMUrW)MWrJJl r* T'T+f
The mask was closing on his face. The wire brushed his cheek. And thenSno, it was
not relief, only hope, a tiny fragment of hope. Too late, perhaps too late. But he had
suddenly understood that in the whole world there was just one person to whom he
could transfer his punishmentSone body that he could thrust between himself and the
rats. And he was shouting frantically, over and over.
8x/ M) )/ ](JMr5 x/ M) )/ ](JMr5 X/) 1T5 ](JMr5 ^ U/06) Wr+T oNr) l/( U/ )/ NT+f 9Tr+ NT+
QrWT /QQh *)+M- NT+ )/ )NT q/0T*f X/) 1T5 ](JMr5 X/) 1T56
GEORGEORWELL, 1984 273–74 (1949).
136 See, e.g., Brian Engdahl, et. al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in a Community Group
of Former Prisoners of War: A Normative Response to Severe Trauma, 154 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1576 (1997); Metin Ba*d /HJ(, Severity of Trauma as Predictor of Long-Term
Psychological Status in Survivors of Torture, 9 J. ANXIETY DISORDERS 339 (1995); Raija-
Leena Punamäki, et. al., Nature of Torture, PTSD, and Somatic Symptoms Among Political
Ex‐Prisoners, 23 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 532 (2010); Colin Bouwer & Dan Stein, Panic
Disorder Following Torture by Suffocation is Associated with Predominantly Respiratory
Symptoms, 29 PSYCHOL. MED. 233 (1999); Alejandro Moreno &Michael Peel, Posttraumatic
Seizures in Survivors of Torture: Manifestations, Diagnosis, and Treatment , 6 J. IMMIGRANT
HEALTH 179 (2004); Devon Hinton, et. al., Panic Disorder Among Cambodian Refugees
Attending a Psychiatric Clinic: Prevalence and Subtypes, 22 GENERALHOSP. PSYCHIATRY 437
(2000); Devon E. Hinton, et. al., Orthostatic Panic Attacks Among Vietnamese Refugees, 44
TRANSCULTURAL PSYCHIATRY 515 (2007); Marcello Ferrada-Noli, et. al., Suicidal Behavior
After Severe Trauma. Part 1: PTSD Diagnoses, Psychiatric Comorbidity, and Assessments
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a 61-year-old Vietnamese refugee living in Boston.137 He had served as a
high-level officer in the South Vietnamese army before he was imprisoned
for 12 years by the North Vietnamese army and subjected to beatings and
torture.138 He reported P/+)N/*)r)MW -r0MW r))rWK*:Spanic attacks induced by
standing upright.139 Researchers who were studying the pervasiveness of that
phenomenon amongst Vietnamese refugees provided the following case
study:
Trung had not received psychiatric care before presenting at our clinic. He complained
/Q -//+ T0T+Olh QJr*NqrWK*h N/-TJT**0T**h M0*/10Mr jL(*) /'T+ r0 N/(+6* *JTT- r) 0MON)ih
and nightmares. Upon standing, he had dizziness, blurry vision, tinnitus, shortness of
breath, chest tightness, sweating, palpitations, diaphoresis, and fear of death. Trung
worried about a heart attack ('a. /i5) and dangerously high blood pressure. After
sitting back down, these symptoms persisted for about 20 minutes. In these panic
episodes, he had four different types of flashbacks. For one, as tinnitus (@ tai) began,
NT +TWrJJTU NM* Q+MT0U6* *W+Tr1* (-/0 qTM0O )rKT0 /() /Q NM* -+M*/0 WTJJ r0U T*W/+)TU r
short distance away, then shot and killed by five guards; the sound of bullets, the
screams of his friend, the anxiety-produced ear ringing, all seemed to combine in a
dizzying mix. Second, he recalled being tortured by having logs placed on his chest
until he lost consciousness. (He was tortured this way several times.) Third, he recalled
when the interrogators kicked and stomped upon his chest until he lost consciousnessS
and that when he awoke, his chest ached. And fourth, he recalled one day, when feeling
ill and off balance, tripping and falling down a rocky, steep slope; he hit his head half
way down the slope, losing consciousness. Each of the flashbacks came into his mind
like a movie, one after another, each lasting about 1 minute. The flashbacks only
stopped when he was able to pull himself from the vortex of memory, most usually by
turning on the television.140
Given that even a memory of torture can induce feelings of panic in this
way, and that such an experience is relatively common amongst torture
survivors, that is at least some further evidence, working backwards, that the
experience of torture itself involves extreme panic.141 We can add this ex
post evidence to the compelling first-hand accounts provided by Améry,
Timerman, Alleg, Hitchens, and LanceSas well as the intuitive evidence
about what it might feel like to be tortured.
With this, we can restate the definition of torture proposed above:
Torture is the intentional infliction of a suffusive panic. Unlike the legal
of Suicidal Behavior, 11 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 103 (1998); Athanase Hagengimana, et. al.,
Somatic Panic-Attack Equivalents in a Community Sample of Rwandan Widows who Survived
the 1994 Genocide, 117 PSYCHIATRY RES. 1 (2003).
137 Hinton, et. al., supra note 136, at 523–24.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 524.
140 Id.
141 Below I consider the moral implications of the long-term damage of torture. See
discussion infra Part IV.A.
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definition of torture (the intentional infliction of severe suffering142) and
tho*T -+/-/*TU ql ;N(T jr0 Pr**r(J) (-/0 )NT UTQT0*TJT**:143) and Sussman
jr Q/+WTU P*TJQ-qT)+rlrJ:144), this definition passes the broad-brush test of
conceptual analysis, encompassing practices that are definitely torture but
leaving out practices that are definitely not torture. The definition easily
encompasses mental tortureStorture which operates directly through
psychological mechanisms, rather than through bodily pain, as in the
presence of constant light or darkness or loud noiseSas long as the
experience overwhelms in the way indicated above, culminating in the same
phenomenology of panic.145 But it leaves out lesser forms of painful
coercion. Very moderately twisting my arm, for instance, will not induce
suffusive panic. It also leaves out blackmail. A victim of blackmail will be
able to reflect to some degree on how she might respond to the threat. She
will not flail about hysterically and impulsively upon receipt of the
qJrWK1rMJT+6* JT))T+h N/oJM0O JMKT r0 r0M1rJf It also leaves out incarceration,
)N(* -+TWJ(UM0O )NT PTr*l: W/1-r+M*/0 qT)oTT0 )/+)(+T r0U J/0O-term
incarceration enabled by the legal definition of torture.146 Whatever long-
term incarceration does to someone, only very rarely does it induce feelings
of utter terror and panic.147
3. Interpretative Constraint
This definition avoids much of the vagueness inherent to the legal
definition of torture. =+T*MUT0) `T/+OT 3f "(*N6* >QQMWT /Q [TOrJ !/(0*TJ
142 See supra Part II.A.
143 Shue, supra note 66, at 130
144 Sussman, supra note 12, at 21.
145 a/+ `T/+OT >+oTJJ6* QMW)M/0rJ rWW/(0) /Q 1T0)rJ )/+)(+Th *TT supra note 135. SeeDavid
Luban & Henry Shue,Mental Torture: A Critique of Erasures in U.S. Law, 100 GEO. L. J. 624
(2011) (analyzing the concept of mental suffering and arguing that US legal interpretation of
anti-torture laws entails the legalization of mental torture).
146 See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
147 This discussion was concerned with the meaning of human torture. Howmight it relate,
though, to the meaning of animal torture? It is not a strange question, given that torture is
commonly referred to in the animal context. While I lack the space to investigate animal
torture at length, I would venture that animal torture constitutes intentionally P*r)(+r)M0O: )NT
r0M1rJ6* consciousness with suffering (making the cat squeal and squirm) in the same way
)Nr) N(1r0 )/+)(+T W/0*)M)()T* M0)T0)M/0rJJl P*r)(+r)M0O: )NT N(1r06* W/0*WM/(*0T** oM)N
suffering. However, whether or not a suffusive panic follows for the animal is ultimately
(0K0/orqJTh ^ )NM0Kh r0U M) o/(JU UT-T0U /0 )NT r0M1rJ6* W/O0M)M'T Wr-rWM)MT*f <TOr+UJT**h
when defining what it means to torture a human, the experience of panic is a necessary
ingredient. Were the person somehow to experience her physical or mental ordeal with internal
calm and equanimity, I would argue that she was not in fact tortured. See related discussion
W/0WT+0M0O _T0+M #JJTO6* )/+)(+T infra Part III.A.4. Thanks to John Goldberg and Victor
Tadros for pressing me to consider animal torture, and for helpful comments on the issue.
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(OLC) lawyers, in considering whether waterboarding qualified as torture,
interpreted the US statute codifying the CATSexcerpted aboveSwhich
UTQM0T* )/+)(+Th M0 +TJT'r0) -r+)h r* r0 rW) Pintended to inflict severe physical
/+ 1T0)rJ -rM0 /+ *(QQT+M0Of:148 ^0 r))T1-)M0O )/ UTQM0T P*T'T+T -rM0 /+
*(QQT+M0Oh: )NT >[! JrolT+* J//KTU )/ 1TUMWrJ rU1inistration statutes, where
!/0O+T** UTQM0T* oNr) r0 PT1T+OT0Wl 1TUMWrJ W/0UM)M/0: M* Q/+ )NT -(+-/*T*
of receiving health benefits.149 These definitions only obliquely reference
P*T'T+T -rM0f: X/0T)NTJT**h )NT >[! JrolT+* r+O(TU )Nr) P*T'T+T -rM0: Q/+
the -(+-/*T* /Q )NT !#9 r1/(0)* )/ oNr) !/0O+T** UTQM0TU r* r PT1T+OT0Wl
1TUMWrJ W/0UM)M/0f:150 They thus concluded, first, that to amount to torture
under the CAT, the pain must be as intense as that associated with serious
physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or
death; and, second, they concluded that waterboarding did not inflict physical
pain of such intensity, and therefore did not qualify as torture.151 Even if the
arguments of John Yoo, Jay Bybee and their colleagues were circuitous and
disingenuous,152 there is at least a patina of legality to them. And the
contention here is that there would have been much less interpretative wiggle
room for them to argue that waterboarding did not qualify as torture if the
legal definitio0 /Q )/+)(+T or* P)NT M0)T0)M/0rJ M0QJMW)M/0 /Q overwhelming
*(QQT+M0Oh: P)NT M0)T0)M/0rJ M0QJMW)M/0 /Q -r0MWh: /+h 1/*) -+TWM*TJlh P)NT
M0)T0)M/0rJ M0QJMW)M/0 /Q r *(QQ(*M'T -r0MWf: In this way, as indicated above,
the legal definition of torture represents a failure of legal drafting, insofar as
a more precise definition, capable of more effective regulation, was available.
4. Counter-Example
Before considering the wrong-making features of intentionally inducing
a suffusive panic, let us consider a potential counter-example for this
proposed definition. What about the unusual person who resists torture?
Alleg may have moved his fingers when he was waterboarded the first timeS
PIn spite of myself, the fingers of my two hands shook uncontrollably.
89Nr)6* M)5 _T6* O/M0O )/ )rJKh6 *rMU r '/MWT:153Sbut he did not in fact talk.
148 See CAT, supra note 1, at art. 1(1).
149 YT1/+r0U(1 Q+/1 >QQMWT /Q )NT #**M*)r0) #))6l `T0f )/ #JqT+)/ <f `/0k !/(0*TJ )/
the President 5–6 (Aug. 1, 2002) (citing 8 USC § 1369 (2000); 42 USC § 1395w-22; id.
§ 1395x (2000); id. § 1395dd (2000); id. § 1396b (2000); id. § 1396u-2 (2000)).
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 For critical discussion of their legal reasoning, see THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD
TOABUGHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005); LUBAN, supra note 9, at
111–36; Waldron, supra note 9, at 1703–09.
153 ALLEG, supra note 124, at 49.
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Not then, nor during any of his increasingly vicious tortures, not even when
they electrically shocked his mouth and genitals.154 He was regarded as
something of a marvel by his tormentors.155 For, as Nance, the expert
or)T+q/r+UT+h o+M)T*h P9NTl rJJ )rJK5:156 "() U/T* #JJTO6* rJ1/*)
*(-T+N(1r0 W/1-/*(+T 1Tr0 )Nr) NT UMU 0/) Tm-T+MT0WT r P*(QQ(*M'T -r0MWh:
and thus entail that he was not tortured, according to my definition? That
would surely be damaging to my proposal, given that there is absolutely no
denying that Alleg was tortured.
Let us consider, though, an alternative situation. Imagine that someone
was provided with a strange drug cocktail, such that she was conscious that
her tormentors were tearing apart her body, but without any pain or alarm, as
if she was sleepily watching a program on a distant television. That my
definition rules out such an experience as torture is, I think, a point in its
favor. Perhaps when she regains full consciousness, she will experience the
panic of genuine torture. During the ordeal itself, however, she was
grievously assaulted, but she was not tortured. This imagined scenario bears
JM))JT +TJr)M/0*NM- )/ #JJTO6* Tm-T+MT0WTf He describes here what happened
after he moved his fingers, but then refused to talk:
83TJJh )NT0$6 ^ +T1rM0TU *MJT0)f 8_T6* -JrlM0O Or1T* oM)N (*5 =() NM* NTrU (0UT+ rOrM056
This time I clenched my fists, forcing the nails into my palm. I had decided I was not
going to move my fingers again. It was better to die of asphyxiation right away. I feared
to undergo again that terrible moment where I felt myself losing consciousness, while
at the same time fighting with all my power not to die. I did not move my hands, but
three times I knew again this insupportable agony. In extremis, they let me get my
breath back while I threw up the water.
The last time, I lost consciousness.157
It is not as if Alleg experienced his violations with equanimity, as if
from a distance. His torturers pushed the buttons that every human has
hidden away, buttons that, when pressed in the right way, will induce
PM0*(--/+)rqJT rO/0l: r0U )T++/+f158 The right way to describe his experience
is that he experienced a suffusive, instinctual panic, and so was tortured, even
if he somehow resisted this panic, denying the authority of the body and
resolving to die.
154 Id. at 69–72.
155 Id. at 104.
156 Nance, supra note 129.
157 ALLEG, supra note 124, at 61–62.
158 Id. at 62.
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B. DISRESPECT
As stated above, the definitional and the normative are closely
intertwined, but ultimately distinct. If this works as a definitional matter, the
normative question nonetheless remains. Why, exactly, is forcing someone
into a perfectly awful moment, via the infliction of a suffusive panic, wrong?
Or, more specifically, what are its wrong-making features? If its wrongness
is obvious, that is not helpful for the present inquiry, which is not about
torture in the end.159 We are looking to torture as a source of comparison, to
see if it can provide any guidance on degradation-limiting reasons more
broadly. 9/ +TrJMkT )Nr) rM1h oT 0TTU )/ Tm-JrM0 )/+)(+T6* o+/0O0T** M0 )T+1*
of general concepts. My central conviction is that the concept of disrespect
is crucial to this inquirySthat the fundamental wrong-making feature of
torture is that it is egregiously disrespectful to victims. While not every
instance of disrespect, such as gently mocking somebody, is degrading, the
hypothesis is that disrespect is the metric of degradation, and that every
instance of degrading treatment will be degrading because it is disrespectful.
<r)NT+ )Nr0 UM*+T*-TW)h )NT W/0WT-) /Q PN(1r0 UMO0M)l: M* /Q)T0 M0'/KTU
in this context: torture is wrong qTWr(*T M) 'M/Jr)T* )NT 'MW)M16* N(1r0
dignity.160 Without an explanation of the underlying premises and reasons,
however, there is little force to the assertion that some treatment violates
*/1T/0T6* UMO0M)lf Respect is more basic than dignity, and more capable of
elucidating the machinery of moral reasons at work in our revulsion to certain
159 In Because it is Wrong, Charles and Gregory Fried do not offer any sort of argument
as to why torture is wrong, with conclusions following from premises. Rather, they present
M1rOT* /Q )/+)(+Th *(WN r* [T/0 `/J(q6* -rM0)M0Oh P^0)T++/Or)M/0 Ih: r0U )NT o+/0O0T** /Q
treating people in those ways is seemingly meant to be obvious to any reasonable individual.
This is not to say that their book is unpersuasiveSfar from itSbut it is not of great value for
our present purposes. CHARLES FRIED & GREGORY FRIED, BECAUSE IT ISWRONG: TORTURE,
PRIVACY AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN THEAGE OF TERROR (2010).
160 See, e.g., John Vorhaus, On Degradation - Part One: Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 31 COMMON L.WORLDREV. FBEh FAA jGccGi jP9NT T**T0WT /Q
degrading punishment is the violation of humanity dignity. . f:i% 3rJU+/0h supra note 2, at
281-AE jW/0*MUT+M0O PQ/(+ KM0U* /Q /()+rOT )/ N(1r0 UMO0M)lh: oNMWN NT (0UT+*)r0U* r*
T,(M'rJT0) )/ PQ/(+ *-TWMT* /Q UTO+rUr)M/0:? PqT*)MrJMkr)M/0h: )+Tr)1T0) QM) Q/+ r0 r0M1rJh
PM0*)+(1T0)rJMkr)M/0h: )+Tr)M0O -T/-JT r* r 1T+T 1Tr0* )/ )NT O+Tr)T+ O//Uh PM0Qr0)MJMkr)M/0h:
)+Tr)M0O r0 rU(J) r* MQ *NT oT+T r0 M0Qr0)h r0U PUT1/0Mkr)M/0h: )+Tr)M0O */1T/0T Pr* )N/(ON NT
oT+T *M1-Jl r 'MJT T1q/UM1T0) /Q T'MJf:i% \T'M0 ]f Y(+)rONh Is Corporally Punishing
Criminals Degrading? 20 J. POL. PHIL. 481, 485 (2cIGi jPu3tM)N +T*-TW) )/ JTOrJ -(0M*N1T0)h
a degrading punishment is one that is inconsistent with the recognition of the basic dignity of
)NT -(0M*NTU -T+*/0f:i% Y(+-Nlh supra 0/)T FGh r) GFF jP# -(0M*N1T0) oMJJ qT (0L(*) jr0U
thus banned on principle) if it is of such a nature as to be degrading or dehumanizing
jM0W/0*M*)T0) oM)N N(1r0 UMO0M)lif:i% ]/N0 \JTM0MOh The Hardness of Hard Treatment, in
FUNDAMENTALS OFSENTENCINGTHEORY GBFh GAB j#f #*No/+)N .Yf3r*MK TU*fh I@@Ai jP9/
degrade another is to detrrW) Q+/1 )NT /)NT+6* UMO0M)l r* r N(1r0 qTM0Of:if
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forms of treatment. There are many things that deserve respect, for instance,
but which do not bear dignity. 3T 1MON) +T*-TW) */1T/0T6* *KMJJ* r* r U+M'T+
without thinking that her skills have dignity or that she has dignity as a result
of this ability. But when something or someone has dignitySlike the dignity
of a judgeSit will be grounded in our respect for that thing or person. And,
indeed, the duty to uphold human dignity is commonly understood to derive
Q+/1 /+ )/ qT *l0/0l1/(* oM)N Nr'M0O P+T*-TW) Q/+ -T+*/0*h: r0U */ oNr)
follows should be understood as an attempt to understand certain aspects of
human dignity.161
1. Respect and Value
3Nr) U/T* M) 1Tr0 )/ P+T*-TW): */1T)NM0O$ Let us first consider Joseph
<rk6* )NT/+l /Q +T*-TW)h r0U /Q +T*-TW) Q/+ -T+*/0*f162 For Raz, respect is a
species of responding to value and thus to reason.163 On his view, respect
has two basic components.
First, he writes, to respect thi0O* 1Tr0* P+TW/O0MkM0O: )NT1 r* )NM0O* /Q
valueSP+TOr+UM0O u)NT1t M0 orl* W/0*M*)T0) oM)N )NTM+ 'rJ(Th M0 /0T6*
thoughts, understood broadly to include imaginings, emotions, wishes,
M0)T0)M/0*h T)Wf: r0Uh M0*/Qr+ r* Jr0O(rOT M* )MTU )/ )N/(ON)h -T+Nr-*
expressing this value recognition with words.164 To despise someone when
he is generous and kind is to have an emotion inconsistent with his value,
Raz explains, and thus is violative of this first reason of respect.165
Second, in light of the meta conviction that things of value are of value,
respect requires that one preserve and not destroy something that she
recognizes to have value.166 If one sees a masterpiece of painting, respect
does not require her to spend time contemplating itSshe might not be
disposed to like itSbut it does require that she not spray-paint over it. That
would be disrespectful. It would dishonor her belief that it was a good
painting, a painting, that is, from which those who are disposed differently
might derive pleasure or insight. Raz, by emphasizing both the psychological
and the practical aspects of respect, is in accord with Robin Dillon, who
161 I discuss dignity further infra Part III.B.2.
162 See generally RAZ, supra note 13.
163 Id. at 160.
164 Id. at 161.
165 Id. at 161–62.
166 Id. at 161–63.
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o+M)T*h P^0 +T*-TW)M0O r0 /qLTW)h oT /Q)T0 W/0*MUT+ M) )/ qT 1rKM0O JTOM)M1r)T
claims on our conduct as well as our thoughts and feelings . . . :167
>0 <rk6* 'MToh )NT -/M0) /Q +T*-TW)M0O r 'rJ(rqJT /qLTW)h JMKT )NT
painting masterpiece, is to protect the possibility of communion between
valuer (person) and value or good:
[I]f engaging with value is the way to realise value, respecting value is the way to
protect the possibility of that realisation. The basic reasons that something being of
value imposes are that it should be allowed to play its proper role, that is, that it should
be allowed to be realised.168
One does not owe respect, on this view, to the painting qua inanimate
object. Respect is not owed to the dry paint in and of itself, but rather to the
value that such paint can generate when appreciated by people. If wet paint
is an instrumental good, something to be used as a tool to create value, then
the completed painting is an intrinsic good, something constitutive of the
good when appreciated by a person.
Either form of value, Raz explains, depends on the presence of
something of value in itself? Pr certain category of value whose existence is
established by the very nature of value, that is, if anything is of value at all
)NT0 */1T)NM0O M* 'rJ(rqJT M0 M)*TJQf:169 Instrumental goods only have value
insofar as they benefit, in the end, something that is good in itself: the water
has value insofar as it nourishes the plant, which has value insofar as it grows
the fruit, which has value insofar as it nourishes and provides pleasure to
people, who have value in themselves.170 Meanwhile, the value of an
intrinsic good depends on the possibility that something of value in itself will
engage with it. The paintingSa potential source of intrinsic value in this
worldSwould have no such value in a world without people (and without
any possibility of generating people).
Razian respect is not limited to valuable objects. It applies with the
same logic to people themselves, given their role in the process of value
creation as beings of value in themselves.171 The conclusion is that respect
T0)rMJ*h r* <rk o+M)T*h P*)+M0OT0): OT0T+rJ U()MT* )/or+U -T/-JTh172 and while
he does not finish the thought entirely, these would involve a duty to
+TW/O0MkT TrWN -T+*/06* Wr-rWM)l )/ T0OrOT oM)N 'rJ(Th q/)N M0 /0T6* )N/(ON)*
167 Robin Dillon, Respect, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N.
Zalta ed. 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/respect/ [https://perma.
cc/U9DZ-A5ZW].
168 RAZ, supra note 13, at 167.
169 Id. at 144–45.
170 See id. at 147.
171 Id. at 170.
172 Id.
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and possibly as a form of verbal or symbolic expression, as well as a duty to
-+T*T+'T TrWN -T+*/06* Wr-rWM)l )/ T0OrOT oM)N 'rJ(Tf173 It is unclear whether
Raz imagines these duties to be positive or negative in nature. A positive
U()l )/ -+T*T+'T */1T/0T6* Wr-rWM)l )/ T0OrOT oM)N 'rJ(T o/(JU qT 'T+l
demanding, probably impossibly so given the realities of aging. But since
we are concerned with injurious actions, we can sidestep this issue, as such
actions implicate even a negative duty of practical respectSa duty not to
-(+-/*TQ(JJl Nr+1 /+ Ur1rOT */1T/0T6* Wr-acity to engage with value.
Stephen Darwall, using different terminology, distinguishes between
P+TW/O0M)M/0: r0U Pr--+rM*rJ: +T*-TW)f174 P<TW/O0M)M/0: +T*-TW) M0QJ(T0WT*
/0T6* rW)M/0*? /0T +T*-TW)* r *-TTU JM1M) ql J/oT+M0O NT+ U+M'M0O *-TTUf175
P#--+rM*rJ: respect, meanwhile, is the respect that we have for things in
'M+)(T /Q )NTM+ TmWTJJT0WT? /0T +T*-TW)* )NT ,(rJM)l /Q */1T/0T6* WNr+rW)T+h /+
tennis skills.176 Therefore, while recognition respect concerns our practical
deliberations (what we have reason to do), appraisal respect concerns our
relative estimation of things (the degree to which we believe something
exhibits some positive attribute). These two forms of respect, however, are
related in ways that Darwall seems to overlook. And we should resist
xr+orJJ6* r))T1-) )/ U+ro r *Nr+- UM*)M0W)M/0 qT)oTT0 )NT )o/h M0 Qr'/+ /Q
<rk6* 'MTo oNT+Tql -+rW)MWrJ Q/+1* /Q +T*-TW) Q/JJ/o +r)M/0rJJl Q+/1 r0
r--+TWMr)M/0 /Q */1T)NM0O6* 'rJ(Tf I believe that an actor is highly skilled
(appraisal respect), and so I see her play (recognition respect). Furthermore,
recognition respect expresses /0T6* r--+rM*rJ +T*-TW)f This could be explicit,
r* oNT0 */1T/0T *rl* */1T)NM0O /() J/(U? P;NT6* r O+Tr) rW)/+5: Or it could
qT M1-JMWM) M0 /0T6* rW)M/0% r))T0UM0O rJJ /Q NT+ plays impliedly expresses that
you think highly of her acting skills.
2. Symbolic and Non-Symbolic Respect
^Qh M0 )NM* orlh -+rW)MWrJ +T*-/0*T* )/ */1T)NM0O6* TmM*)T0WT Tm-+T**
/0T6* 'MTo /Q )Nr) )NM0O6* 'rJ(T j/+ JrWK )NT+T/Qih oT /(ON) )/ WJr+MQl )NT
difference between symbolic and non-symbolic forms of practical respect.
Symbolic respect or disrespect for a person does not, as a matter of the laws
of physicsh M1-rW) /0T6* rqMJM)l )/ qT /+ )/ U/ r0l)NM0Of It is symbolic and
therefore culturally determined. The most obvious means of symbolic
+T*-TW) /+ UM*+T*-TW) M*h /Q W/(+*Th Jr0O(rOT? Pw/(6+T qTr()MQ(J5: /+ Pw/( U/
0/) 1r))T+5: But there are non-verbal means, as well. For instance, unlike
173 See id. at 170–71.
174 See Stephen Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, 88 ETHICS 36 (1977).
175 Id. at 38.
176 Id. at 41.
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running elec)+MWM)l )N+/(ON */1T/0T6* q/Ulh *-M))M0O /0 */1T/0T U/T* 0/)h
as a matter of the laws of physics, have much of an impact. It is a non-verbal,
q() 0/0T)NTJT** *l1q/JMW 1Tr0* /Q W/11(0MWr)M0O /0T6* qTJMTQ rq/()
*/1T/0T6* JrWK /Q o/+)Nf Non-symbolic disrespect, meanwhile, involves a
physical interference with the means or mechanism by which the thing
exhibits or realizes value. Burning a painting makes it physically impossible
for the painting to exhibit value and therefore disrespects the painting. We
should follow Raz, though, in thinking that while symbolic forms of respect
are often an essential part of practical value recognition, they are generally
/Q JT**T+ M1-/+)r0WT )Nr0 rW)M/0* )Nr) -Nl*MWrJJl NTJ- /+ NM0UT+ )Nr) )NM0O6*
capacity to exhibit or realize value.177
To clarify this point, consider YMWNrTJ </*T06* W+M)M,(T /Q ]T+T1l
3rJU+/06* )NT/+l /Q N(1r0 UMO0M)lf178 Waldron unites (a) the egalitarianism
within religious definitions of dignity, wherein everyone equally exhibits the
dignity of standing above the unreflective, impulsive animal kingdom, with
(b) the traditional notion that dignity refers to high social status (as in the
PUMO0M)l: /Q r KM0Oif179 The resulting construction, which he believes is
immanent within the law, creates a general human dignity, mirroring the
a+T0WN +T'/J()M/0r+MT*6 digni/e de l’"o55e, such that each person deserves
a quasi-aristocratic status in society.180 Everyone on this view, paupers
included, merit the deferential, courteous, and caring treatment accorded to
nobility in previous centuries. </*T0 qTJMT'T* )Nr) oNMJT 3rJU+/06*
interpretation of dignity is the right one, it means that either (a) every
fundamental rights violation is essentially symbolic or (b) dignity cannot
fulfill the foundational role assigned to it in basic rights documents, as it can
only ensure the more symbolic forms of decent treatment.181 Rosen takes the
*TW/0U 'MToh r+O(M0O )Nr) 0/) rJJ +MON)* 'M/Jr)M/0* r+T P*l1q/JMW Nr+1*:?
Pu9tNT o/+*) /Q oNr) )NT XrkM *)r)T UMU )/ )NT ]To* or* 0/) )NT N(1MJMrtion
of herding them into cattle trucks and forcing them to live in conditions of
(0M1rOM0rqJT *,(rJ/+% M) or* )/ 1(+UT+ )NT1f:182
While murder is surely worse than humiliation, we should be careful to
see the connection between the more symbolic and the more physical,
between a willingness to profoundly humiliate and a willingness to murder.
177 RAZ, supra note 13, at 167.
178 MICHAELROSEN, DIGNITY: ITSHISTORY ANDMEANING (2012); Michael Rosen,Dignity
Past and Present, in JEREMYWALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS 79 (Meir Dan-Cohen
TUf GcIGi uNT+TM0rQ)T+ P</*T0h Dignity Past and Present:tf
179 WALDRON, supra note 33.
180 Id.
181 See Rosen, Dignity Past and Present, supra note 178.
182 Id. at 97.
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Whether or not both are forms of indignity, both are forms of disrespect. Of
course, in some cases, like herding people into cattle trucks, symbolic and
non-symbolic forms of disrespect are united. To herd people into any truck
against their will is a non-symbolic form of disrespect, insofar as it represents
a physical interference with their ability to realize value; but to use a cattle
truck adds an additional symbolic component, implying with cultural cues
that they are equivalent to animals.183 Regardless, both forms of disrespect,
the more symbolic humiliation and the entirely non-symbolic murder, derive
Q+/1 )NT *r1T UT0MrJ /Q )NT 'MW)M1*6 'rJ(Tf Both are ultimately forms of
expression, even if murder is undoubtedly the more emphatic statement.
Avishai Margalit attempts to unite symbolic and non-symbolic forms of
UM*+T*-TW) (0UT+ r q+/rUT+ W/0WT-)M/0 /Q PN(1MJMr)M/0h: oNMWN NT UTQM0T* r*
Pr0l */+) /Q qTNr'M/(+ /+ Wonditions that constitutes a sound reason for a
person to consider his or her self-+T*-TW) M0L(+TUf:184While his book contains
great insight into the meaning of humiliation, there are at least two reasons
to think that even his broader conception of the term is an insufficient guide
to degradation. First, as AnthonyQuinton explains, onemight endure terrible
treatment while nonetheless maintaining her self-respect and composure; and
we should not think in such a case that she was not victimized.185 Second, as
Vorhaus argues, humiliation itself is not always indicative of degradation or
impermissible treatment. He imagines a national soccer team widely
expected to win the World Cup, but which returns home after a meek first
round loss. Such a team will be humiliated on and off the field, he explains,
but we would not say that they were degraded.186 Thus, while we must worry
about symbolic forms of disrespectSand humiliating treatment more
broadlySwe should not use those concepts as our singular guides to
degradation.
3. Respect as an Epistemic Virtue
<T*-TW)h M0 *(1h M0'/J'T* r--+TNT0UM0O */1T)NM0O6* 'rJ(T r0U )NT0
responding appropriatelySboth attitudinally and practicallySgiven (a) the
183 See John Vorhaus, On Degradation Part Two: Degrading Treatment and Punishment,
31 COMMON L. WORLD REV. CDh B@ jGccFi jPx/(q)JT** )+Tr)1T0) )Nr) +T-+T*T0)* r )N+Tr) )/
dignity often does so partly by virtue of what it causes to happen, but, however we choose to
describe the nature of the threat, it is important not to lose sight of the many ways in which
dignity is impinged upon by the symbolic nature of much ill-)+Tr)1T0)f:if >0 )NT W/00TW)M/0
between degradation and animalization, see infra Part IV.B.
184 AVISHAIMARGALIT, THEDECENTSOCIETY 9 (1996). (ee also >The Greek Cr*Th: supra
0/)T DCh r) IAC jP9+Tr)1T0) /+ -(0M*N1T0) /Q r0 M0UM'MU(rJ 1rl qT *rMU )/ qT UTO+rUM0O MQ M)
grossly humiliates him before others . . . :if
185 Anthony Quinton, Humiliation, 64 SOC. RES. 77, 79–80 (1997).
186 See Vorhaus, supra note 183, at 68.
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analytic connection between value and reason and (b) the principle that, to
the extent it is in our power, we ought to think, say, and do that which is
justified by reason. The reasons that ground respect on this view, to be clear,
are object-generated, rather than subject-OT0T+r)TU? M) M* r )NM0O6* /qLTW)M'T
value, whether instrumental or intrinsic, rather than our subjective desires,
that determines the demands of respect.187 John Rawls argues along these
lines that respect involves the recognition of something Pr* UM+TW)Jl
determining our will without reference to what is wanted by our
M0WJM0r)M/0*f:188
This process of seeing the objective value in something and then
+T*-/0UM0O r--+/-+Mr)TJl M0 /0T6* )N/(ON)* r0U rW)M/0* M* suggested by the
Latin source of respect: respicere, 1Tr0M0O P)/ J//K qrWK r): /+ P)/ J//K
rOrM0f:189 Willful blindness is perhaps the essence of disrespect, then, as one
refuses to truly look at or see the value in front of her. If something were
incapable of recognizing valueSincapable of looking back, as it wereSthen
it would not be capable of disrespect. Consider a falling rock, an attacking
shark, or someone who, in the moment of action, is legally insane or a legal
automaton. All are capable of causing harm to people, but none have the
capacity to disrespect the people they harm, given that they lack the capacity
to perceive and then to reject the presence of their value. Along these lines,
respect may be, as Dillon suggests, at least partly an epistemic virtue
associated with the responsible pursuit of and commitment to the truth,
0r1TJlh )NT )+()N /Q */1T)NM0O6* 'rJ(Tf190
C. HUMAN VALUE
Let us take stock. We have been inquiring into the nature of
degradation-limiting reasons, which operate with relative independence from
187 See Thomas H. Birch,Moral Considerability and Universal Consideration, 15 ENVTL.
ETHICS FIF jI@@Fi jr+O(M0O )Nr) +T*-TW) M0'/J'T* r PUT/0)MW Tm-T+MT0WTh: oNT+Tql /0T must
pay attention and respond appropriately); ALLANWOOD, KANT6SETHICALTHOUGHT 46 (1999)
jPu<tT*-TW) +TQT+* (* )/ r +Tr*/0 Q/+ rW)M/0 oNMWN M* rJorl* UM*)M0W) Q+/1 jr0U -+M/+ )/i r0l
object of desire that is to result from the action.:i% !r+J !+r0/+h Toward a Theory of Respect
for Persons, 12 AM. PHIL. Q. 309, 311 (1975).
188 JOHNRAWLS, LECTURES ON THEHISTORYOFMORALPHILOSOPHY 153 (Barbara Herman
ed. 2000).
189 Latin source provided in Dillon, supra note 167.
190 Dillon, supra note 167; see also Sarah Buss, Respect for Persons, 29 CAN. J. PHIL. 517,
DEA jGcIFi jr+O(M0O )Nr) M0UMQQT+T0WT )/ /)NT+ -T/-JT +T*(J)* Q+/1 r0 Pepistemic dTQMWMT0Wl:if
For the sake of completeness, if moral and ethical questions were non-objective, such that the
P)+()N: /Q */1T)NM0O6* 'rJ(T or* UT)T+1M0TU ql r W/0)Tm)-dependent system of meaningS
one to which a society has committed itselfSthe demands of respect as outlined here would
'T+l JMKTJl *)MJJ /-T+r)T oM)NM0 *(WN r *l*)T1h OM'T0 )NTM+ +r)NT+ *)+rMON)Q/+or+U J/OMW jTfOf PU/
0/) UT*)+/l )Nr) oNMWN oT UTT1 'rJ(rqJT:if
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other penal considerations. We have assumed that the general reasons that
oppose the infliction of torture simply are our degradation-limiting reasons
(or the most fundamental ones). We defined torture as the intentional
infliction of a suffusive panic. We hypothesized that the concept of
UM*+T*-TW) M* )NT 1T)+MW /Q UTO+rUr)M/0h *(WN )Nr) M) Wr0 WJr+MQl )/+)(+T6*
wrong-making features. And we have outlined the abstract framework of
disrespect. Disrespect involves a failure to respond appropriately to
*/1T)NM0O6* Wr-rWM)l )/ +TrJMkT 'rJ(Th 1/*) M1-/+)r0)Jl ql QrMJM0O )/ P-+/)TW)
)NT -/**MqMJM)l /Q )Nr) +TrJM*r)M/0h: r* <rk Tm-JrM0*h r* oTll as by failing to
provide more symbolic forms of recognition.191
Given that respect is not purely symbolic, to apply this framework to a
personSand to assess how disrespectful torture is to a personSwe need at
least a basic theory of the human good, of what people do to exhibit or realize
value, and which capacities enable them to do this. Put differently, what is
the mechanism by which humans realize value? Only by answering this
question can we understand the degree to which an action disrespects a
person by interfering with this mechanism, and thereby failing to protect the
possibility of her realizing value. <rk6* rq*)+rW) r0U Q/+1rJ 0/)M/0 )Nr)
-T/-JT r+T /Q 'rJ(T PM0 )NT1*TJ'T*: U/T* 0/) -+/'MUT r0 r0*oT+f192
1. Diachronic Human Value
I take a broadly Aristotelian line on human value. The conviction is that
-T/-JT6* 'rJ(TSor their essentially human valueSderives from their
capacity to stitch moments together through time and construct good lives.
Aristotle, in Book 1 of Nichomachean Ethics, inquires M0)/ )NT PN(1r0
O//Uf:193 _T r+O(T* )Nr) )NT PWNr+rW)T+M*)MW rW)M'M)l: /Q N(1r0* M* JTrUM0O r
PWT+)rM0 KM0U /Q JMQT . . . M0 rWW/+Ur0WT oM)N +Tr*/0f:194 A characteristic
rW)M'M)l M* PrWW/1-JM*NTU oTJJ oNT0 M) M* rWW/1-JM*NTU M0 rWW/+Ur0WT oM)N
the appropriatT 'M+)(Th: NT W/0)M0(T*h *(WN )Nr) )NT PN(1r0 O//U: M* r JMQT
lived in accordance with the human virtues, which enable one to live in
accordance with reason (or are constitutive of living in accordance with
reason).195 Most importantly for our purposes, Aristotle emphasizes that the
N(1r0 O//U Wr0 /0Jl qT +TrJMkTU P/'T+ r W/1-JT)T JMQTf:196 He alludes to the
migratory return of the swallows, which marks the beginning of summer:
191 RAZ, supra note 13, at 167.
192 Id. at 144–45.
193 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 3–22 (1094a–1103a) (Roger Crisp trans. & ed.,
2000).
194 Id. at 12.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 12–18.
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Pa/+ /0T *orJJ/o U/T* 0/) 1rKT r *(11T+h 0/+ /0T Urlf Neither does one
day or a sN/+) )M1T 1rKT */1T/0T qJT**TU r0U Nr--lf:197 The idea is that
the human goodSthe realization of value by a personSis a diachronic
achievement.
Aristotle argues, for instance, that we cannot say that a child has led a
PqJT**TU: JMQT?
If he is called blessed, he is being described as such on account of the potential he has,
since, as we have said, happiness requires complete virtue and a complete life. For there
are many vicissitudes in life, all sorts of chance things happen, and even the most
successful can meet with great misfortunes in old age, as the story of Priam in Trojan
times. No one calls someone happy who meets with misfortunes like these and comes
to a wretched end.198
Aristotle maintains that, since the human good is realized in the context
of a life as a whole, we cannot say that a child has realized the human good.
Such a judgment is premature. Aristotle implies that we cannot judge whether
someone has realized the human good until his life is complete. Priam, for
instance, was King of Troy at the time of its destruction by Agamemnon,199
with the implication being that an otherwise virtuous or glorious life can end
*/ )T++MqJl )Nr) M) or+-* /+ +(M0* /0T6* JMQT r* r oN/le. Ronald Dworkin makes
r +TJr)TU -/M0) M0 )NT W/0)Tm) /Q )NT UTqr)T /'T+ T()Nr0r*Mr? PWe worry about
)NT TQQTW) /Q JMQT6* Jr*) *)rOT /0 )NT WNr+rW)T+ /Q JMQT r* r oN/JTh r* oT 1MON)
o/++l rq/() )NT TQQTW) /Q r -Jrl6* Jr*) *WT0T /+ r -/T16* Jr*) *)r0kr /n the
T0)M+T W+Tr)M'T o/+Kf:200
#+M*)/)JT O/T* T'T0 Q(+)NT+ )/ *(OOT*) )Nr) )NT ,(rJM)l /Q /0T6* JMQTh
viewed in this holistic manner, may be altered by posthumous events, such
r* )NT *(WWT** /+ QrMJ(+T /Q /0T6* UT*WT0Ur0)*h )N/(ON NT rU1M)* )NT
P/UU0T**: /Q this position.201 We need neither accept nor deny these more
U+r1r)MW W/0WJ(*M/0* )/ r--+TWMr)T #+M*)/)JT6* 1/+T OT0T+rJ -/M0)h oNMWN M*
that if humans enliven and exhibit value, they do so in the context of a
diachronic project: the pursuit of a flourishing life as a whole. We can take
this general point from Book 1 of Nichomachean Ethics without engaging
with the remaining Books 2–10, which discuss the virtues that are conducive
to realizing a flourishing life as a whole. That is, we can accept the notion
of a diachronic, life-based human good without accepting or denying a
foundation of virtue ethics.
197 Id. at 12.
198 Id. at 16.
199 Id. at 16 n. 6.
200 RONALDDWORKIN, LIFE6SDOMINION: ANARGUMENT ABOUTABORTION, EUTHANASIA,
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 199 (1993).
201 ARISTOTLE, supra note 193, at 16–17.
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To clarify the diachronic nature of the human good, let us consider
xo/+KM06* UM*)M0W)M/0 qT)oTT0 PTm-T+MT0)MrJ: r0U PW+M)MWrJ: M0)T+T*)*f202
Pbm-T+MT0)MrJ M0)T+T*)*: r+Th OT0T+rJJlh M0)T+T*)* M0 Nr'M0O -JTr*(+rqJT *T0*/+l
experiences, including refined instances like playing an instrument, and in
having positive emotional states, and in avoiding displeasing sensory
experiences and negative emotional states.203 P!+M)MWrJ M0)T+T*)*h:
meanwhile, are not essentially phenomenological; they are interests in
+TrJMkM0O /0T6* -T+*/0rJ 'rJ(T* r0U W/11M)1T0)*Scompleting a project,
*TTM0O J/'TU /0T* *(WWTTUh T0UM0O /0T6* JMQT oM)N UMO0M)lh r0U */ Q/+)Nf204
The value of realizing a critical interest is, of course, connected to the value
of realizing a good life as a diachronic achievement. But so is the value of
realizing experiential interests, it seems. The value of pleasure, for instance,
seems to depend on its connection to the broader good life, a connection that
is usually, but not always secure. Consider the heroin addict who has
destroyed her life due to her drug use, rejecting her personal obligations and
descending into depravity and indignity. It is only with an appreciation of
her as a being that constructs value through time, in the context of a life as a
whole, that we can appreciate the immense disvalue of her shooting up, her
temporary ecstasy notwithstanding.
Connie Rosati represents a diverse and distinguished group of
contemporary theorists who have endorsed the diachronic conception of the
human good when she writes:
u#t O//U JMQT *TT1M0OJl M0'/J'T* 1/+T )Nr0 r -T+*/06* Nr'M0O 1r0l O//U 1/1T0)* /+
having many particular things that may be good for her; and it involves more precisely
because of the peculiar capacities of persons. Persons have capacities for reason,
memory, and imagination, that (most) nonhuman animals evidently lack. Persons have
the capacity to reflect on themselves and their lives. Moreover, they have the capacity
to be moved not only by what they may desire but by their determinations about what
is worth desiring; and so they have the capacity to decide, in light of these
determinations, what sort of person to be and what sort of life to lead. The ordinary
exercise of these sundry capacities has the result that persons not only attend to their
lives from moment to moment; they also take up a view of their lives as a whole,
reflecting on themselves and their existence over time. In so doing, they also take, so
)/ *-TrKh r 8Jr+OT+ 'MTo6 /Q )NT1*TJ'T* r0U )NTM+ JM'T*f205
202 DWORKIN, supra note 200, at 199–208.
203 Id. at 201.
204 Id. at 201–02.
205 Connie S. Rosati, The Story of a Life, 30 SOC. PHIL. & POL6Y 21, 26–7 (2013). See also
CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 50–51
jI@A@i jP3T or0) /(+ JM'T* )/ Nr'T 1Tr0M0Oh /+ oTMON)h /+ *(q*)r0WTh /+ )/ O+/o )/or+U */1T
fulness, or however the concern is formulated . . . But this means our whole lives. If necessary,
oT or0) )NT Q()(+T )/ 8+TUTT16 )NT -r*)h )/ 1rKT M) part of a life story which has sense or
-(+-/*Th )/ )rKT M) (- M0 r 1Tr0M0OQ(J (0M)lf:i% ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A
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It is only with such a conception of the essentially human capacitiesS
at least reason, memory, and imaginationSand of how they collectively
enable the construction of a good life through time that we can understand
)NT rUUMW)6* TW*)r*l )/ qT oM)N/() 'rJ(Th *M0WT M) UM1M0M*NT* NT+ JMQT r* r
whole.206 If viewed as a moment standing alone, her ecstasy would be of
great value, of course, since pleasure abstractly conceived has value. But
that is not how humans conceive of, or ought to conceive of, their existence,
as if they had no memories and were like gold!ish, born in each moment anew,
untethered to the past or future.207 #* !f^f [ToM* o+M)T*? P9NT WNr+rW)T+M*)MW
good of willing and achieving is not one found in this or that passing instant
merely, nor in an aggregation of the goods thus momentarily and separately
STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 216–19 (2d ed., 1984) jr+O(M0O )Nr) 1r0 M* PT**T0)MrJJl r *)/+l-
)TJJM0O r0M1rJh: *(WN )Nr) )NT O//U JMQT M* /0T )Nr) (0Q/JU* )N+/(ON )M1T oM)N P0r++r)M'T (0M)l:i%
JOHNRAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 63–64 (1971) (maintaining that a good life consists in the
approximate realization /Q r P+r)M/0rJ JMQT -Jr0:S)NT -(+*(M) /Q /0T6* Q/(0Ur)M/0rJ rM1*h
oNMWN r+T O+/(0UTU M0 /0T6* +TQJTW)M'T UT*M+T*h r0U oM)N )NT -Jr06* UT)rMJ* QMJJTU M0 /'T+ )M1Th
M0 )NT W/0)Tm) /Q /0T6* T'/J'M0O WM+W(1*)r0WT*i% JEFFMCMAHAN, THEETHICS OFKILLING 180
(200Gi jPu3tT 1(*) rJ*/ +TW/O0MkT )Nr) oTJJ-being is multidimensional and that some of its
dimensions are relationalSin particular those concerned with the meaning that a state or event
Nr* oM)NM0 r -T+*/06* JMQT:i% MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES 300–02,
FGF jI@@ci jr+O(M0O )Nr) )NT 'rJ(T /Q r JMQT M* r Y//+Tr0 P/+Or0MW oN/JT:if
206 But are these essentially human capacities? What about intelligent animals? Can they
0/) rJ*/ Pq(MJU JM'T*:$ xr'MU 4TJJT1r0 r+O(T* )Nr) oT *N/(JU 0/) 1rM0)rM0 )Nr)h *rlh r W/o6*
life considered as a holistic achievement matters, given that the cow itself (unlike a person) is
incapable of understanding itself as a diachronic, life-building being:
I assume that a cow cannot conceive of itself as a persisting individual and consequently
cannot conceive of itself as enjoying different benefits at different moments during its
life. What the cow cannot conceive, it cannot care about; and so a cow cannot care
about which sequences of momentary goods it enjoys . . . I am not sympathetic to
*)+/0OT+ 'T+*M/0* /Q M0)T+0rJM*1h oNMWN 1rKT r )NM0O6* M0)+M0*MW 'rJ(T Q/+ */1T/0T
contingent on his being disposed to care about it under specified or specifiable
conditions; but I am inclined to think that unless a subject has the bare capacity, the
equipment, to care about something under some conditions or other, it cannot be
intrinsically good for him.
David Velleman, Well-being and Time, 72 PAC. PHIL. Q. 48, 68–69 (1991). If this works, it
may begin to explain the moral difference between killing a person and a cow. When you kill
a person, you not only deprive her of access to future pleasurable or otherwise valuable
standalone moments, as you would with the cow; you may have also ruined her ability to
realize a good life as a whole.
207 Memory has been grossly undervalued as an essential human capacity. Locke is an
exception:
Memory, in an intellectual creature, is necessary in the next degree to perception. It is
of so great a moment, that where it is wanting, all the rest of our faculties are in a great
measure useless; and we, in our thoughts, reasonings, and knowledge, could not
proceed beyond present objects, were it not for the assistance of our memories . . . .
LOCKE, supra note 118, at 150 (Book II, Ch. X, Sect. 8).
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disclosed, but in the temporal and relational patterns of a whole of experience
whose progression is cumulative and con*(11r)/+lf:208 The most valuable
goods that people can realize, things like maintaining families, careers, and
Q+MT0U*NM-*h r+T T**T0)MrJJl P)T1-/+rJ: O//U*h oNMWN Wr0 /0Jl qT +TrJMkTU
through time in the context of a broader life project.
If a moment of pleasure might be devoid of value on this diachronic
conception of the human good, then in the other direction, pain, stress, and
suffering can sometimes have great value, insofar as they constitute
investments toward a good life as a whole, or are analytically connected to
such investments, as with the years of rigorous training required to become,
say, a qualified surgeon.209 TNM* OT0T+r)T* r W/0WT-)M/0 /Q N(1r0 PUM*'rJ(Th:
which will come into play when we return to the discussion of torture.
Disvalue is distinct from, and worse than, the absence of value. If human
flourishing in the context of a whole life is constitutive of human value, then
wanton human sufferingSsuffering that does not represent an investment
M0)/ /0T6* O//U JMQTSis constitutive of human disvalue.
There are stronger and weaker versions of this theory. The stronger
versionSwhich I acceptSis that something is good for a person only if it is
good for her life considered as a whole. The question of whether a certain
activity or experience is good for me, on this stronger version, is identical to
the question of whether it is good for my life considered as a whole. This
viewpoint need not be obsessively forward-looking. It has a central place for
P1/1T0)r+l: O//U*h JMKT MWT-cream cones, which do not require cultivation
over time, and which are realized entirely in the moment. As a matter of
general tendency or personal principle, such goods are surely constitutive of
a good life. That is, a life without such goodsSwithout ice-cream conesS
would be worse when considered as a whole.210
208 C.I. LEWIS, ANALYSIS OFKNOWLEDGE ANDVALUATION 498 (1946).
209 See id.:
The goodness of pursuing and attaining is not the goodness found in striving, regardless
of the end pursued, plus the goodness found in having something desired, regardless of
how it is attained. It lies peculiarly in the relationship between the active intent, the
conation, and the realization. The goodness of the end to be realized infuses the activity;
and the goodness belonging to purposive action, and not to be found in mere good
fortune, colors the realization of the end attained.
Id.
210 Does this strictly life-based conception of the human good presuppose controversially,
contra xT+TK =r+QM)h )Nr) ^ r1 MUT0)MWrJ oM)N )NT Pl/(0OT+: r0U P/JUT+: -T/-JT oN/ Nr'T
J//KTU r0U oN/ oMJJ J//K /() )/ )NT o/+JU )N+/(ON P1l: W/0*WM/(*0T**$ See DEREK PARFIT,
REASONS AND PERSONS 199–244, 307–20 (1987). How else could I be said to be working of the
-+/LTW) /Q P1l: O//U JMQT$ !Nr+JT* 9rlJ/+ o+M)T* -T+WT-)M'TJl /0 )NM* 1T)r-Nl*MWrJ /qLTW)M/0f
_T o+M)T* )Nr) oNMJT P)NT+T M* */1T)NM0O JMKT r0 r -+M/+M (0M)l /Q r N(1r0 JMQT )N+/(ON M)* oN/JT
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We might retreat to a more moderate version, however, without
impacting our overall argument. The more moderate position is that while
-T/-JT6* UMrWN+/0MW Wr-rWM)MT* r+T )NT Q(0Ur1T0)rJ qr*M* /Q )NTM+ 'rJ(Th
W/0*)M)()M'T /Q )NTM+ rqMJM)l )/ +TrJMkT P)T1-/+rJ: O//U* JMKT Qr1MJMT*h Wr+TT+*h
Q+MT0U*NM-*h r0U */ Q/+)Nh -T/-JT Wr0 0/0T)NTJT** OT0T+r)T P1/1T0)r+l:
value that has nothing to do with their life project. That is, something could
be good for me without being good for my life considered as a whole.
=T+Nr-* )NT NT+/M0 rUUMW)6* -JTr*(+T Nr* 'rJ(T M0 )NM* orlh r* r 1/1T0)r+l
experience of pleasure, valuable even though it detracts from the pursuit of
her good life as a whole. xr'MU 4TJJT1r0 )rKT* )NM* -/*M)M/0h o+M)M0O )Nr) Pr
person has two distinct sets of interests, lying along two distinct
dimensionsShis synchronic interests in beingwell off at particular moments,
and his diachronic interests in having good periods of time and, in particular,
r O//U JMQTf:211 _/oT'T+h OM'T0 )Nr) P1/1T0)r+l: O//U* r+T W/0*)M)()M'T /Q
Tm)T0)h: oT 1MON) M1rOM0T r W(J)(+T )Nr) W/0WTM'T* /Q JMQT r* split into distinct parts. TAYLOR,
supra 0/)T GcCh r) DIf P=T+Nr-* r) */1T rOTh *rl Q/+)lh -T/-JT O/ )N+/(ON r N/++T0U/(* +M)(rJ
passage, in which they go into ecstasy and the emerge as, say, their reincarnated ancestor. That
is how they describe things a0U JM'T )NT1f: Id. He concludes, though, that in the absence of
such a cultural understanding, that is, in our o/+JUh P)NT *(--/*M)M/0 )Nr) ^ W/(JU qT )o/
temporally succeeding selves is either an overdramatized image, or quite false. It runs against
the s)+(W)(+rJ QTr)(+T* /Q r *TJQ r* r qTM0O oN/ TmM*)* M0 r *-rWT /Q W/0WT+0*f: Id.
3NMJT ^ rWWT-) 9rlJ/+6* r+O(1T0)h )NT 1/+T M1-/+)r0) -/M0) )/ 1rKT M* )Nr) )NT
metaphysical objection is not dispositive. If we do not share an identity with our past and
future selves, that need not vitiate the conclusions from this section. The achievement of a
PO//U JMQT: o/(JU *M1-Jl qTW/1T */1T)NM0O /Q r O+/(- -+/LTW)f 9Nr) M*h )NT )TT0rOT+ r0U )NT
old man that he becomes could be different people, but nonetheless could be said to be living,
and working on, the same life. They would be distinct and yet impossibly bonded, perhaps the
purest form of family. And we could reasonably maintain that their respective capacities to
work together and to honor one another, as it were, were their most essential and valuable
capacities. I take no position on whether this indeed describes the metaphysical nature of our
existence through time. Much more would need to be said to flesh out its details. The point is
that some such view is coherent, at least, and that even a radical Parfittian metaphysics need
not vitiate our moral convictions about the diachronic nature of human value.
211 Velleman, supra note 207. As evidence of the independence of synchronic and
diachronic well-being, Velleman introduces an interesting hypothetical. Consider two possible
lives with the same total amount of synchronic, moment-to-moment well-being. One begins
desperately and ends wonderfully, while the other begins wonderfully and ends desperately.
Velleman argues that we believe that the former is the better life overall, and that we can make
this judgment only if the narrative sequence of events matters. And, he continues, the narrative
sequence of events can matter only if diachronic well-being is distinct from synchronic well-
being (given that both lives have the same amount of synchronic well-being).
4TJJT1r06* r+O(1T0) Nr* OT0T+r)TU W/0*MUT+rqJT r))T0)M/0f a/+ /(+ -(+-/*T*h N/oT'T+h oT
can maintain that human value is centered on the pursuit of temporal goods and a good life as
r oN/JT oM)N/() rWWT-)M0O /+ +TLTW)M0O )NT -+/-/*rJ )Nr) )NT P0r++r)M'T: /+ P*)/+l: /Q r JMQT M*
r0 M0UT-T0UT0) 'r+MrqJT M0 1rKM0O r O//U JMQTf a/+ r+O(1T0)* M0 Qr'/+ /Q )NT 'MTo )Nr) r JMQT6*
narrative structure matters as an independent variable, see TAYLOR, supra note 206, at 50–51;
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a good life as a whole, as with ice-W+Tr1 W/0T*h 4TJJT1r06* UM*)M0W)M/0h T'T0
if sound, is not of great analytical import. It would provide traction only for
)N/*T -(+-/+)TUJl 1/1T0)r+l O//U*h JMKT )NT rUUMW)6* TW*)r*lh )Nr) r+T
'rJ(rqJT M0 )NT 1/1T0) q() qrU Q/+ /0T6* JMQT /'T+rJJf
2. Practical Reason
In this section, we were concerned to discover the mechanism by which
human beings exhibit or realize value in order to understand how an actionS
like tortureSmight interfere with that mechanism and therefore express
disrespect for a person. What, then, is the relevant mechanism? It is the
collection of capacities which enables one to stitch moments together and
construct a meaningful life over time. Rosati mentions reason, memory, and
imagination.212 We might break reason down into at least autonomy and
value-recognition. Autonomy involves the ability to consciously see
multiple practical options and then to select one, while value-recognition
involves the ability to see the relative objective value in such choices. I
follow Donald Regan and David Enoch in thinking that the bare fact that
someone has exercised her autonomy and freely chosen an option does not
render that option valuable and constitutive of a good life.213 People can
freely exercise their agencySeven passing a Kantian test of
universalizability214Sbut nonetheless make mistakes by choosing an option
that contains or entails less objective value than another. An agent could
have the capacity for autonomy, in this way, but then be incapable of building
MACINTYRE, supra note 206, at 216–19; Daniel Dennett, The Self as the Center of Narrative
Gravity, in SELF AND CONSCIOUSNESS: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES (Frank S. Kessel, Pamela M.
Cole, and Dale L. Johnson eds., 1992); MCMAHAN, supra note 206, at 175–80. For criticism
of the view, see Stephen Campbell, When the Shape of a Life Matters, 18 ETHICAL THEORY&
MORAL PRAC. 565, 571 (2015); Rosati, supra note 206; Galen Strawson, Against Narrativity,
17 RATIO 428 (2004); FRED FELDMAN, PLEASURE AND THE GOOD LIFE 124–41 (2006); Johan
Brännmark, Leading Lives: On Happiness and Narrative Meaning, 32 PHIL. PAPERS 321
(2003).
212 Rosati, supra note 206, at 27.
213 See Donald Regan, How to be a Moorean, 113 ETHICS 651 (2003) (arguing that agents
necessarily take a critical stance in relation to their desires and that they can only do so by
relying on a conception of the good that is not itself reducible to their desires); Donald Regan,
The Value of Rational Nature, 112 ETHICS 267 (2002) (arguing that rational nature cannot
have value where there are no self-standing principles about good states of affairs and
activities); David Enoch, Agency, Schmagency: Why Normativity Won’/ Co5e #ro5 %"a/ Bs
Constitutive of Action, 115 PHIL. REV. 169 (2006) (arguing that a complete account of action
and agency is not a complete account of normativity).
214 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 4:421 (1785),
reprinted in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY FBh BF jYr+l ]f `+TO/+ TUf . )+r0*fh I@@Ci jPrW) /0Jl M0
accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a
(0M'T+*rJ Jrof:if
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a good life if she lacked the independent capacity of value-recognition. This
might explain the future of artificially intelligent agents and possibly the
current reality of psychopaths.
We need not reach a firm conclusion on these issues, however, to
understand that some such collection of relatively distinct capacities enables
humans to realize and exhibit value in a diachronic, life-building manner.
[T) (* UTQM0T )NM* W/JJTW)M/0 /Q Wr-rWM)MT* r* r -T+*/06* 1T)r-capacity for
practical reason.215 In sum, the mechanism by which human beings exhibit
or realize value is their capacity for practical reason, which enables them to
build meaningful lives through time.216
IV. TORTURE AS EXTREMEDISRESPECT
We can now combine the analyses of respect and human value and
+T)(+0 )/ )NT M0,(M+l M0)/ )/+)(+T6* o+/0O-making features (for the purpose of
discerning degradation-limiting reasons more generally). ^Q r -T+*/06* 'rJ(T
is constitutive of her capacity to stitch moments together through time and
construct a good life, then torture, by forcing her ken into a terrifying, panic-
stricken moment, is egregiously disrespectful of that capacity, and primarily
215 9NM* o/(JU ,(rJMQl r P+r0OT -+/-T+)l: )NT/+l /Q N(1r0 'rJ(Th r* M) qrses human value
M0 r 0r)(+rJ -+/-T+)l )Nr) -T/-JT TmNMqM) (0T,(rJJlf =T/-JT6* -+rW)MWrJ +Tr*/0M0O Wr-rWM)MT*h
understood as their ability to construct good lives, will doubtfully be precisely equal. The
P+r0OT -+/-T+)l: MUTr M* )Nr)h +TOr+UJT** /Q *(WN M0Tqualities, a sufficiency of the property
+T0UT+* /0T W/1-JT)TJl oM)NM0 )NT +TJT'r0) Wr)TO/+lf ]T+T1l 3rJU+/0 Tm-JrM0* )Nr) PqTM0O M0
;W/)Jr0U: M* r +r0OT -+/-T+)lf 3NMJT ;)M+JM0O M* M0 )NT WT0)T+ /Q )NT W/(0)+l r0U `+T)0r M* L(*)
over the border from England, both are equally PM0 ;W/)Jr0Uf: See JEREMYWALDRON, ONE
ANOTHER6S EQUALS: THE BASIS OF HUMAN EQUALITY 84–127, 222–23 (2017); Ian Carter,
Respect and the Basis of Equality, 121 ETHICS 538, 552 (2011) (arguing that we ought to base
human equality on (a) r0 (0UT+*)r0UM0O )Nr) TrWN -T+*/0 Nr* )Nr) PWT+)rM0 1M0M1(1 /Q rOT0)MrJ
Wr-rWM)MT*: +T,(M+TU )/ qT r 1/+rJ rOT0) r0U )NT0 jqi r -(+-/*TQ(J MO0/+r0WT /Q r0l rOT0)MrJ
M0T,(rJM)MT* rq/'T )Nr) )N+T*N/JUif 9N(*h )NT ,(T*)M/0 NT+T M* 0/)h P_/o Tr*l M* M) Q/+ l/( to
q(MJU r 'rJ(rqJT JMQT$: q() +r)NT+h Px/ l/( Nr'T )NT Wr-rWM)l )/ q(MJU r 'rJ(rqJT JMQT$: 9Nr)
bare capacity renders one deserving of full and equal respect on this view. Rawls introduced
the idea of a range property. RAWLS, supra note 206, at 506 (grou0UM0O -T/-JT6* o/+)N M0 )NTM+
1/+rJ -T+*/0rJM)l r0U W/0WJ(UM0O )Nr) PoNMJT M0UM'MU(rJ* -+T*(1rqJl Nr'T 'r+lM0O Wr-rWM)MT*
for a sense of justice . . . [o]nce a certain minimum is met, a person is entitled to equal liberty
/0 r -r+ oM)N T'T+l/0T TJ*T:if
216 Margalit outlines three strategies for defending the ideal that each person deserves
+T*-TW)? r P-/*M)M'T: /0T )Nr) r--TrJ* )/ r -r+)MW(Jr+ N(1r0 )+rM)% r P*KT-)MWrJ: /0T qr*TU /0
the empirical and cultural fact that in our way of life we respect each othe+% r0U r P0TOr)M'T:
one that fails to justify the ideal, but forecloses disrespect (which Margalit understands as
PN(1MJMr)M/0:i qTWr(*T M) M* r0 M0*)r0WT /Q 1T0)rJ W+(TJ)lf MARGALIT, supra note 184, at 57-
112. The argument presented here would fall under )NT P-/*M)M'T: *)+r)TOlh Q/JJ/oM0O #+M*)/)JT
and others in finding the essentially human trait to be the capacity for practical reason (as
defined above). Note, as well, that since Margalit focuses only on disrespect as humiliation,
he fails to see how disrespect can involve physical as well as mental cruelty.
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in a non-symbolic or physical manner. If the value creation and exhibition
machine that is a person depends on the proper functioning of its practical
reasoning capacities (at least autonomy, value recognition, imagination, and
memory), then torture obliterates that machineSat least temporarily and
while risking permanent damage, as I discuss further below. To force the
torture victim into this maximally horrible moment is to force her outside of
the pursuit of her good life and outside of time, as it were, as she loses
awareness of where she came from and where she is going, of who she is and
oNr) *NT 'rJ(T*h r* PuNT+t QJT*N qTW/1T* r )/)rJ +TrJM)lf:217
When Scarry writes that the torture victim is incapable of betrayal, given
her lack of awareness of the commitments or values that she may betray by
confessing or M0Q/+1M0Oh *NT UT1/0*)+r)T* )/+)(+T6* 0/0-symbolic disrespect
Q/+ r 'MW)M16* Wr-rWM)MT* /Q 1T1/+l r0U 'rJ(T +TW/O0M)M/0f218 The demands
/Q )NT -r*) r0U )NT Q()(+T J/*T )NTM+ *)+M0OT0Wlh r* )NT 'MW)M16* M0*)M0W)(rJ r0U
utter panic collapses her sense of self and conception of value into a terrifying
present, and she is prepared to do or say anything to end the ordeal. At least
)Nr) M* )NT )/+)(+T+6* M0)T0)M/0f
Torture, by inducing such panic, is similarly disrespectful in the non-
*l1q/JMW *T0*T /Q /0T6* Wr-acity for autonomy. It effectively ruins this
capacity (again, at least temporarily). It is not just that genuine deliberation
is impossible under the throes of panic, as it would be when experiencing
extreme pleasure or, indeed, when sleeping. Panic takes a further step by
rW)M'TJl NMLrWKM0O /0T6* -/oT+* /Q UTJMqT+r)M/0 r0U UTWM*M/0-making, as
/0T6* 1T0)rJ r--r+r)(* M* W/0WT0)+r)TU Q(JJl )/or+U )NT *M0O(Jr+ rM1 /Q
T0UM0O /+ T*Wr-M0O Q+/1 )NT */(+WT /Q /0T6* )T++/+f If suffusive pleasure
tends to transfix, perhaps rendering action impossible, suffusive panic
absolutely animates, demanding actionSwild, unthinking actionSeven if
that just means desperately flailing about. Overwhelming pain, containing
within it the likelihood of such panic, is thus generally a greater autonomy
violation than overwhelming pleasure, contra Sussman.219 But should
extreme pleasure somehow generate this experience, then there would be no
difference between the two with regard to their impact on autonomy.
The disrespect of torture goes a step beyond preventing a person from
generating value, as would death or forcing someone to sleep for the rest of
her life. Torture also forces the victim into a locus of disvalue. It is not just
that the victim loses the thread of her life and so fails to exhibit or create
value, but that her new existence, as it were, is necessarily horrible for
217 AMÉRY, supra note 15, at 33.
218 SCARRY, supra note 110, at 30.
219 Sussman, supra note 12, at 15.
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however long it may last. As argued above, disvalue constitutes wanton
*(QQT+M0Oh *(QQT+M0O )Nr) U/T* 0/) +T-+T*T0) r0 M0'T*)1T0) M0)/ /0T6*
flourishing life as a whole. If respect involves the duty to maintain the
-/**MqMJM)l /Q */1T)NM0O6* T0OrOT1T0) oM)N 'rJ(Th M) T0)rMJ* r* r W/+/JJr+l )NT
duty not to use that thing to generate disvalue.220
9/+)(+T U/T* M0'/J'T r P-T+'T+*M)lh: )NT0h r* ;(**1r0 r+O(T*, but it is
not the forced self-betrayal that he articulates.221 The perversity involves
taking a creature capable of engaging with value in such a profound and
interesting way, and then converting it into a site of pure disvalue, of
suffering and nothing else. 3T Wr0 +T)(+0 NT+T )/ "TWWr+Mr6* -/M0) rq/() N/o
torture saturates the victim with suffering.222 The physics of the human brain
are such that we can experience only a certain amount of suffering. If we
imagine torture via running electricity though s/1T/0T6* q/Ulh rq/'T r
certain voltage the victim will experience the same maximum amount of pain
and anxiety. The aim of torture is just to trigger the experience of panic
which pushes someone over that threshold. The torture victim, suffused with
suffering, is thus maxing out her capacity for disvalue. Whether the torture
is meant to punish, to interrogate, to terrorize a populace, etc., the intended
experience for the victim is the same, at least when viewed from this
perspective on value. In sum, torture is the exemplar of disrespect. With
+TOr+U )/ jri )NT U()l )/ T0rqJT /+ r) JTr*) 0/) )/ UT*)+/l r -T+*/06* Wr-rWM)l
to generate value and (b) the correlated duty not to turn a person into a locus
of disvalue, torture is the most disrespectful thing that you can do to someone,
Q/+ r* J/0O r* M) Jr*)*? M) W/1-JT)TJl NrJ)* )NT 'MW)M16* 'rJ(T-generating
capacities and completely maximizes her disvalue-generating capacities.223
Are there any purely symbolic forms of disrespect involved with
torture? An element of symbolic humiliation inheres undeniably in
W/0'T+)M0O */1T/0T Q+/1 r0 (-+MON)h UMO0MQMTU qTM0O M0)/ r P*N+MJJl *,(TrJM0O
220 This corollary duty would only apply to conscious creatures, which are capable of
generating disvalue in the form of wanton suffering. By comparison, while it is possible to
disrespect a painting by, say, burning it, it is not possible to make the painting itself a locus of
disvalue, given that the painting cannot experience suffering.
221 Sussman, supra note 12, at 4.
222 Beccaria, supra note 117, at 41.
223 There are very unusual cases where someone inflicts a suffusive panic as a means or
byproduct of helping )NT P'MW)M1f: ;(WN rW)M/0* o/(JU rQQM+1 +r)NT+ )Nr0 +TLTW) )NT
M0UM'MU(rJ6* T**T0)MrJJl N(1r0 'rJ(Tf !/0*MUT+h Q/+ M0*)r0WTh T1T+OT0Wl qr))JTQMTJU *(+OT+l
oM)N/() r0T*)NT*Mrh r* oTJJ r* !N+M*)/-NT+ _M)WNT0*6 )/+)(+Tf See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
By waterboardinO _M)WNT0* oM)N NM* W/0*T0)h _M)WNT0*6* )/+)(+T+* oT+T M0 QrW) rMUM0O NM*
realization of the good, a process which for him involved participatory journalism and
engagement with foreign policy debates. We might excise these very unusual cases from the
word P)/+)(+Th: *(WN )Nr) 0TM)NT+ )NT qr))JTQMTJU -r)MT0) 0/+ _M)WNT0* oT+T +TrJJl P)/+)(+TUh:
even though they experienced the phenomenology of torture.
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-MOJT)h: OM'T0 )Nr) rJJ N(1r0 W(J)(+T* *TT1 )/ 'rJ(T 1rM0)rM0M0O /0T6*
composure in the presence of others.224 There is also the symbolically
meaningful fact that torture converts a person into a squealing animal, as it
were, as I discuss further below. It may also depend on the means of torture.
To torture someone in public, for instance, as was the case with historic penal
tortures, would add an additional layer of symbolic disrespect and
humiliation.225 Certain forms of torture, furthermore, may be more
culturally-specific, using symbolic disrespect as a tool of bringing about a
suffusive panic, such as forcing a religious person to violate a spiritual
commitment in an extreme manner. In general, though, we should think that
in most cases of genuine torture, any purely symbolic disrespect would be
drowned out by the non-symbolic, physical impact of a suffusive panic,
consi*)T0) oM)N )NT rq/'T W/0WJ(*M/0* +TOr+UM0O )NT PJr0O(rOT-UT*)+/lM0O:
nature of torture, whereby torture effectively takes the victim outside of his
linguistic and cultural setting, in which symbolic forms of expression have
meaning.
A. THE SPECTRUM OF DISRESPECT
Is all torture equally disrespectful? This conclusion is tempting, but it
is not true. First, there seems to be a qualitative difference between very brief
tortures, like breaking a single finger without any threat of further harm, and
longer tortures, like those experienced by Améry, Timerman, Alleg, and
Trung. We might think, in the former case, that the panic does not have an
/--/+)(0M)l )/ *M0K M0h r* M) oT+Th r0U /qJM)T+r)T )NT 'MW)M16* -T+*/0rJM)lf We
ought to remove the former cases from the term torture, I think, their brutality
and cruelty notwithstanding. Let us move forward with the understanding
that when we use the term torture, we are referring to experiences on a par
oM)N #1p+lh 9M1T+1r0h #JJTOh r0U 9+(0O6*f
Second, and more importantly, torture is traumatic and contains within
it a serious risk of long-term damage, as seen with Trung, who experiences
debilitating panic attacks decades after his ordeals. As Améry writes,
P3N/T'T+ or* )/+)(+TU *)rl* )/+)(+TUf Torture is ineradicably burned into
him . . . :226 ^r0 9N/1*/0h =+M1/ [T'M6* qM/O+r-NT+h r+O(TU )Nr)h M0 rUUM)M/0
)/ [T'M6* +T*-/0*MqMJM)l Q/+ NM* TJUT+Jl 1/)NT+ r0U 1/)NT+-in-law, traumatic
memories of his time in Auschwitz caused his depression and ultimate
224 AMÉRY, supra note 15, at 35.
225 For a critical explication of historic public tortures, in particular that of Robert-François
Damiens in 1757, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
3–72 (2d ed., Alan Sheridan trans., 1995).
226 AMÉRY, supra note 15, at 34.
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suicide.227 Elie Wiesel was more succinct: P=+M1/ [T'M UMTU r) #(*WNoM)k
Q/+)l lTr+* Jr)T+f:228 In many instances, torture entails the risk of long-term
physical damage as well. A willingness to inflict or to seriously risk long-
term damage, psychological and physical, is absolutely a component of the
disrespect of torture (as well as other potentially degrading forms of
punishment, such as long-term incarceration). We should not think,
however, that all tortures pose the exact same long-)T+1 +M*K* )/ r 'MW)M16*
capacity to build a good life. Those that pose more of a risk are yet more
disrespectful than those that pose less of a risk. To torture someone by
cutting off his fingers and toes seems yet more disrespectful than, say,
waterboarding him, assuming he is ultimately released back into society. The
+Tr*/0 M* )Nr) q(MJUM0O r O//U JMQT M* 1(WN1/+T UMQQMW(J) oM)N/() /0T6* QM0OT+*
and toes, even if both forms of torture contain the risk of long-term
psychological damage. But does this variation in the disrespectfulness of
torture matter for the purposes of discerning when degradation limitations
apply?
There is a spectrum from maximum respect to maximum disrespect for
an individual human being and her capacity for practical reason. This Article
clarifies the nature of maximum disrespect. I concluded that torture is the
most disrespectful thing that you can do to someone for as long as it lasts.
As such, torturing someone for an eternitySsomehow rendering her
immortal and placing her under non-stop tortureSis the most disrespectful
treatment imaginable.229 It does not merely risk long-term damage; it
guarantees the worst possible long-term outcome: suffusive panic forever.
As we work our way down the spectrum, we will see other forms of torture,
with those entailing a greater risk of long-term damage higher up on the
ladder than those that entail less of such risk.
This idea of a spectrum of disrespect is key to understanding the concept
of a dispositive degradation limitation. A form of punishment need not be
the singularly most disrespectful thing imaginable to surpass such a limit.
That is, assuming such limitations exist, they will rule out more than penal
torture for an eternity. Even if certain forms of torture are yet more
227 IAN THOMSON, PRIMO LEVI: A LIFE 508–33 (2003).
228 Diego Gambetta, Primo Le-i’s Las/ ?o5en/s, BOSTON REV. (June 1, 1999),
http://bostonreview.net/diego-gambetta-primo-levi-last-moments [https://perma.cc/3FCP-
VYB8].
229 James Joyce, in a fictional sermon, offers a searing description of Hell as torture for an
eternity. JAMES JOYCE, A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS AYOUNGMAN 128–43 (Penguin 2000,
1915).
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disrespectful than others, all forms of penal torture can still surpass a
dispositive degradation limitation.230
But where exactly on the spectrum of disrespect shall the dispositive
line be drawn, beyond which we would say not merely that such treatment is
degrading, but that it is absolutely impermissibly degrading, such that you
simply cannot do that to a human being as a form of state punishment in the
United States, no matter the stringency of the other reasons pushing in favor
of such treatment? We cannot determine this with precision. The central
idea, however, is something like this: the treatment is so disrespectful that it
T1q/UMT* r +TLTW)M/0 /Q )NT /QQT0UT+6* *)r0UM0O r* r N(1r0 qTM0Of This is a
vague (and familiar231) formulation, but it gains definition when understood
in the context of the above analyses into respect and respect for persons.
`M'T0 )Nr) +T*-TW) M0'/J'T* )NT -+/WT** /Q +T*-/0UM0O )/ */1T)NM0O6*
value, disrespect for a person always embodies a rejection, to some degree,
of her value. But, as we have seen, there are different modes of disrespect.
>0T 1MON) L(*) UM*+T*-TW) r0/)NT+6* 'rJ(T r*h *rlh r 1(*MWMr0f But when
delivered in a certain manner and degree, disrespect can embody a rejection
/Q */1T/0T6* 'rJ(T r* r human, which is grounded on her essentially human
capacity to construct value through time. Such treatment demonstrates the
convictionSthe false conviction, the lieSthat this creature does not matter,
at least not like a normal human being does, such that we can ruin it or do
whatever we want with it, without regard for its practical reasoning capacity
or its capacity to suffer, as if it were a mere thing or animal.232 We can say,
230 3T Wr0 r--TrJ )/ )NT W/0WT-) /Q r P+r0OT -+/-T+)l: NT+Th r* oTJJh oM)N MUTr qTM0O )Nr)
all forms of treatment above the line are impermissibly disrespectful, even if some are yet
more disrespectful than others. See discussion of range properties supra note 216.
231 See, e.g.,MARGALIT, supra 0/)T IAEh r) IEF jP<TLTW)M0O r N(1r0 qTM0O ql N(1MJMr)M0O
her means rejecting the way she expresses herself as a human. It is precisely this fact that gives
content to the abstract concept of humiliation (i.e. degradation) as the rejection of human
qTM0O* r* N(1r0f:i% Y(+-Nlh supra 0/)T FGh r) GFF jP;T0UM0O -rM0Q(J '/J)rOT )N+/(ON r 1r06*
testicles to which electrodes have been attached, or boiling him in oil, or eviscerating him, or
gouging out his eyesSthese are not human orl* /Q +TJr)M0O )/ r0/)NT+ -T+*/0f:if
232 9NM* P1T+T )NM0O /+ r0M1rJ: Jr0O(rOT U/'T)rMJ* oM)N \r0)Mr0 )NT1T*f \r0) o+M)T*?
In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price can
be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is above all
price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity . . . Now, morality is the
condition under which a rational being can be an end in itself, since only through this
is it possible to be a lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends. Hence morality, and
humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity.
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 4:434–35 (1785),
reprinted in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 37, 42 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996). Nonetheless,
oT *N/(JU 0/) )NM0K )Nr) )NT W/0WJ(*M/0* -+T*T0)TU NT+T QJ/o *)+rMON)Q/+or+UJl Q+/1 \r0)6*
complex system, with its focus inter alia /0 -T/-JT6* 1oral capacities and the
universalizability of their maxims.
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more particularly, that punishment aq/'T )NT PUM*-/*M)M'T: JM0T +TLTW)* r0
/QQT0UT+6* *)r0UM0O r* r N(1r0% r0U -(0M*N1T0) +TLTW)* r0 /QQT0UT+6*
standing as a human when it embodies the conviction that his life-building
capacitySthe very basis of his humanitySis either completely absent or
fundamentally worthless.233 9NT -N+r*T PM0N(1r0: MJJ(1M0r)T*f Above the
JM0Th )+Tr)1T0) M* PM0N(1r0: qTWr(*T M) UT0MT* )NT -+T*T0WT /+ o/+)N /Q /0T6*
essentially human capacity.
Mens reamatters. To determine whether A has impermissibly degraded
"h oT 0TTU )/ K0/o #6* 1T0)rJ *)r)Tf Did A injure B purposefully,
knowingly, recklessly, negligently, or non-negligently? In most cases of
extreme degradation, like the tortures considered above, this variable is not
complex, as A purposefully injures B in a vicious manner. By comparison,
if A were to injure B entirely accidentally and non-negligently, we could not
*rl )Nr) # rQQM+1r)M'TJl UT0MTU "6* N(1r0M)l )N+/(ON NT+ rW)M/0*f
Nonetheless, one could impermissibly degrade another with a degree of mens
rea lesser than full-blown purpose. ^Q #h WNr+OTU oM)N "6* Wr+Th JT)* " *)r+'T
)/ UTr)Nh oT W/(JU UT)T+1M0T )Nr) # rQQM+1r)M'TJl UT0MTU "6* N(1r0M)l
without intentionally harming B. #6* rW)M/0*Sor rather inactionSembody
)NT W/0'MW)M/0 )Nr) "6* 'rJ(T-generating capacities simply do not matter. I
discuss the relevance of mental state further below, in the context of long-
term incarceration.
B. SYMBOLIC DEGRADATION
As suggested above, non-symbolic means of disrespect are much more
likely to surpass the threshold of impermissible degradation. The most
*)+rMON)Q/+or+U orl )Nr) r -(0M*N1T0) Wr0 UT0l r0 /QQT0UT+6* N(1r0M)l M*
for it to ruin his capacity to realize diachronic value as a non-symbolic matter
of physics. But it seems that more symbolic forms of disrespect could be so
Tm)+T1T r* )/ +T*MUT rq/'T )NT PUM*-/*M)M'T: JM0Tf Of course, merely saying
r -N+r*T JMKTh Pw/(6+T o/+)NJT** – l/( *N/(JU qT )/+)(+TU )/ UTr)N5: o/(JU
not qualify. But some non-linguistic, yet still symbolic forms of disrespect
are inherently more serious and meaningful.
!/0*MUT+ PxT+ql6* x/*Th: r N/++MqJT -(0M*N1T0) invented by the slave
overseer Thomas Thistlewood in the mid-18th Century for runaway slaves.234
In addition to beating the runaway and rubbing salt pickle, bird pepper, and
233 We can see here the connection between extreme disrespect and the dictionary
UTQM0M)M/0 /Q PUTO+rUT:? P9/ reduce from a higher to a lower rank, to depose from . . . a
-/*M)M/0 /Q N/0/(+ /+ T*)M1r)M/0f: OED ONLINE (April 4, 2018), www.oed.com/view/Entry/
49100 [https://perma.cc/94T9-WTHZ]. Impermissibly degrading treatment involves denying
*/1T/0T )NT P+r0K: /f human and granting them the rank of some lesser creature or thing.
234 GLADWELL, supra note 16, at 282.
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JM1T L(MWT M0)/ NM* /+ NT+ o/(0U*h oNr) 1rUT M) PxT+ql6* x/*T: or* )Nr)
r0/)NT+ *Jr'T o/(JU UTQTWr)T M0)/ )NT +(0rorl6* 1/()Nh rQ)T+ oNMWN NT /+ *NT
would be gagged for four or five hours.235 Let us consider the process of
forcing someone to eat human excrement, ignoring the beatings and the
gagging. This need not, as a matter of physics, vitiate her ability to realize
value, but it seems to be based on the same type of reasoning and to embody
the same fundamental message as something that does. A willingness to
M0QJMW) )Nr) W/1-/0T0) /Q xT+ql6* x/*Th JMKT r oMJJM0O0T** )/ )/+)(+Th
genuinely expresses the conviction that the victim does not matterSin the
most direct sense that her capacities to generate human value and disvalue do
not matterSand that no form of treatment is beyond the pale morally.
9NT W/0WT-) /Q PUM*O(*): *TT1* )/ qT M0'/J'TU oM)N *(WN *l1q/JMW
forms of extreme degradation. Yr+)Nr X(**qr(1 r+O(T* )Nr) PUM*O(*)
embodies a shrinking from contamination that is associated with the human
desire to be nonanimal . . . :236 By forcing the runaway to do something
())T+Jl UM*O(*)M0Oh r0U )NT+Tql PW/0)r1M0r)M0O: NT+*TJQ JMKT r0 r0M1rJh
Thistlewood acts to reject her humanity and standing as a nonanimal person.
9NM* W/00TW)* oM)N )NT -/*M)M/0 )Nr) -T/-JT6* UMrWN+/0MW Wr-rWM)MT* r+T )NTM+
PT**T0)MrJJl N(1r0: Wr-rWM)MT*f As far as we know, animalsSunlike
peopleSdo not purposefully construct good lives, as Velleman explains;
they are synchronic creatures that live moment-to-moment.237 To force a
person symbolically to become what we conceive of as an animal is thus to
deny her humanity, by denying the presence or worth of her diachronic
capacities. It is to express the conviction that she is a synchronic animal and
therefore not a diachronic person.238 The same can be said, of course, about
the process of torturing someone and non-symbolically converting them into
howling beast for a period of time.239
235 Id.
236 MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 74
(2006). See also Paul Rozin & April E. Fallon, A Perspective on Disgust, 96 PSYCHOL. REV.
23 (1987) (arguing that anything that reminds us that we are animals elicits disgust).
237 See discussion supra note 207.
238 See Waldron, supra note 2, at 282 jP9NT 8NMONT+ )Nr0 )NT r0M1rJ*6 *T0*T /Q N(1r0
dignity gives us a natural sense /Q 8UTO+rUM0O )+Tr)1T0)6? M) M* )+Tr)1T0) )Nr) M* 1/+T QM) Q/+ r0
r0M1rJ )Nr0 Q/+ r N(1r0h )+Tr)1T0) /Q r -T+*/0 r* )N/(ON NT oT+T r0 r0M1rJf:i%Murphy, supra
0/)T FGh r) GFF jr+O(M0O )Nr) r -(0M*N1T0) M* PM0 M)*TJQ: UTO+rUM0O oNT0 M) P)+Tr)* )NT -+M*/0T+
r* r0 r0M1rJ M0*)TrU /Q r N(1r0 qTM0O: /+ P-T+Nr-* T'T0 M* r0 r))T1-) )/ reduce him to an
r0M1rJ /+ r 1T+T )NM0O:if
239 I am grateful to John Goldberg and Peter Ramsay for pressing me to explore the
connection between degradation and animalization.
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C. DEGREES OF DEGRADATION
While I am concerned with punishments above the dispositive line of
UM*+T*-TW)h )N/*T )Nr) rQQM+1r)M'TJl UT0l r0 /QQT0UT+6* N(1r0M)lh 0/) rJJ
forms of degradation are so extreme. The distinction is vague, but
nonetheless important. xTO+rUr)M/0 M* r *(q*T) /Q )NT Wr)TO/+l /Q PNr+1f:
xTO+rUM0O )+Tr)1T0) M* 0/) 1T+TJl PNr+1Q(J: M0 ]/TJ aTM0qT+O6* *T0*T /Q
qTM0O r P*T)qrWK )/ M0)T+T*)f:240 ^) rJ*/ )/ */1T UTO+TT UT0MT* /0T6* *)r0UM0O
as a bearer of interests or at least of distinctly human interests. But treatment
can be degrading in this wayStreating someone to some degree as a non-
humanSoM)N/() rQQM+1r)M'TJl UT0lM0O /0T6* *)r0UM0O r* r -T+*/0f
Consider sentencing someone to a dirty, but otherwise decent prison for
a week. That the prison is dirty is degrading. It treats the offender as a non-
human in part because of the symbolic disrespect of forcing him to live like
an unclean animal. But we should not think that sentencing someone to such
a prison for a week, in and of itself, represents an affirmative denial of his
humanity on a par with torture or rape. We ought not send offenders to dirty
prisons. Doing so is wrong in part because it is degrading. Nonetheless,
there is a qualitative difference between sending an offender to a dirty prison
for a week and torturing or raping him as a form of punishment. Only the
latter affirmatively denies his standing as a human.
Degradation-limiting reasons are in competition with reasons of
offense-punishment proportionality and social utility, as discussed in Part I.
In this competition, the reasons that oppose penal torture and rape are an
order of magnitude stronger than those that oppose dirty prisons, though they
all reside within the same category of penal considerations. I can imagine a
situation in which a judge permissibly sends someone to a dirty prison for a
week, say, the offender is a demonstrable security risk and the cleaning staff
is on strike. I cannot imagine a situation in which a judge permissibly
sentences someone to be tortured or raped as a form of punishment.241
D. INVIOLABILITY AND DEGRADATION
Punishments like torture and rape conflict with the liberal commitment
to the separateness of persons, whereby each individual is deemed inviolate
or sacredSsomehow, a universe of value unto herself.242 This is a central
240 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, VOLUME 1: HARM TO
OTHERS 31 (1987).
241 ^ UM*W(** )NT P)MWKM0O )M1T q/1q: *WT0r+M/ infra at Part IV.E.
242 See RAWLS, supra note 206, at 3–E jPbrWN -T+*/0 -/**T**T* r0 M0'M/JrqMJM)l Q/(0UTU
on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice
UT0MT* )Nr) )NT J/** /Q Q+TTU/1 Q/+ */1T M* 1rUT +MON) ql r O+Tr)T+ O//U *Nr+TU ql /)NT+*f:i%
NOZICK, supra note 17 at 32–33:
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point. We must remember, however, that we are concerned here with
genuine offenders in a reasonably just society, not blameless runaway slaves
r* M0 )NT Wr*T /Q xT+ql6* x/*Tf We are concerned, furthermore, with
otherwise proportional forms of punishments. That is, we are assuming that
the punishments in question are proportional means of realizing our
legitimate penal aims: inflicting suffering or censure commensurate with the
/QQT0UT+6* o+/0OU/M0Oh243 forcing the offender to fulfill a duty of repair
toward his victim,244 forcing the offender to fulfill a duty of repair toward
society as a whole, 245 or whatever it may be. The idea of a dispositive
degradation limitation is that even if a form of treatment above the line is
-+/-/+)M/0rJ M0 rWW/+Ur0WT oM)N *(WN PM0)T+0rJ: -T0rJ +Tr*/0*h M) M*
impermissible given that its degree of disrespect embodies a denial of the
/QQT0UT+6* qr*MW N(1r0M)l /+ o/+)Nf It does not matter that the offender is
culpable; we cannot reject or destroy his human valueSruining him or
breaking himSas a tool for realizing our social aims.
Human inviolability, in sum, requires that agents incorporate into their
reasoning a certain profoundly high valuation of each person, as well as a
commitment to the separateness of persons, such that we do not view
individuals as mere things or animals, or as merely fungible components of
a wider social good. And it thus rules out actions, like the tortures considered
rq/'Th r0U JMKT xT+ql6* x/*Th )Nr) W/(JU /0Jl qT Wr++MTU /() MQ /0T +TLTW)TU
such a valuation and commitment. Put differently: respect ultimately
concerns the reasons that one acts upon; liberal respect demands that one
incorporate the ideal of human inviolability into her reasoning; and liberal
respect thus rules out extremely degrading punishments.
In this way, human inviolability, which forecloses sacrificing offenders
to mitigate harms or threats for which they lack responsibility,246 also
Why not . . . hold that some persons have to bear some costs that benefit other persons
more, for the sake of overall social good? But there is no social entity with a good that
undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. There are only individual people, different
individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of these people for the
benefit of others, uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more. What happens is that
something is done to him for the sake of others. Talk of an overall social good covers
this up.
Id.
243 See DUFF, supra note 18; LARRYALEXANDER, KIMBERLYKESSLER FERZAN&STEPHEN
MORSE, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OFCRIMINAL LAW (2009).
244 See VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL
LAW (2011).
245 See Jacob Bronsther, Two Theories of Deterrent Punishment, 53 TULSA L. REV. 461
(2018).
246 Id. at 462.
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constrains the means by which we can force people to repair those harms or
threats for which they are responsible. Deontology thus pushes and pulls.
The individual offender, conceived of in the liberal mode as a responsible
agent, is deemed to have a duty to repair the wrongs that he has committed
against other inviolable individuals,247 but then his own inviolability entails
that there are methods that we cannot employ to force him to fulfill his duty,
even if it goes unfulfilled as a result.
All of this is not without cost. There may be, say, significantly more
criminality in society as a result of our refusal to thoroughly degrade
offenders. That might not be true as an empirical matter, of course. But if it
were trueSif our refusal to, say, inflict penal rape meant that rapists could
not fulfill their duties of repair, such that there was significantly more rape
in societySit would not impact our conclusion. We should not lose sight of
this fact, thoughSthat degradation-limiting penal reasons can have genuine
costs, genuine moral costs. The prospect of such costs, though, is analytic to
all deontological constraints.
E. TICKING TIME BOMB
Finally, we should consider the possibility that otherwise dispositive
degradation-limiting reasons could be overwhelmed when the costs were
rq/'T r WT+)rM0 )N+T*N/JU /+ oNT0 )NT /QQT0UT+6* U()l or* rq/'T r WT+)rM0
threshold of stringency, such that he effectively forfeits his standing as a
human being and we can do anything to him permissibly (torture, rape,
mutilation, etc.).248
If such a threshold exists, it seems far more likely to be passed by a
forward-looking duty of prevention than a backward-looking duty of
rectification,249 when, say, the offender is responsible for an imminent threat
of sufficiently great magnitude, we are sufficiently sure of this fact, for some
reason the only way to force him to prevent the threat involves extreme
degradation, and there are no non-degrading means of forcing him to fulfill
a lesser, but still significant portion of his duty. I take no position here on
247 See id. at 476–80; TADROS, supra note 244 at 275–79.
248 9NM* M* Yr))NTo \+r1T+6* -/*M)M/0 oM)N +TOr+U )/ PrW)-i1-TJJM0O: )/+)(+Th ql oNMWN )NT
state tortures someone so that she performs a specific action, like informing the state as to
J/Wr)M/0 /Q NT+ W/1+rUT*f _T o+M)T* )Nr) *(WN )/+)(+T M* PrJorl* r0U T'T+loNT+T o+/0Oh: q()
0/0T)NTJT** P1/+rJJl /-)M1rJ: M0 +r+T cases. See KRAMER, supra note 40, at 115, 188–89, 194,
197, 201.
249 4MW)/+ 9rU+/* W/0*MUT+* oNl P)NT )+r0*M)M/0 Q+/1 *TJQ-defense to punishment may not
qT T0)M+TJl *1//)Nh: *(WN )Nr) M) 1rl qT -T+1M**MqJT )/ M0QJMW) O+Tr)T+ Nr+1* /0 */1T/0T jri )/
force him to eliminate a threat for which he is responsible than (b) to force him to rectify a
prior wrong. TADROS, supra note 244, at 347–48.
484 BRONSTHER [Vol. 109
the moral coherency of such a threshold,250 nor on whether, if such a
threshold does exist, the potential for abuse means that we ought to rule it out
as a legal matter.251 I will make two points, however, on the issue.
First, if such a threshold exists, it need not vitiate the idea that
degradation-limiting reasons represent relatively free-standing
considerations, considerations which are overwhelmed in those very unusual
cases, but which can be dispositive elsewhere. That is, those cases would
involve a tragedy. The conclusion would not be that we simply harmed the
wrongdoer to a proportional degree, akin to fining him $10, without any
moral remainder; the conclusion would be that we harmed the wrongdoer to
a proportional degree and, as a result, by denying his basic worth or standing
as a human being, we enacted an abomination.
Second, if such a threshold exists, there is little reason to believe that it
is relevant in criminal courts in the United States, where judges are concerned
to sentence offenders with regard to their backward-looking duties or
liabilities, possibly in addition to their non-imminent forward-looking
looking duties of prevention. It may be proven that an offender is a danger
to people moving forward, insofar as he is unreasonably unreliable with
+TOr+U )/ (-N/JUM0O )NT W+M1M0rJ Jro6* -+/NMqM)M/0* /0 'M/JT0WTh q() 'ery
doubtfully will it be proven that he is imminently about to murder a great
number of people. Thus, even if torture is permissible above the threshold,
let us move forward with the conclusion that penal torture, at least, is
absolutely impermissible in the United States, and for degradation-limiting
reasons derived from the liberal conception of the inviolable individual.
F. LONG-TERM INCARCERATION
This analysis immediately opens up new lines of sentencing inquiry.
While we do not torture people anymore as a form of punishment, that does
not mean that we do not degrade offenders. Consider long-term
incarceration. Where on the spectrum of disrespect does a decades-long
prison sentence reside? Is it so disrespectful that, like penal torture or
Derql6* x/*Th M) T1q/UMT* r +TLTW)M/0 /Q )NT /QQT0UT+6* *)r0UM0O r* r N(1r0$
While this is a question to consider in depth elsewhere, I will conclude this
section by outlining the structure of such an investigation, to demonstrate the
general applicability of the above argument.
250 For clear discussion of threshold deontology, see EYALZAMIR&BARAKMEDINA, LAW,
ECONOMICS, ANDMORALITY 41–56 (2010).
251 See generally Jeff McMahan, Torture in Principle and in Practice, 22 PUB. AFF. Q.
111 (2008) (arguing that torture could be justified as a means of self-defense, but that it ought
to be categorically outlawed due to its potential for abuse). But see STEINHOFF, supra note 74,
at 53–60.
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1. Associational Deprivations
To determine whether long-term incarceration is permissible, we must
first understand what it means to incarcerate someone. If a punishment, by
definition, deprives an offender of something, what does the state deprive an
offender of when it sends him to prison?252 The standard view, that
M0Wr+WT+r)M/0 M* P)NT UT-+M'r)M/0 /Q JMqT+)lh: M* M0rUT,(r)Tf253 A fine deprives
someone of the liberty to spend his money as he wishes, for instance, but a
fine is not incarceration. P[MqT+)l: M* r Qr1/(*Jl *JM--T+l W/0WT-)254 and
+r)NT+ )Nr0 )+lM0O )/ P*Nr+-T0:255 the term in the prison context, we ought to
consider a more direct question, derived from Martha Nussbaum and
#1r+)lr ;T06* PWr-rqMJM)l r--+/rWNf:256 What valuable activities or states
/Q qTM0O U/T* M0Wr+WT+r)M/0 JM1M) r0 M01r)T6* rWWT** )/h r0U )/ oNr) UTO+TT$
There is a great diversity in prison quality, from a prison where
thousands of inmates are packed in against one another without space even
to sit down,257 to a quiet penal island with beaches, bicycles, and flocks of
sheep.258 This diversity means that incarceration for any period of time can
entail a wide array of possible deprivations. There is, however, one
252 See Hugo Adam Bedau & Erin Kelly, Punishment, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/
punishment/ [https://perma.cc/EJ3C-JKEP] jP=(0M*N1T0) . . . is the authorized imposition of
deprivations . . . :if
253 See, e.g., Victor L. Shammas, Pains of Imprisonment, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CORRECTIONS 1, 2 j\T0) <f \T+JTl TUfh GcIBi jP9NT Q(0Ur1T0)rJ -+T1M*T /Q -+M*/0* M* )/
remove or +T*)+MW) JMqT+)lf:if
254 See generally LIBERTY (David Miller ed., 1991).
255 >0 )NT -+/WT** /Q P*Nr+-T0M0O: 'rO(T )T+1*h *TT OT0T+rJJl Kit Fine, Vagueness, Truth,
and Logic, 30 SYNTHESE 265 (1975).
256 See generally MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE
CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011); Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in TANNER LECTURES ON
HUMAN VALUES (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1980); AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND
CAPABILITIES (1985); Amartya Sen, Capabilities, Lists and Public Reasons: Continuing the
Conversation, 10 FEMINIST ECON. 77 (2004).
257 David Orr, D./.s Deld in +%ors/ *rison in /"e %orld’H !,888 (.s3e$/s o# )Fanda
Massacre are Kept in a Jail Built for 400, THE INDEPENDENT (July 15, 1995),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/hutus-held-in-worst-prison-in-world-1591700.
html [https://perma.cc/26U7-8KNR]; Diagnosing the State of Prisoner Health: The Gitarama
Example, MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES (Mar. 1995) (reporting that 1 in 8 inmates in the
Gitarama prison died over a 9-month period), http://speakingout.msf.org/en/node/643
[https://perma.cc/9ES7-6TYP].
258 Erwin James, The Norwegian Prison Where Inmates are Treated Like People, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/feb/25/norwegian-
prison-inmates-treated-like-people [https://perma.cc/T9KC-CZTR]; John Sutter, Welcome to
/"e %orld’s =i$es/ *rison, CNN (May 24, 2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/24/world/
europe/norway-prison-bastoy-nicest/index.html [https://perma.cc/4REX-8LRR].
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deprivation inherent to all prisons: inmates will be unable to associate freely
oM)N /)NT+ -T/-JT M0 */WMT)lf 9NM* UT0MrJ /Q )NT PQ+TTU/1 /Q OT0T+rJ
r**/WMr)M/0h: ^ qTJMT'Th M* )NT UT-+M'r)M/0rJ W/+T /Q M0Wr+WT+r)M/0f What unites
the many types of prisons is their remove from the broader community. They
each represent a form of quarantine or banishment, by severely depriving
inmates of the ability to associate with other individuals.
We can now add the variable of sentence length to the analysis. The
denial of the freedom of general association becomes a grave injury as time
-r**T*h +TOr+UJT** /Q )NT -+M*/06* ,(rJM)lf Long-term confinement away from
society inhibits the realization of certain associational goods that one can
only realize over time. Some of these goods are intrinsically associational,
as with the maintenance of a romantic partnership, family, or friendship; that
is, the good itself just is a special form of association. Others are
instrumentally associational, in the sense that associating with other people
is the means by which one realizes the good, as with the development of most
types of professional expertise. In either form, such goods are foundational
to almost all conceptions of the good life. Long-term incarceration, in sum,
is a slow-Q/+1M0O M0L(+l )/ /0T6* JMQT -+/LTW)f Indeed, we can say that long-
)T+1 M0Wr+WT+r)M/0 *T'T+TJl +M*K* +(M0M0O r0 M01r)T6* JMQT r* r oN/JTf
2. Slow Degradation
As indicated above, mens rea matters. When examining whether A has
impermissibly degraded BSwhether A has treated B with inhumanitySwe
W/0*MUT+ q/)N jIi oNr) # Wr(*TU )/ Nr--T0 )/ " r0U jGi #6* mens rea in
bringing about that outcome. Did A injure B purposefully, knowingly,
recklessly, negligently, or non-negligently? If long-term incarceration
represents a severe risk of ruining an inmr)T6* JMQT r* r oN/JTh )NT+T +T1rM0*
)NT ,(T*)M/0 /Q oNr) )NT *)r)T6* M0)T0)M/0* r+T oNT0 M) M0QJMW)* *(WN
punishment. The answer depends on the underlying theory of punishment:
retribution, deterrence, or incapacitation.259
259 What about rehabilitation? Given that prison is not the ideal environment for
rehabilitation, any argument that incarceration, long-term or otherwise, can be justified purely
on rehabilitative grounds is immediately suspect. At best, rehabilitation in the prison context
is a component of penal parsimony, as successful rehabilitation might limit the costs, both to
the offender and to society, of pursuing whatever aim in fact justifies his confinement. See
John Pratt, Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an Era of Penal Excess. Part 1: The Nature and
Roots of Scandinavian Exceptionalism, 48 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY II@h IGF jGccAi jP>Q W/(+*Th
one must recognize that however relaxed a prison regime, whatever material comforts are
provided, prisoners are still prisoners. There are rules, levels of surveillance, record-keeping,
denials of choices, deprivations and sanctions that will differentiate any prisoner from free
-T/-JTf:if
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I. Retribution and DeterrenceSRetributivist and deterrent theorists
intend to harm offenders, using a broad understanding of harm as anything
oNMWN M* r'T+*M'T /+ oNMWN 0TOr)M'TJl rQQTW)* /0T6* M0)T+T*)*f To realize their
penal aims they require punishment to be harmful. Retributivists generally
see this harm as an end in itself, as the intrinsic good of deserved suffering
or censure; though, Antony Duff, for one, sees retributive penal harm as
Nr'M0O M0*)+(1T0)rJ 'rJ(Th r* oTJJh M0*/Qr+ r* M) T0rqJT* )NT /QQT0UT+6*
reformation and social reintegration.260 Deterrence theorists, meanwhile, see
penal harm as a thoroughly instrumental good, as a tool for threatening
would-be future offenders. If punishment were not harmful, then it would
fail as a deterrent.
Therefore, when the state inflicts retributive or deterrent long-term
incarceration, it purposefully harms an offender in a manner that foreseeably
and severely risks ruining his life as a whole. It sees injuring him in this
manner as a reason for action. The conviction expressed by the state in this
W/0)Tm) M* WJTr+f ^) M* )NT )/+)(+T+6* W/0'MW)M/0? l/(+ T**T0)MrJJl N(1r0
capacity to build a good life does not matter. Such a punishment is
impermissibly degrading, and it has no place in a liberal society. Given that
a liberal society is committed to the inviolability of each individual, and
OM'T0 )Nr) TrWN M0UM'MU(rJ6* 'rJ(T M* O+/(0UTU /0 NM* JMQT-building capacity,
r JMqT+rJ *)r)T Wr00/) M0)T0)M/0rJJl +(M0 r0 /QQT0UT+6* JMQTh 0/+ Wr0 M)
intentionally create a severe risk of ruining his life, regardless of how heinous
his offense or how useful it might be to do so, just as it cannot sentence him
to penal torture.
Compare a 20-year retributive or deterrent sentence in even a mild
prison to 20 waterboarding sessions. They act in very different ways:
whereas torture is immediate and urgent, long-term incarceration is gradual
and subtle; torture explodes a person; long-term incarceration erodes a
person. In the end, though, the question is the same: To what degree does the
prrW)MWT M0)T+QT+T oM)N /+ *l1q/JMWrJJl UM*N/0/+ )NT /QQT0UT+6* Wr-rWM)l )/
exhibit and construct value? Long-term incarceration, by severely limiting
r0 /QQT0UT+6* rWWT** )/ WT+)rM0 r**/WMr)M/0rJ O//U*h oNMWN r+T Q(0Ur1T0)rJ )/
the pursuit of a good life as a whole, interferes with his value-generating
capacity in a direct and profoundly damaging manner. If torture removes
someone, entirely, from his diachronic process of value generation, long-
term incarceration acts to ensureSor at least to severely riskSthat this
process fails. "/)N o/+K )/ T+r*T /0T6* TmM*)T0WT r* r N(1r0h r* */1T/0T
who builds value through time.
260 See DUFF, supra note 18, at 88–98.
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II. IncapacitationSWhen the state acts for the sole reason of
incapacitation, it need not be motivated to harm the offender. It would prefer,
for instance, that the offender was somehow immediately rehabilitated and
then released upon his first day in prison. The costs of incarceration, in that
case, can be unintended side-TQQTW)* /Q )NT *)r)T6* rM1 /Q -+T'T0)M0O )NT
offender from committing very serious offenses. As such, long-term
incapacitation can be legitimate if, against odds, the state meets at least three
strict conditions. These conditions ensure that the state is not merely
throwing away the life of someone who is potentially dangerous out of
convenience, hatred, or fear.
First, the incarceration must be proportional to an established threat of
very serious future crime posed by the offender. This is, undoubtedly, an
enormous evidential question rife with the possibility of abuse with regard to
the presumption of innocence and the broader prohibition on merely
sacrificing individuals toward the greater good of crime prevention.261
Second, the state must provide the offender with significant rehabilitative and
therapeutic resources in a non-punitive facility. Third, the state must provide
the offender with regular opportunities to demonstrate his rehabilitation, with
the state bearing the burden on each occasion to prove that he is sufficiently
likely to commit very serious offenses in the future.262 The logic of long-
term incapacitatory incarceration depends upon the offender maintaining a
set of normative commitments that involves denying the authority of the law
and the rights of other people as an ongoing matter. Once that set of
commitments changes sufficiently, such that the evidential requirements for
incapacitation are not met, then at that moment further incarceration becomes
disproportional. #* #0U+To #*No/+)N r0U [(WMr vTU0T+ o+M)Th Pthe absence
of periodic review and impossibility of release suggests that the preventive
TJT1T0) M* *(q*MUMr+l )/ )NT -(0M)M'Tf:263
261 See PETERRAMSAY, THE INSECURITY STATE: VULNERABLEAUTONOMY AND THERIGHT
TO SECURITY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW (2012); BERNARD HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION:
PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN ANACTUARIALAGE (2007).
262 See Carol Steiker, Proportionality as a Limit on Preventive Justice: Promises and
Pitfalls, in PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 194, 198, 203-04 (Andrew
Ashworth, Lucia Zedner, & Patrick Tomlin eds., 2013); Rinat Kitai-Sangero, The Limits of
Preventive Detention, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. @cFh @GA jGcICif !rJMQ/+0Mr6* P;Tm(rJJl 4M/JT0)
=+TUr)/+: Jro +T,(M+T* r0 r--JMWr)M/0 Q/+ Tm)T0*M/0 T'T+l )o/ lTr+*h r) oNMWN -/M0) M) 1(*) qT
determined at trial beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender fulfils the criteria for
confinement. James Vess, Preventive Detention versus Civil Confinement: Alternative
Policies for Protection in New Zealand and California, 12 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 357,
360–62 (2005).
263 ANDREWASHWORTH&LUCIA ZEDNER, PREVENTIVE JUSTICE 156 (2014).
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^Q )NT*T W/0UM)M/0* N/JUh )NT0 ^ o/(JU 'T0)(+T )Nr) )NT /QQT0UT+6* J/0O-
term incarceration need not deny the existence or worth of his capacity to
build a good life. At no point would the state declare, as it does when it long-
)T+1 M0Wr+WT+r)T* Q/+ +Tr*/0* /Q +T)+Mq()M/0 r0U UT)T++T0WT? P`/ rorl Q+/1
Q+TT */WMT)l Q/+ Gc /+ Fc lTr+*f: ^) *rl*? P!/1T qrWK )/ W/(+) M0 C )/ IG
1/0)N*f: There is thus not the same process, or the same moment, of seeing
)NT /QQT0UT+6* JMQT r* r oN/JT r0U )NT0 UTWMUM0O )/ TQQTW)M'TJl T+r*T r Jr+OT
portion. Indeed, given the opportunities for rehabilitation and review, such
a sentence would only be potentially long-term.
There is much more to say. This was a mere introduction to the question
of what long-term incarceration is, and whether it is impermissibly
degrading. But, in sum, that the disrespect of torture is so extreme does not
mean that torture is qualitatively different than all other forms of aversive
treatment. It can serve as a guide to degradation, I have argued, and it can
provide us with the conceptual tools to move beyond retributive
proportionality and utilitarian efficiency when assessing the morality of
punishments.
CONCLUSION
This was not an attempt to provide a knock-down argument for the
existence of dispositive degradation limitations. Our understanding of the
grounds of deontology is too limited for that, and not just in the extra
complicated penal context, where we are dealing with culpable
individuals.264 We do not have anything close to a clean justification for even
the easiest cases for deontology, say, the idea that it is wrong to harvest the
/+Or0* /Q /0T M00/WT0) -T+*/0 )/ *r'T QM'T -T/-JT6* lives.265 As such, the
most honest thing to do might be to restate the conclusion in a conditional
manner. That is, we have been interested to discern the bases and contours
264 Even Rawls and Nozick do not attempt to ground or justify their deontological
commitments, and present them essentially as assumptions in the first few pages of their
seminal works. See RAWLS, supra note 160, at 3-E jPbrWN -T+*/0 -/**T**T* r0 M0'M/JrqMJM)l
Q/(0UTU /0 L(*)MWT )Nr) T'T0 )NT oTJQr+T /Q */WMT)l r* r oN/JT Wr00/) /'T++MUTf:i% NOZICK,
supra 0/)T IBh r) Mm jP^0UM'MU(rJ* Nr'T +MON)*h r0U )NT+T r+T )NM0O* 0/ -T+*/0 /+ 1rl U/ )/ )NT1
joM)N/() 'M/Jr)M0O )NTM+ +MON)*if:i% id. r) mM' jP9NM* q//K U/T* 0/) present a precise theory of
the moral basis of individual rights . . . :if
265 For attempts to ground deontological constraints, see, e.g., Frances Kamm,
Inviolability, 20 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 165 (1995); FRANCES KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS 227-
236 (2007); Thomas Nagel, The Value of Inviolability, inMORALITY ANDSELF-INTEREST (Paul
Bloomfield ed., 2007). For relevant discussion, see, e.g., John M. Taurek, Should the Numbers
Count? 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 293 (1977); Michael Otsuka, Saving Lives and the Claims of
Individuals, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 109 (2006), Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Kamm on
Inviolability and Agent-Relative Restriction, 15 RES PUBLICA 165 (2009).
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of degradation limitations, assuming they exist. Of course, such an
assumption is relatively uncontroversial. Most people have the strong
conviction not only that deontological limits exist with regard to innocent
people, but also that they generate dispositive degradation limitations with
regard to the culpable. Most people would oppose penal rape, I think, even
when proportional by reference to their favored positive theory of
punishment. MoreoverSas further evidence of the plausibility of
degradation limitationsSmany legal systems have incorporated such
limitations, as indicated above.266 We can restate our general conclusion,
then, as follows. Assuming that dispositive degradation limitations exist,
then following the inquiry into torture, we ought to understand the metric of
UTO+rUr)M/0 )/ qT UM*+T*-TW) Q/+ r -T+*/06* T**T0)MrJJl human capacity to
build a good life through time, with dispositive degradation limitations
emerging above a certain point on the spectrum of disrespect, above which
)NT -(0M*N1T0) T1q/UMT* r UT0MrJ /Q )NT /QQT0UT+6* *)r0UM0O r* r N(1r0 ql
demonstrating the absence or worthlessness of his life-building capacity.
266 See supra note 1.
